- within Employment and HR topic(s)
- in Turkey
Introduction
Labour law, in harmony with its historical development, is not merely a normative system but also a dynamic field of practice. In this context, judicial decisions do not merely apply existing norms to specific cases but also fulfil a role in developing and supplementing the law in areas that the legislator could not have foreseen or regulated. In 2025, within the context of Turkish labour law, it was not only the Constitutional Court decisions we previously discussed1 but also the Court of Cassation’s case law that, whilst fulfilling the aforementioned function, gave rise to significant debates. The decisions of the 9th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, particularly regarding the termination of employment contracts, mediation processes, declaratory actions and the calculation of employees’ claims, go beyond resolving specific disputes to highlight areas where existing norms fall short.
As in recent years, the decisions issued by the Court of Cassation in 2025 have served as an opportunity to re-examine the fundamental concepts of labour law within the context of contemporary employment relationships. The decisions discussed below have been selected from among those that reinterpret fundamental concepts such as the right to terminate, the right to unionise, paid leave, the right to rest, and overtime within the framework of current disputes. Furthermore, whilst examining the Court of Cassation’s decisions, reference has been made, where appropriate, to the rulings of supranational judicial bodies such as the Constitutional Court, the European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the European Union, with regard to the impact of fundamental rights on employment relationships.
1. Freedom of Expression, Trade Union Activities and the Employer’s Right to Terminate
Court of Cassation, 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2025/9059, Decision No. 2025/10261, 23 December 2025
In the present case, the claimant’s employment contract was terminated by the employer on just cause pursuant to Article 25(II) of the Labour Code No. 4857, due to statements made by the claimant on social media directed at the president of the trade union of which he was a member. The Court of First Instance concluded that the employee was entitled to severance pay and notice pay on the grounds that the statements in question could not be classified as just cause for termination, as these are limited by law; in contrast, the Regional Court of Appeal deemed the termination justified, assessing the employee’s conduct as a breach of the duty of loyalty. The 9th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, however, held that the employee’s remarks directed at the trade union president did not amount to a breach of the employee’s duties of honesty and loyalty, and that there was no concrete evidence to demonstrate that this conduct had disrupted workplace harmony or negatively affected the collective bargaining process, and consequently overturned the Regional Court of Appeal’s decision, concluding that the dismissal was not based on just cause.
The Court of Cassation decision dated 23 December 2025 draws an important boundary, primarily regarding the protection of the employee’s private life. This is because the incident occurred outside the workplace and on social media, and the employee’s conduct was not directly linked to the performance of their duties. The Court of Cassation’s approach establishes that an employee’s conduct outside the workplace does not automatically extend to the employment relationship; such conduct may only be considered grounds for termination if it has a concrete and serious impact on the employment relationship. Against this background, the decision reflects an approach that acknowledges the need to protect the employee’s private life from employer interference, and that such interference must be based on a proportionate ground linked to the requirements of the employment relationship.
The decision outlined above also contains noteworthy assessments regarding freedom of expression. In the decision, whilst the expressions used by the claimant employee were of a harsh and rude nature, the fact that these expressions were directed not at the employer but at the president of the trade union of which the employee was a member, and that they arose within a trade union context, proved decisive. The Court of Cassation established that such expressions cannot automatically be regarded as grounds for just cause for dismissal, thereby indicating that assessments made within a trade union context must be considered within a broader scope of freedom of expression. This approach is consistent with the principle of protecting trade union freedom of expression, as guaranteed by ILO Convention No. 87 on Freedom of Association and Protection of the Right to Organise and Convention No. 98 on the Right to Organise and Collective Bargaining; and also aligns with the principle set out in Article 51(5) of the Constitution that the management and operation of trade unions must be in accordance with democratic principles. Furthermore, the decision implicitly indicates that freedom of expression is not absolute, and that this freedom may be restricted where it conflicts with the requirements of the employment relationship. In this respect, the decision brings to mind the ECtHR’s judgment in Palomo Sanchez and Others v. Spain (Grand Chamber, 12 September 2011). For in that judgment, the ECHR found that derogatory and insulting statements made by employees in a trade union context fell outside the scope of the protection of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR.
In the judgment under review, the employer’s claims that workplace harmony had been disrupted or the company’s reputation damaged were deemed insufficient as they remained abstract in nature; it was accepted that such claims must be supported by concrete facts linked to the specific case and capable of being proven. Indeed, the Court of Cassation concluded that the termination was not based on just cause, noting that the adverse effects alleged by the employer could not be established within the scope of the case file. This conclusion is also consistent with the established proportionality test applied by the Constitutional Court in its decisions on individual applications where the employer’s right to terminate conflicts with the employee’s fundamental rights. The Constitutional Court examines whether the termination is based on a legitimate aim, whether it is suitable for achieving that aim, whether it is necessary, and finally, whether it is proportionate. The Court of Cassation’s decision under review is also consistent, in its fundamental premises, with the Constitutional Court’s 2025 rulings regarding the employee’s freedom of expression and the employer’s right to terminate employment, which held that the employer’s right to terminate employment constitutes an interference with the employee’s private life that is lawful provided it is proportionate2 .
2. The Right to Rest, Annual Leave Pay and the Employee’s Right to Terminate the Contract
Court of Cassation, 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2025/2024, Decision No. 2025/2487, 10 March 2025
The decision of the 9th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation dated 10 March 2025, concerning the timing of payment of annual leave pay and the employee’s right to terminate the contract for just cause, has been one of the most debated decisions on the Turkish labour law agenda in 2025. The dispute at the heart of the decision concerned the resolution of a divergence in case law regarding whether an employer’s failure to comply with the obligation under Article 57(1) of the Labour Code No. 4857 to pay the employee the remuneration for the annual paid leave period in advance or as an advance payment prior to the commencement of the leave constituted just cause for termination from the employee’s perspective.
In specific cases, employees have terminated their employment contracts due to the non-payment of leave pay prior to taking annual leave and have claimed severance pay. Among the differing approaches adopted by the Regional Courts of Appeal, in one instance this situation was accepted as a just cause for termination, whilst in another, it was concluded that the conditions for valid termination had not been met on the grounds that the employee had not additionally made a claim for payment.
In resolving the dispute, the Court of Cassation based its decision on the mandatory nature of Article 57 of Law No. 4857 and clearly established that the employer’s obligation to pay annual leave pay prior to the leave is absolute, and that the employee is not required to make a separate request for this obligation to be fulfilled. Moreover, it was concluded that failure to pay the annual leave pay before the leave commences constitutes a failure to pay the employee’s wages in accordance with the law and therefore constitutes just cause for termination under the provisions of Article 24/II of the Labour Code.
The Court of Cassation’s decision in question is also consistent with the content of the right to rest guaranteed under Article 50 of the Constitution. This is because the effective exercise of the right to rest—which is a right aimed at the physical and mental renewal of the employee—depends on the employee being free from financial concerns during the leave period. It is precisely for this reason that Article 50(4) of the Constitution provides for the right to ‘paid’ annual leave. The requirement that annual leave pay be paid before the leave is taken also serves the same constitutional purpose. Moreover, this guarantee is reflected not only at the national level but also in international legal instruments. Although not ratified by Turkey, Article 7 of the ILO’s No. 132 Convention concerning Paid Annual Holidays (1970)—a fundamental international text on the right to paid annual leave—also provides that the pay for the holiday period must be paid no later than before the holiday begins. Consequently, the Court of Cassation’s interpretation of the breach of this obligation as a direct failure to pay wages, thereby constituting a just cause for termination, is an appropriate interpretation aimed at ensuring that the right to rest is not merely a right on paper but is effectively protected.
3. Overtime, Contract Records and Digital Evidence
Court of Cassation, 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2025/620, Decision No. 2025/4696, 22 May 2025
The dispute concerning the Court of Cassation 9th Civil Chamber’s decision dated 22 May 2025 is worthy of examination regarding the use of workplace records and technical data in proving claims for overtime pay. In the specific case, although the employment contract stipulated that overtime pay was included in the basic wage, the Court of Cassation acknowledged that such records do not have an absolute binding effect and draws particular attention to the annual limit of 270 hours. The decision states that, this limit must be assessed not in an absolute manner, but “based on weekly and monthly averages”. Accordingly, the decision is consistent with previous Court of Cassation case law3 . However, whilst this will not be discussed here, it should be noted that valid objections have been raised in Turkish labour law doctrine regarding the validity of such provisions4 .
In the ruling handed down by the Court of Cassation, the role of electronic data held at the workplace—or which employers are legally required to hold—in proving overtime is also a matter of debate. From this perspective, it should first be noted that, pursuant to Article 9 of the Regulation on Working Hours under the Labour Code, employers are obliged to document employees’ working hours using appropriate means. It is understood from the ruling that, in the dispute, only the working hours calculated by examining the records of entry and exit from the workplace were taken into account for the purposes of proving overtime. However, the claimant, who lodged the appeal, argued that the claimant was a computer engineer, capable of working remotely as well as by physically attending the workplace, and that on certain days of the week the claimant worked remotely; that the Regulation on Banks’ Information Systems and Electronic Banking Services stipulates that access logs must be retained by the Bank for a minimum of five years; that the records of the claimant’s remote work were still stored in the Bank’s system and can therefore be easily identified, and that the periods during which the claimant worked both remotely and in the office should be calculated together, with overtime determined accordingly. The Court of Cassation did not take the grounds for appeal mentioned into account and dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the proceedings had been conducted in accordance with the rules of procedure and evidence. Consequently, it was not deemed necessary to examine the electronic records (log records, system access data, etc.) that, under banking legislation, the employee was required to maintain officially at the workplace, despite the employee’s claim of remote work.
It is worth discussing the fact that, despite the employee’s claim of remote work, the examination of the electronic records (log records, system access data, etc.) purportedly held by the employer was not deemed necessary, and a conclusion was reached solely on the basis of entry and exit records at the workplace. This is because the approach taken in the ruling requires a critical assessment within the context of the deepening ‘information asymmetry’ between employees and employers in today’s employment relationships. With digitalisation, a significant portion of the act of work is now carried out via electronic systems under the employer’s control; conversely, the employee does not have direct access to this data. Particularly in remote working models, proving the employee’s actual working hours through witness statements has become significantly more difficult, whilst detailed log and access records are now maintained in the employer’s systems. The information asymmetry between the parties creates a de facto situation that could be described as an asymmetry in access to evidence. This situation, in turn, leads to the principle of ‘the burden of proof lies with the claimant’ (Actori incumbit probatio) in classical evidence law taking on a structure that effectively results in outcomes detrimental to the employee.
In its rulings, particularly in recent years, the Constitutional Court has explicitly taken into account the asymmetry of information and evidence between the employee and the employer5 and has emphasised the impact of this situation on the right to a fair trial. The Court acknowledges that where evidence in the employer’s possession is not introduced into the proceedings or access to such evidence is not granted, the burden of proof on the employee is effectively increased, and this may constitute a violation of the right to a fair trial in connection with the right to a reasoned decision. From this perspective, the failure to investigate or assess technical data that could support the employee’s claims is not merely a matter of evidential assessment, but also an issue that must be evaluated within the framework of constitutional safeguards.
Viewed in the light of the principles outlined above, the Court of Cassation decision under review, by failing to adopt an active approach towards investigating digital records under the employer’s control, does not fully align with the rights-based approach to proof developed by the Constitutional Court. In particular, despite the claimant explicitly pointing to the existence of electronic records that are required to be kept under banking legislation and stored for specific periods, the fact that the examination of these records was not deemed necessary gives the impression that the worker’s means of proof were not sufficiently taken into account.
The deepening information asymmetry between the employee and the employer, resulting from the employer’s control over data relating to working conditions—particularly working hours—and the increasing difficulty for the employee to prove working conditions, is also reflected in the European Court of Justice’s rulings on the recording of working hours (in particular Case C-55/18). Court rulings have clearly established that employers are under an obligation to record employees’ daily working hours using an objective, reliable and accessible system. This obligation is significant not only from the perspective of health and safety at work, but also in enabling employees to effectively claim their overtime pay. This approach adopted under European Union law also serves as a guide for Turkish labour law6 .
The Court of Cassation’s decision of 22 May 2025, whilst demonstrating its continued adherence to traditional rules of evidence, can be criticised for failing to adequately adapt to the new structure of evidence created by digitalisation and the resulting issues of proof. When the case law of the Constitutional Court and developments in European Union law are considered together, it becomes evident that, particularly in labour disputes, an approach should be adopted whereby a more active role is assigned to the examination of digital data under the employer’s control, thereby effectively alleviating the employee’s burden of proof; this is a requirement of the right to a fair trial.
4. Data Protection, the Right to a Fair Trial and the Burden of Proof
Court of Cassation 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2024/15063, Decision No. 2025/823, Date: 23 January 2025
In another specific dispute subject to a Court of Cassation decision in 2025, the interests of the parties regarding the protection of personal data and the right to a fair trial came into conflict. In the case brought against the Ministry’s determination that the trade union was authorised to conclude a collective agreement, the Supreme Court examined the presentation of the union’s membership records in encrypted form—on which the court’s decision was based—in terms of the right to a fair trial and, in particular, the burden of proof. The Court of First Instance and the Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the case, accepting that the union had secured the necessary majority; however, the Court of Cassation quashed the decision, characterising the failure to provide the parties with access to the number of workers and union membership information—which formed the basis for resolving the dispute—as “inadequate examination”.
At the heart of the Court of Cassation’s decision dated 23 January 2025 lies the right to be heard, which is an element of the right to a fair trial, and the burden of proof, which is an inseparable part of this right. As clearly emphasised in the decision, the failure to grant the parties access to the information and documents relevant to the proceedings constitutes not merely a procedural formality, but directly amounts to the elimination of the possibilities for defence and proof. Furthermore, the Court of Cassation, recalling that proceedings, documents and information of which a party is unaware cannot form the basis of a trial, stated that, in particular, the failure to make trade union membership records available for the parties’ inspection constitutes a violation of the principle of equality of arms. Moreover, the approach adopted by the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) in its judgment in Regner v. the Czech Republic (Grand Chamber, 19 September 2017) should also be noted. In the aforementioned judgment, the ECHR established that, where documents of a confidential nature are used in proceedings, the restrictions necessitated by confidentiality must be balanced by sufficient compensatory safeguards within the overall context of the proceedings in order to safeguard the principle of equality of arms. In the decision under review, the Court of Cassation also took into account a similar need for balance and concluded that the reliance on data withheld from the parties would be incompatible with the right to a fair trial.
The trade union membership information at issue in the dispute covered by this decision constitutes “sensitive personal data” pursuant to Article 6(1) of the Personal Data Protection Law No. 6698. Article 6(3) of the Law on the Protection of Personal Data stipulates that the processing of special category personal data is, as a rule, prohibited. However, the aforementioned provision provides for certain exceptions. The Court of Cassation, in its ruling, stated that the processing of special category personal data is permissible provided that it is expressly provided for by law and is necessary to the extent required by the proceedings. Based on this principle, the ruling concluded that the submission of trade union membership information to the case file within the scope of the proceedings would not constitute a breach of Article 6 of Law No. 6698.
The approach adopted by the Court of Cassation in its decision dated 23 January 2025 is consistent with the principle of ‘being relevant to the purpose, limited and proportionate’ set out in Article 4 of Law No. 6698 regarding the lawful processing of personal data. The administration of justice constitutes a legitimate legal basis for the processing of personal data; as stated in the decision, an exception for judicial activities is provided for under Article 28 of Law No. 6698. In particular, the exception for judicial activities set out in Article 28(1)(c) of Law No. 6698 should be interpreted not as an unlimited exemption, but as an exception subject to the condition of proportionality. Indeed, the Constitutional Court has emphasised in a decision issued within the scope of normative review that interventions in the right to the protection of personal data can only be deemed legitimate if they are in accordance with the requirements of a democratic social order and are proportionate7 . Within this framework, the processing of personal data necessary for the court to resolve the dispute, limited to the scope of the dispute, does not constitute a breach of the law.
The Court of Cassation’s assessment of the matter is also consistent with international sources and European Union data protection legislation. The classification of trade union membership as a special category of personal data is a requirement of the freedom of association protected under ILO conventions and Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Furthermore, under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), trade union membership is also recognised as ‘special category data’ and its processing is generally prohibited. However, pursuant to Article 9(2)(f) of the GDPR, the processing of such data is permitted where it is necessary for the establishment, exercise or defence of legal claims. In this respect, the Court of Cassation’s approach, which deems the processing of data to the extent required by the proceedings to be lawful, is consistent with the exception regime under the GDPR.
5. The Freedom to Seek Remedies, Declaratory Actions and the Extension of the Concept of Legal Interest
Court of Cassation, 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2025/2882, Decision No. 2025/5087, 16 June 2025
In Turkish law, the concept of legal interest has long been interpreted narrowly in the context of declaratory actions; it has been almost universally accepted that a declaratory action cannot be brought where an action for performance is available. Article 106 of the Code of Civil Procedure No. 6100 requires the existence of the plaintiff’s “legal interest” as a condition for bringing a declaratory action; in legal doctrine, this condition is defined as the plaintiff’s legal position being under an existing and serious threat, and this threat being of a nature that can be remedied by a declaratory judgment8 . In the Court of Cassation’s decision dated 16 June 2025, the discussion essentially centred on how the concept of legal interest should be interpreted in disputes arising from employment relationships.
In the present case, the employee brought an action seeking the rectification of the termination code (Code 46) reported by the employer (which refers to conduct by the employee that breaches the principles of honesty and loyalty, such as abusing the employer’s trust, committing theft, or disclosing the employer’s trade secrets); The Court of First Instance, however, dismissed the case on the grounds that there was no legal interest, acting in accordance with the aforementioned standard practice. In its judgment, the Court of First Instance stated that the mere establishment of factual circumstances could not constitute the subject matter of a declaratory action, noting that the claimant had previously filed a claim for notice pay, which was dismissed on the grounds that the defendant had terminated the employment contract for just cause, and that this ground was consistent with the termination code; consequently, it was concluded that there was no current legal interest in bringing a declaratory action. Although the claimant lodged an appeal, the Regional Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal on the grounds that the decision of the Court of First Instance was in accordance with the law.
The 9th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation, which examined the dispute during the appeal process, stated that, first and foremost, that for a declaratory action to be heard, the claimant must have a current legal interest worthy of protection, and that where it is possible to bring an action for performance, there is no legal interest in bringing a declaratory action. Following this reiteration of the general rule, and noting that the claim for notice pay had become final at the time the action was brought, the Chamber concluded that the claimant had a current legal interest in bringing the action seeking a determination that the termination code should be corrected. Upon examination of the decision, it is understood that the view was reached that, even if the employee’s employment contract was terminated by the employer for just cause and even if this fact was established by a court decision, since the Social Security Institution’s (SGK) exit codes provide for different grounds for termination, the employee has a legal interest in requesting that the correct code, reflecting the reason for termination, appear in the official records. It is undoubtedly appropriate that the Court of Cassation ruled that the exit code should not be interpreted narrowly, limited solely to material matters such as wage claims or entitlement to unemployment benefit, but should be interpreted broadly, taking into account its direct impact on the process of finding new employment and on personal and professional reputation. The decision discussed above demonstrates that, in labour litigation, a declaratory action is not merely a technical legal instrument but a functional mechanism designed to protect the employee’s current and concrete interests.
Indeed, in a ruling issued in 2024 9, the Council of State emphasised that termination codes constitute personal data and that the fact that this information is easily accessible to third parties contravenes the principle of proportionality. It stated that, as in the ruling discussed above, codes containing references to ‘breaches of morality and good faith’ in particular could have serious consequences for an individual’s professional reputation. In 2026, amendments were made to secondary legislation in line with the Council of State’s approach; whilst termination codes continued to exist, they were no longer displayed on standard SGK service records. With these amendments, although potential employers or third parties are no longer able to access this information easily, it is clear that employees have an interest in the correction of termination codes incorrectly reported by the employer, particularly those that infringe upon the employee’s personal rights (Turkish Civil Code, Articles 24–25). Consequently, the decision of the 9th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation retains its significance despite the regulatory changes.
6. Alternative Dispute Resolution in Employment Relations, Mediation and Abuse
Court of Cassation, 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2025/2403, Decision No. 2025/5338, 23 June 2025
Mediation, established as a prerequisite for litigation, is one of the institutions that has significantly influenced the practice of Turkish labour law on the one hand, whilst being subject to intense criticism in recent times on the other. It is frequently argued that this institution, introduced to enable workers to access their rights easily and swiftly, has resulted in substantial loss of rights for workers due to the limited judicial oversight. The legitimacy of the restriction imposed by mandatory mediation on the freedom to seek redress, guaranteed under Article 36 of the Constitution, is frequently reviewed by the Constitutional Court within the framework of the principle of proportionality10 . During its constitutional review, the Constitutional Court examines whether the restriction imposed on the freedom to seek redress is based on a legitimate aim, is suitable and necessary to achieve that aim, and, ultimately, does not infringe upon the very essence of the freedom to seek redress.
Within the framework outlined above, the Court of Cassation’s decision of 24 April 2025 also relates to a dispute in which the institution of mediation was misused with the aim of restricting employees’ rights to bring legal proceedings. In the case in question, the claimant worked as a business development specialist at the defendant company under an open-ended employment contract from 11 November 2019 to 11 March 2023; the employment contract was terminated by the defendant on 11 March 2023. The claimant alleged that, immediately following the termination, the defendant employer had initiated voluntary mediation on 13 March 2023 with the aim of creating a bar to bringing legal proceedings; that the mediation proceedings were conducted in breach of procedure; and that her will had been vitiated. He therefore sought the annulment of the mediation agreement and reinstatement to his post. The Regional Court of Appeal noted that the claimant was on maternity leave at that time, that the notice of resignation was submitted to the Social Security Institution (SGK) on 13 March 2023, the date of the mediation, and that the employer had initiated mediation before any dispute had arisen between the parties, thereby concluding that the claimant’s will had been vitiated and declaring the mediation record invalid. The fundamental legal issue before the Court of Cassation, however, concerns whether the voluntary mediation agreement document constitutes a valid agreement document under Article 18(5) of Law No. 6325. The 9th Civil Chamber of the Court of Cassation found the Regional Court of Appeal’s decision to be in accordance with procedure and the law, dismissed the defendant’s appeal, and upheld the decision by a majority vote.
In this decision, as in some of its previous rulings 11, the Court of Cassation proceeded on the principle that the purpose of mediation is to resolve existing disputes through negotiation; and that practices contrary to this are inconsistent with both the principles of labour law and the freedom to seek justice. In cases such as the present one, where a mediation agreement entered into with an employee is not aimed at resolving a genuine dispute but rather at depriving the employee of their freedom to seek redress in the future, Court of Cassation, adopting a sound approach, does not attribute any legal validity to such mediation agreements.
Footnotes
1. For an analysis of significant decisions handed down by the Constitutional Court in 2025 that directly concern Turkish labour relations, see Baysal, Ulaş/Astarlı Muhittin: Turkish Labour Law in 2025 (1): Five (+1) Constitutional Court Decisions on Labour Relations: https://www.mondaq.com/turkey/employee-rights-labour-relations/1742070/2025te-t%C3%BCrk-%C4%B0%C5%9F-hukuku-1-%C3%87al%C4%B1%C5%9Fma-%C4%B0li%C5%9Fkilerine-dair-be%C5%9F-%2B1-anayasa-mahkemesi-karar%C4%B1
2. See, for example, AYM Erdem Kaplan and Others (2019/34183, 29 April 2025)
3. For several of these decisions stating that the inclusion of overtime pay within the basic wage is valid only up to a limit of 270 hours per year, 22.5 hours per month and 5.2 hours per week, see Court of Cassation 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2017/19084, Decision No. 2020/13601, Date: 27 October 2020; Supreme Court of Appeals 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2016/22595, Decision No. 2019/9249, Date: 22 April 2019; Supreme Court of Appeals 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2011/12175, Decision No. 2013/17024, Date: 4 June 2013. 6
4. Mustafa Alp, The Validity and Scrutiny of Contractual Provisions Including Overtime in Wages, Labour and Society, Vol. 68, pp. 11–43, 2021.
5. Constitutional Court Cafer Oruç (2021/3130, 4 February 2025)
6. For further details on this subject, see Uçar, Ali/Astarlı, Muhittin: Recent Developments in European Union Law and German Law Regarding the Employer’s Obligation to Record Working Hours, Work and Society, Vol. 3, No. 86, p. 1116 ff.
7. Constitutional Court, E.2014/87, K.2015/112, 8 December 2015
8. Supreme Court of Appeals, General Assembly of Civil Chambers, Case No. 2015/21-3366, Decision No. 2019/987, Date: 1 October 2019.
9. Council of State 10th Chamber, Case No. 2020/2598, Decision No. 2024/3991, Date: 14 October 2024
10. Constitutional Court: Yaşar Çıkrıkcı (2020/36673, 17 July 2024); Constitutional Court: Gönül Aydan (2020/39775, 28 November 2024).
11. See, for example, Court of Cassation 9th Civil Chamber, Case No. 2024/6910, Decision No. 2024/8857, Date: 22 May 2024.
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