No Place Like Home: BC Court Of Appeal Finds Remote Work Arrangement An Enforceable Employment Term

In Cressey Construction Corporation v Parolin,¹ the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered when a remote work arrangement adopted during the COVID-19 pandemic — but never reduced to writing — becomes a contractual entitlement that an employer cannot unilaterally revoke. The Court upheld a finding of constructive dismissal against a Vancouver-based real estate development and construction company, but the decision rests on a distinctive constellation of facts that meaningfully constrains its application to other remote work arrangements.

Remote Work Arrangement Grounds Constructive Dismissal Claim

Tracy Parolin worked for Cressey Construction Corporation (“Cressey”) for 18 years, most recently as Director of Marketing. Following the birth of twins in 2012, one of whom had significant health issues, Ms. Parolin returned to work on a reduced, flexible schedule with her employer’s approval. When the COVID-19 pandemic began in 2020, she transitioned to remote work and remained at home after colleagues returned to the office, with the approval of successive supervisors who understood her childcare needs. Ms. Parolin first received approval to continue working from home from her then-supervisor, the Vice President of Development. After his departure in 2021, she sought and received re-confirmation from Cressey’s Executive Vice President, who told her the arrangement could continue “as long as the job was getting done” and personally assisted in setting up her home office.

On May 10, 2023, Ms. Parolin met with a new supervisor to discuss the salary increase she had been seeking since her 2018 promotion. She was offered an increase she viewed as inadequate and was told her role was more comparable to a Marketing Manager than a Director of Marketing. Ms. Parolin’s supervisor also directed her to return to the office full-time, Monday to Friday from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m. As a result, Ms. Parolin considered herself constructively dismissed and worked her last day on May 17, 2023.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision on Constructive Dismissal

The trial judge found Ms. Parolin’s work-from-home arrangement to be an enforceable oral term of her employment contract, supported by years of approval and support by her employer. The Court of Appeal affirmed, characterizing the work-from-home arrangement as an express (not implied) oral term of the contract. The arrangement was the product of a specific request, an explicit verbal agreement, and three years of consistent performance. The Court further confirmed that an oral modification supported by long-standing reliance and consistent conduct does not require fresh consideration to bind the employer. Employers cannot rely on the absence of a formal written amendment to argue that an informal accommodation carries no binding force.

On appeal, Cressey argued that a finding of constructive dismissal required both a breach of an essential term and a demotion. The Court of Appeal rejected this submission. Applying the first branch of the framework from Potter v New Brunswick Legal Aid Services Commission (“Potter”)^2, the Court held that a unilateral and substantial change to a single essential term of an employment contract is independently sufficient to ground constructive dismissal. Cressey’s return-to-office directive, issued without notice or discussion, was precisely such a change: Ms. Parolin had relied on the work-from-home arrangement for three years to manage her childcare responsibilities, and a reasonable person in her position would objectively have experienced the sudden change as a substantial alteration to the essential terms of her contract. The Court observed that the trial judge appears to have considered whether the broader course of conduct surrounding Ms. Parolin’s salary requests could separately have grounded constructive dismissal under the second branch of Potter, but expressly declined to resolve that question given its conclusion on the first branch.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision on Mitigation

Cressey argued that Ms. Parolin had failed to mitigate by not seeking comparable employment, having instead pursued a series of business ventures that had not generated revenue by the time of trial. Following her departure, Ms. Parolin pursued three successive business ventures: a residential real estate development company that drew directly on her industry experience; an AI-based interior design product that was later paused; and a digital safety education platform for young people.

The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. Under Forshaw v Aluminex Extrusions Ltd.,³ the duty to mitigate requires an employee to take such steps as a reasonable person in their position would take in their own interests, not in the interests of their former employer. Starting a business is a recognized form of mitigation, and the Court rejected Cressey’s argument that a dismissed employee must first seek employment before any entrepreneurial efforts will count toward mitigation. The Court clarified that there is no such general rule: the inquiry is always fact-specific, and there may be more than one reasonable course of action open to a dismissed employee. Further, the onus of proving failure to mitigate rests on the employer. Cressey failed to discharge that onus on two grounds: Ms. Parolin’s ventures drew on her extensive industry experience and were pursued with genuine diligence, and the job postings Cressey relied upon required primarily in-office work, terms incompatible with the very arrangement whose breach had caused her dismissal. The Court upheld the trial judge’s award of 19 months’ pay in lieu of notice, which was based on Ms. Parolin’s age, her 18-year length of employment, and her director-level role.

Distinguishing Parolin: The Limits of the Decision

The Court’s reasoning is closely tied to an uncommon constellation of facts. Ms. Parolin’s work-from-home arrangement was the subject of express verbal agreement with two successive senior leaders, actively supported by the employer (including the Executive Vice President’s personal assistance in setting up her home office), and consistently honoured across multiple reporting lines for three years following the initial pandemic transition. The return-to-office directive was then delivered abruptly, without prior consultation, and in the context of a contentious compensation discussion in which her role was simultaneously being downgraded in characterization.

The Court did not hold that pandemic-era remote work arrangements are presumptively contractual, nor that every employee who has worked from home since 2020 has acquired an enforceable right to do so. The Court was careful to confine its reasoning to an express oral term, expressly declining to address the broader “flexibility” issue raised by the trial judge’s reasons. What matters is the totality of the employer’s conduct over time. An arrangement that was clearly communicated as temporary, that was the subject of periodic written confirmations of its discretionary nature, or that was not actively endorsed by senior leadership will not necessarily produce the same result.

Key Takeaways for Employers

• Course of Conduct, Not Mere Practice, Drives the Result. A remote work arrangement does not become a contractual entitlement simply because an employee has worked from home for an extended period. It is the combination of express verbal agreement, active employer support, consistent treatment across time and supervisors, and the absence of any written reservation that distinguishes a binding term from a discretionary accommodation. The fact that Ms. Parolin’s arrangement was re-confirmed by successive senior leaders weighed against any characterization of it as a one-off accommodation. Employers who extended remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic and wish to revisit those arrangements should communicate their expectations clearly and document the temporary or discretionary nature of the arrangement in writing, rather than relying on an unspoken assumption that the arrangement was always meant to be temporary.
• Return-to-Office Mandates Must Be Implemented with Reasonable Notice. The Court of Appeal held that Cressey’s unilateral, immediate return-to-office directive, delivered without prior discussion or reasonable notice, was sufficient to constitute constructive dismissal. Employers contemplating a return-to-office policy, particularly for employees with long-standing remote work arrangements, should provide meaningful advance notice and engage in substantive dialogue with affected employees before implementing any such change. The length of notice required will generally track common law notice principles applicable to fundamental contractual changes.
• Documentation Remains the Employer’s Most Effective Tool. Parolin is, in part, a cautionary tale about the absence of any written confirmation that pandemic-era arrangements were intended to be temporary. An employer who had documented in 2020 or 2021 that remote work was a temporary accommodation subject to revocation, or who had periodically reconfirmed the discretionary nature of the arrangement, would be in a materially different position. Going forward, employers should ensure that any flexible work arrangement is captured in writing, with clear language preserving the employer’s right to require attendance at the workplace on reasonable notice.

Conclusion

Parolin is a reminder that verbal arrangements expressly agreed at the senior level and consistently honoured over time can be as binding as written ones. Employers who want to preserve their discretion should ensure any flexibility extended is documented as temporary or discretionary at the outset, and that reasonable notice and meaningful dialogue precede any material change.

Footnotes

1. 2026 BCCA 199.

2. 2015 SCC 10.

3. 39 BCLR (2d) 140, 1989 CanLII 234 (C.A.).

The foregoing provides only an overview and does not constitute legal advice. Readers are cautioned against making any decisions based on this material alone. Rather, specific legal advice should be obtained.

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