Removal Of Protectors: Parking The 'Narrow Versus Wider Role' Debate Over Protectors' Powers

Summary

Protectors are persons, or a group of persons, who are given certain powers under a trust deed in trust structures. These fiduciaries often act as a brake on the power of trustees to exercise certain powers.

Court decisions regarding the scope of a protector's role have been a recurring feature of this blog (see our previous posts here and here), and we have recently written about the Privy Council's significant decision on this topic in A and Ors (Appellants) v C and others (Respondents) [2026] UKPC 11 (see here). Whilst this big-picture issue has been the focus of commentary in recent years, there have of course also been cases dealing with other aspects of the protector function.

In In the Matter of the Billevese Trust [2025] GRC060, the Royal Court of Guernsey considered an application from the sole discretionary beneficiary and life tenant of a trust¹ to remove certain protectors following an alleged breakdown in relations.

In granting the application to remove the protectors, the Court demonstrated its willingness to intervene in situations where the ability of fiduciaries to comply with their duties is in question.

Background

Billevese Trust concerned a trust which had been settled by the Applicant's grandmother. The Trust Deed provided for a single Trustee and two classes of protectors, Class A and Class B. All the protectors together comprised a "Board of Protectors", with the main difference between the classes being the way in which they were appointed and removed. Notably, the Applicant did not have the power to remove a Class A Protector.

Following the Settlor's death, the Trustee instructed a financial planner to undertake a comprehensive review of the management of the Trust assets. The financial planner proposed several changes, including replacing the Trust's investment managers. The Class A Protectors opposed these changes, which the Applicant alleged was in part because of the Class A Protectors' financial interests in the existing investment managers of the Trust (thereby creating a conflict). Following this, the Applicant requested that the Class A Protectors step down and appoint a replacement selected by her and the Trustee.

The Class A Protectors rejected this request, stating that this would not be in the interests of the discretionary beneficiaries² or of the administration of the trust, and that they were not obliged to "simply do what they are told". In turn, the Applicant and the Trustee believed that the Class A Protectors were unreasonably obstructing the changes proposed by the Trustee, arguing that they had a "vested interest in maintaining the status quo" and had "abused their position" to protect their personal financial interests.

Relations between the Applicant beneficiary and the Trustee (on the one hand) and the Class A Protectors (on the other hand) deteriorated to such an extent that the former alleged a complete breakdown of trust and confidence, and accused the latter of refusing to attend a meeting aimed at resolving the issues between them unless certain assets remained with the existing investment managers.

In assessing the application, the Court considered that the key question was whether the Class A Protectors continuing in their role would prevent the proper administration of the Trust for the benefit of the beneficiaries.

The Court concluded that there were grounds to show a "clear and irretrievable breakdown" in the relationship between the Class A Protectors and the Applicant, which was detrimental to the Trust's proper execution. This itself would have been sufficient to justify an order for removal of the Class A Protectors. However, the Court also concluded that, given her position as the sole discretionary beneficiary, this was a trust for the benefit of the Applicant, and the Class A Protectors had failed to recognise the negative impact of their actions on her. The Court further found there to have been an un-managed conflict of interest, caused by one of the Class A Protectors' financial interest in the trust's investment manager.

Analysis

In granting the application, the Court reaffirmed its inherent jurisdiction to remove a protector as set out in In the matter of the K Trust 31/2015, explaining that the general principle guiding the Court when exercising the power was "the welfare of the beneficiaries and the competent administration of the Trust in their favour".

The Court confirmed that there was no need for there to have been misconduct on the part of the protectors for it to order their removal: "it is not necessary for there to be positive misconduct by a fiduciary nor will every mistake or neglect of duty or inaccuracy of conduct mean that a fiduciary will be removed … The threshold to remove a fiduciary is not exceptional circumstances but rather a jurisdiction not to be exercised lightly and with required caution".

Having predated the Privy Council's decision in A v C (see above), the judgment briefly commented on the debate regarding the scope of a protector's role. In Billevese Trust, the Class A Protectors argued that to decide the application, it was necessary for the Court to set out whether it accepts the "narrower" or "wider" view of the role of a protector.

The Court did not agree, taking the view that the issue at the heart of the application was whether a breakdown in relations had led to a detrimental effect on the administration of the Trust. It therefore declined to comment on which position the Guernsey Courts should take on the role of protectors.

Conclusion

This case reaffirms the Court's willingness to safeguard the proper administration of trusts by removing fiduciaries whose continuation in office has become detrimental – even absent proven misconduct. The judgment underscores enduring themes: beneficiary welfare is paramount; fiduciary duties require loyalty, transparency and constructive engagement; and unmanaged conflicts – personal, commercial or familial – will weigh heavily against continuation in office.

For trustees and protectors alike, the practical takeaways include:

1. recognise and manage conflicts early;
2. separate technical advisory roles from fiduciary decision‑making;
3. avoid imposing pre‑conditions on attempts to resolve disputes which entrench positions or create deadlock;
4. communicate directly and promptly without unnecessary intermediaries; and
5. document decisions with a clear focus on the beneficiary’s best interests.

Footnotes

1 The judgment records that the Applicant was the sole discretionary beneficiary as she did not have children or remoter issue, and that – upon the Applicant's death – unless she had children, the trust would pass in accordance with a power of appointment which had been exercised by the Applicant.

2 Whilst the judgment does not elaborate on the Class A Protectors' position in this regard, we understand this to be a reference to a class of theoretical discretionary beneficiaries (i.e. the Applicant's children and remoter issue, were they to be born).

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.