Termination For Non-Payment Of Salary Under The FIFA Regulations

Introduction

The termination of a professional football contract for non-payment of salary is not governed solely by the number of outstanding salaries. Under the FIFA Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (“RSTP”), a player may, depending on the circumstances, have more than one legal basis upon which to terminate the employment relationship with just cause.

The RSTP provides two distinct routes in this context, each operating on a different legal basis. This article examines the relationship between these two provisions and considers the circumstances in which a player may be entitled to terminate a contract where remuneration remains unpaid. It further explores why the history and pattern of non-payment may be as significant as the amount outstanding at the date of termination, and why the assessment cannot always be reduced to a simple calculation of the number of unpaid salaries.

The article also considers how this analysis may differ where the player is pregnant or on maternity leave, including the additional contractual and regulatory considerations that may arise in such circumstances.

The Two Routes to Just Cause:

1. Article 14bis: the specific route

Article 14bis deals with outstanding remuneration. Where a club unlawfully fails to pay a player at least two monthly salaries on their due dates, the player is deemed to have just cause to terminate, provided that the player has put the club in default in writing and has granted a deadline of at least 15 days for full compliance¹. The strength of the provision is certainty: if the conditions are met, the existence of just cause is not open to serious debate. Its limitation is that everything turns on those conditions, namely two salaries, unlawfulness, written default and an expired cure period.

1. Article 14: the general route

Article 14 is the general just-cause provision. A contract may be terminated by either party without consequences where there is just cause, and just cause generally exists where a party can no longer reasonably and in good faith be expected to continue the contractual relationship. That formulation was made express in the interim amendments that followed the Court of Justice’s decision in Diarra, but it largely codifies the approach of the FIFA dispute-resolution bodies and the Court of Arbitration for Sport (CAS), which apply the RSTP and, subsidiarily, Swiss law, under which good cause is any circumstance that makes continuing the employment relationship in good faith unreasonable. See, C-650/22 FIFA v BZ (Diarra) EU:C:2024:824. FIFA subsequently adopted interim amendments to the RSTP in December 2024, which included the express reference to what a party can ‘reasonably and in good faith’ be expected to bear in art 14(1). Swiss Code of Obligations (SR 220) art 337(2); Code of Sports-related Arbitration, art R58 (FIFA regulations apply primarily and Swiss law subsidiarily)

Article 14 is therefore not confined to two unpaid salaries. Outside the situations the RSTP expressly codifies, the existence of just cause is assessed case by case, having regard to the overall circumstances ². Article 14bis does not exhaust the concept; it gives one important example of it a fixed form.

Why the Distinction Matter

The distinction becomes decisive where salaries are paid repeatedly late rather than left unpaid. Imagine a club that pays every month, but consistently weeks after the due date. On the day the player wishes to terminate, perhaps only one salary is outstanding. The specific conditions of Article 14bis may not be met. That does not end the analysis. The player may argue under Article 14 that the repeated delays, viewed with the surrounding circumstances, have made continuation unreasonable.

Two points of caution are needed. First, a late payment does not automatically entitle a player to terminate. A salary paid a few days late once is very different from a sustained pattern of substantial delays. Secondly, because termination is treated as a measure of last resort, a decision-maker will want to see that the player gave the club a genuine opportunity to put matters right. The factors likely to be weighed include:

1. the payment history, and the length and frequency of the delays;
2. the amounts involved and their importance to the player;
3. communications between the parties, and any promises to pay that were then broken;
4. written notices of default and the club’s response; and
5. whether the situation was continuing, or had been remedied, at the time of termination.

The point is that the history may matter as much as the amount outstanding at the moment of termination. The two-month threshold in Article 14bis should not be read as a universal rule that a player must always wait for two unpaid salaries before Article 14 can be considered. The practical question is not only how many salaries are unpaid? but also has the club’s payment conduct become so serious that the player can no longer reasonably be expected to continue?

The risk is asymmetric. A player who terminates and is later found to have done so without just cause faces the consequences the RSTP attaches to that outcome, including liability for compensation³. Proceeding under Article 14 without the safe harbour of Article 14bis therefore calls for a carefully documented record.

The Maternity Perspective

The analysis takes on an additional dimension where the player is pregnant or on maternity leave. The RSTP now sets minimum protections for female players. During maternity leave, defined as a minimum of 14 weeks of paid absence, with at least eight weeks after the birth, a player is entitled to at least two-thirds of her contracted salary, unless national law or a collective agreement is more favourable⁴.

A contract cannot be made conditional on a player being or becoming pregnant or taking leave, and a club that terminates on those grounds is presumed to have done so without just cause and is exposed to compensation and sporting sanctions⁵. The club must also support the player’s return, including a post-partum plan, medical support and suitable facilities for breastfeeding or expressing milk⁶.

Payment conduct as indirect pressure

Because a club cannot lawfully terminate a contract because of pregnancy, non-payment can become an indirect way of pressing the player out. Abusive conduct aimed at forcing the other party to terminate or change the contract independently entitles the player to terminate with just cause.⁷ Where delays begin or worsen after the club learns of the pregnancy, or coincide with pressure to renegotiate, the timeline itself may be strong evidence. Contemporaneous records of when the club was informed and when payments slipped are therefore critical.

Conclusion:

Article 14bis provides a specific route; Article 14 provides the general one. The presence of one does not remove the other. In a dispute over late salaries, the decisive question is often whether the club’s payment conduct as a whole has seriously undermined the relationship, and for a pregnant player or one on maternity leave the answer may be reached sooner because the context makes the same conduct more serious. In football employment disputes, as this article has argued, the pattern is often more important than the snapshot.

Footnotes

1. FIFA, Regulations on the Status and Transfer of Players (July 2025 edn) arts 14, 14bis (1) (RSTP).

2. FIFA, Commentary on arts 14 and 14bis.

3. RSTP art 17 (consequences of terminating a contract without just cause).

4. RSTP art 18(7); Maternity Protection Convention 2000 (No 183) (adopted 15 June 2000, entered into force 7 February 2002) 2181 UNTS 253, arts 4 and 6.

5. RSTP art 18quater(1)–(3).

6. RSTP art 18quater(5)–(6).

7. RSTP art 14(2).