Interrupting The Work Of Independent Boundaries Commissions Found To Be Unconstitutional

In Québec (Attorney General) v. Lalande, the Supreme Court of Canada determined that Québec’s provincial Act to interrupt the electoral division delimitation process¹ (the Act), which was found to violate s. 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms² (the Charter), is not saved by s. 1 of the Charter.

At first instance, the applicants challenged the validity of the Act asserting that it violated both s. 3 (right to vote) and s. 1 of the Charter because its impairment of the right to effective representation was not justified by the purpose. The Superior Court of Québec held that, while the Act infringed s. 3, it was justified under s. 1 of the Charter. The Court of Appeal for Québec reversed that decision, finding that the Act was not justified under s. 1 of the Charter. The only issue before the Supreme Court of Canada was whether the Act was justified under s. 1.

Background

The Act is designed to interrupt the independent process of electoral boundary reform undertaken by the commission de la représentation électorale (the Commission), which is a regular process after every second election to consider, among other matters, equity among voters. The Supreme Court of Canada has previously interpreted the right to vote in s. 3 as encompassing the right to effective representation and the idea that, to the greatest extent possible, the vote of every Canadian should carry the same weight regardless of where they live. Independent commissions generally undertake the work of adjusting federal and provincial boundaries on a regular schedule (typically every second election or 10 years). According to the Attorney General of Québec, the legislation served a dual purpose of protecting electoral divisions in regions experiencing population decline, especially in rural areas, and specifically preventing the elimination of the electoral division of Gaspésie, a historic and well-defined region in the province. In the Attorney General’s view, the interruption would allow for a period of reflection required to craft a suitable long-term solution. Voter groups in larger ridings (whose votes were diluted, relatively, by the existing electoral map) challenged the constitutionality of the Act.

Lower court decisions

The application judge found that the legislation was justified under s. 1 in part because he accepted the dual purpose of the Act as submitted by the Attorney General of Québec.³ However, the Court of Appeal for Québec disagreed, determining that the primary objective of the Act was to prevent the elimination of the electoral division of Gaspésie.⁴ Justice Schrager also acknowledged that the evidence indicated that the National Assembly had been aware for several decades that the electoral division of Gaspésie would eventually be eliminated.

The Supreme Court of Canada decision

The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the appeal.

Justice Kasirer, writing for the majority, rejected the Attorney General’s argument that the Court of Appeal unduly narrowed the objective of the Act when it considered avoiding the elimination of the electoral district of Gaspésie as the primary purpose. Rather, that finding was made by the application judge, and it was open to the Court of Appeal to rely on it. In his view, the broader objective of assisting regions experiencing population decline that was accepted by the application judge lacked the requisite precision to meet the Oakes test.

Justice Kasirer further held that, even if the broader objective was sufficiently precise, it lacked a rational connection with the Act’s effect. The majority was not persuaded that interrupting every delimitation of every electoral division in Québec was required to preserve certain electoral divisions. Rather, and to the Attorney General’s benefit, it was only by characterizing the objective of the Act as the protection of the Gaspésie riding that the lower courts could find a rational connection between the Act’s purpose and effect.

Additionally, and regardless of the precise purpose or rational connection tests, Justice Kasirer held that the Act was not a “minimal impairment” of the rights it infringed. This finding was made despite the deference afforded to the National Assembly. The majority was not persuaded that a unanimous passing of the Act sufficiently demonstrated that the law was carefully tailored. Rather, the majority agreed with the Court of Appeal that there was at least one less impairing path to the same practical outcome. In their shared view, the National Assembly could have interrupted the independent delimitation process for Gaspésie only, leaving the process in place for the rest of Québec and its electors.

Conclusion

Lalande will serve as persuasive authority on issues relating to s. 3 given that the Supreme Court of Canada has offered comparatively sparse guidance on its application. It will also be interesting to see how it may be applied in the future. The Alberta government recently allowed its independent boundaries commission to complete its work but then rejected its recommendations, which reduced the number of rural ridings. The government intends to have the boundaries set by government committee with no further public consultation.

This case also serves as another stark reminder that the manner in which a legislature formulates the objectives of an act often determines the outcome of constitutional review. The case shows that a reviewing court will wade into the evidence on questions of law, which reinforces the importance of a fulsome evidentiary record, for all litigants.

Interestingly, Lalande now exists alongside a small category of cases⁵ in which the Supreme Court of Canada has found that the effects of a legislature’s action are not rationally connected to the stated purpose. The Court’s finding is remarkable in that the rational connection step is widely acknowledged as a threshold question with a low bar. The Act now serves as yet another indicator of what a reviewing court will consider deficient in respect of justification.

Footnotes

1. SQ 2024, c 14. 
2. Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11 
3. 2025 QCCS 2078, at paras. 118-120. 
4. 2025 QCCA 1558, at para. 63.
5. For example, Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral Officer), 2002 SCC 68; R. v. Smith, 2015 SCC 34; Frank v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 SCC 1; and R v. J.J., 2022 SCC 28. 

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