On 25 July 2025, the Supreme Court delivered a pivotal decision in Dillon v Irish Life Assurance Plc [2025] IESC 37, which clarifies the treatment of emotional distress claims that do not meet the threshold of recognised psychiatric injury. The Supreme Court has ruled that claims for emotional distress such as upset, anxiety, and inconvenience, which do not involve a recognised psychiatric injury, are not considered personal injury claims under Irish law. This means that PIAB authorisation is not needed before issuing proceedings.
Background
This case involved repeated data breaches by Irish Life Assurance over a 12-year period, during which the plaintiff's personal and financial information was mistakenly sent to a third party. In response, the plaintiff instituted proceedings alleging negligence and breach of duty, seeking damages for emotional distress, upset, anxiety, and inconvenience. Crucially, he did not first obtain authorisation from the Personal Injuries Assessment Board (PIAB).
Both the Circuit Court and High Court concluded that the plaintiff's claim constituted a personal injury action under section 2(1) of the Civil Liability Act 1961, and was therefore procedurally defective due to the absence of PIAB authorisation. Supreme Court disagreed and overturned these decisions.
Key Findings
Delivering judgment, Mr Justice Murray held that:
- Emotional distress that does not constitute a recognised psychiatric injury does not fall within the statutory definition of "personal injury."
- As a result, claims of this nature do not require PIAB authorisation under section 12 of the Personal Injuries Assessment Board Act 2003.
- Claims seeking damages for non-material harm, including emotional distress alone, must be brought under the statutory framework provided by section 117 of the Data Protection Act 2018, which implements Article 82 of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR).
- The Court clarified that negligence is not an appropriate legal route for emotional distress claims unless there is demonstrable harm amounting to a recognised injury.
- The judgment underscores the importance of clarity in pleadings, with Mr Justice Murray stating: "It is first and foremost the responsibility of the plaintiff to plead and properly identify the type of loss for which they seek compensation and the precise legal basis on which they do so. Where their claims are solely for mental distress, upset and anxiety they will fall outside the PIAB regime, but they cannot expect anything other than very, very modest awards."
The Supreme Court's ruling removes the PIAB hurdle for standalone emotional distress claims arising from data breaches, but it also confirms that such claims unaccompanied by recognised psychiatric injury will yield only very modest awards. While claimants may now bypass PIAB for emotional distress actions under section 117 of the Data Protection Act, the likely quantum remains low and is unlikely to result in a new flood of high-value claims.
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