Justice Department Declination Of Prosecution Reinforces Positive Impact Of Self-Disclosure

On June 17, 2026, in a decision that highlighted the voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, and remediation by Robert Bosch GmbH (“Bosch”), the Department of Justice’s National Security Division issued a letter (see announcement) declining to prosecute the company in connection with alleged re-exports of foreign-produced Micro-Electro-Mechanical Systems (“MEMS”) sensor products and software to Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd. (“Huawei”) and its affiliates on the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons (“SDN”) List. 

According to the DOJ, two non-U.S. Bosch subsidiaries re-exported more than $70 million in items subject to the Entity List Foreign Direct Products Rule (“FDPR”) to Huawei from approximately September 2020 through approximately September 2024 without the required Bureau of Industry and Security (“BIS”) export authorizations, generating approximately $11,430,098 million in pre-tax profits. The declination is conditioned on Bosch’s disgorgement of this profit, with cross-crediting for amounts paid to BIS, and runs in parallel with an approximately $36 million BIS civil penalty. The DOJ emphasized that the declination does not protect any individuals and that the Department may reopen the investigation if new information emerges or if disgorgement is not timely paid.

The DOJ’s rationale focused on early voluntary self-disclosure, cooperation, remediation, and the adequacy of parallel regulatory remedies. Bosch disclosed the re-exports to DOJ’s Counterintelligence and Export Control Section and to BIS while its internal investigation was still ongoing and provided prompt, voluntary responses and relevant facts and documents. Remediation included organizational changes, updates to policies and procedures, the addition of 66 employees to its trade compliance organization, and expansion of U.S. trade compliance resources. DOJ also cited the adequacy of regulatory remedies, specifically the approximately $36 million BIS penalty, in concluding that a declination was appropriate under the Corporate Enforcement and Voluntary Self-Disclosure Policy.

The BIS allegations provide further context on the compliance gaps. BIS alleged that Bosch’s trade compliance personnel were ill-equipped to provide accurate FDPR guidance, missed several third-party warnings suggesting the FDPR could apply, and that these deficiencies contributed to the violations. In its public summary, DOJ noted ongoing sales despite missed opportunities to identify the FDPR issue, reinforcing the remediation emphasis in the declination analysis.

For in-house legal, compliance, and business leaders, the practical takeaways are clear. Rapid internal escalation when potential export-control exposure surfaces, early consideration of voluntary disclosure to both DOJ and the relevant regulator, and demonstrable, well-documented remediation can materially influence outcomes in national security matters. Building contemporaneous records of decision-making, promptly enhancing resourcing and controls, and ensuring cross-functional coordination—particularly where U.S. technology or software may bring foreign-produced items within U.S. jurisdiction—are critical to positioning the company for a favorable resolution.