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A Massachusetts federal court vacated President Trump's January 20 memorandum, which halted all offshore wind leasing on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). See State of New York et al., v. Trump, No. 25-cv-11221 (D. Mass. Dec. 8, 2025).
In January of this year, President Trump issued a memorandum pausing offshore wind leasing on the OCS and mandating a review of the federal government's wind project leasing practices (the Wind Memo).1 It required the Secretary of the Interior, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Secretary of Energy, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency, and the heads of all other relevant agencies (collectively, the Agency Defendants) to conduct a comprehensive assessment and review of federal wind leasing and permitting practices, considering environmental impacts of onshore and offshore wind on wildlife, the economic costs associated with electricity generation, and the effect of subsidies on the wind industry.
Seventeen states,2 the District of Columbia, and Alliance for Clean Energy New York (ACE NY) challenged the Wind Memo under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), arguing that it was both (1) arbitrary and capricious and (2) contrary to law and in excess of statutory authority. In addition, ACE NY, as intervenor defendant, claimed that the Wind Memo was procedurally improper because the agencies affected did not undergo notice and comment before it was implemented.
On cross motions for summary judgment, Judge Saris of the District of Massachusetts concluded that the Wind Memo was both arbitrary and capricious and in excess of statutory authority, vacating it in its entirety.
In her opinion, after concluding that the state plaintiffs and ACE NY had constitutional standing and fell within the "zone of interests" of the APA, the court discussed the merits of the plaintiffs' argument. First, the court determined that the Wind Memo constituted final agency action under the APA because it "mark[ed] the consummation of the agency's decision-making process" and because "legal consequences will flow" from the action.
Next, the court considered the Agency Defendants' argument that any agency is exempt from arbitrary and capricious review under the APA3 whenever it acts pursuant to presidential command. The Agency Defendants emphasized that because they "merely followed" the Wind Memo, it did not constitute a "decision" and that no reasoned explanation was required. First, the court concluded that under recent Supreme Court precedent in Orr v. Trump, ___ S. Ct. ___, 223 L. Ed. 2d 180 (2025), "an agency need not provide a reasoned explanation, other than pointing to an executive order, in the specific scenario where a statute ... expressly delegates discretion to the President himself and requires the agency to follow directives pursuant to that delegation."4 However, the Orr decision does not exempt other agency actions made pursuant to an executive order. Thus, agency action that carries out presidential directives is ordinarily subject to APA review.
Third, the court held that the Wind Memo was arbitrary and capricious under the APA. The APA requires that agency action be "reasonably explained"5 and any change in existing policies requires "a reasoned explanation for the change."6 The Agency Defendants, however, relied only on the Wind Memo and the Department of the Interior's written order suspending the issuance of renewable energy authorizations under the Wind Memo when deciding to cease issuing new approvals and authorizations. The court concluded that these two documents do not meet the "reasoned explanation" standard to justify the Agency Defendants' decisions. Specifically, the Wind Memo did not provide an "adequate explanation," because it only cited "various alleged legal deficiencies underlying" wind permitting, "potential inadequacies in various environmental reviews," and the possibility that these vaguely defined issues "may lead to grave harm." Because the court could not determine the relationship between this rationale and the "immense scope" of the Wind Memo, agency decisions made under that Wind Memo were arbitrary and capricious.
Finally, the court held that the Wind Memo was not in accordance with law and in excess of statutory authority.7 Under this standard, agency actions must be set aside when they are contrary to statutory requirements or inconsistent with regulations. Because there are multiple statutes and regulations providing the permitting framework for wind projects,8 all of which contain fixed deadlines for the permitting of those projects, a memorandum indefinitely pausing all offshore wind permitting violates those frameworks. Further, the APA requires that agencies conduct license application proceedings "within a reasonable time."9 A halt on all authorizations related to wind projects would violate this requirement as well.
Because the Wind Memo was both arbitrary and capricious and not in accordance with law, the court declared it unlawful and vacated it in its entirety. Because the court vacated the permitting pause, federal agencies should return to processing applications for wind projects. However, other administrative activities attacking wind projects and other renewable energy initiatives may continue to function as a de facto moratorium on wind permitting.10
Footnotes
1. Temporary Withdrawal of All Areas on the Outer Continental Shelf from Offshore Wind Leasing and Review of the Federal Government's Leasing and Permitting Practices for Wind Projects, 90 Fed. Reg. 8363 (Jan. 20, 2025), available at https://www.whitehouse.gov/presidential-actions/2025/01/temporary-withdrawal-of-all-areas-on-the-outer-continental-shelf-from-offshore-wind-leasing-and-review-of-the-federal-governments-leasing-and-permitting-practices-for-wind-projects/.
2. Those states are Arizona, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington.
3. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (requiring courts to "hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be ... arbitrary, capricious, [or] an abuse of discretion").
4. Quoting Orr v. Trump, ___ S. Ct. ___, 223 L. Ed. 2d 180 (2025).
5. FCC v. Prometheus Radio Project, 592 U.S. 414, 423 (2021).
6. Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U.S. 211, 221 (2016).
7. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A)-(C) (requiring courts to hold unlawful agency actions "not in accordance with law" and "in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations").
8. For instance, 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) requires the Army Corps of Engineers to publish notice of a dredge and fill permit application within 15 days of a completed application, and 50 C.F.R. § 13.11(c) requires the US Fish and Wildlife Service to process certain permit applications "as quickly as possible."
9. 5 U.S.C. § 558(c).
10. For example, in August 2025, the Department of Transportation withdrew $679 million in funding for offshore wind projects across the country. See US Department of Transportation, Trump's Transportation Secretary Sean P. Duffy Terminates and Withdraws $679 Million from Doomed Offshore Wind Projects (Aug. 29, 2025), available at https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/trumps-transportation-secretary-sean-p-duffy-terminates-and-withdraws-679-million. Further, in August 2025, the Secretary of Commerce initiated an investigation to determine the effects that importing wind turbines has on national security. See Notice of Request for Public Comments, 90 Fed. Reg. 41380 (Aug. 25, 2025).
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