First, in Gillespie v. Gillespie, Case No. 09-P-2174,
2011 Mass. App. Unpub. LEXIS 156 (Feb. 7, 2011), a decision issued
pursuant to Rule 1:28, the Appeals Court addressed claims for
tortious interference with expectancy of a gift and wrongful death
by suicide.
The decedent was survived by his second wife Peggy and his son
Vincent. Vincent alleged that Peggy was liable to him for
tortiously interfering with his expectancy by "hectoring"
the decedent to execute a will largely in her favor, and was liable
to the decedent's estate for wrongful death by forcing him to
commit suicide through her cruelty. The superior court granted
Peggy's motion for summary judgment with respect to both
claims, and the Appeals Court affirmed.
Judgment as a matter of law was entered on the tortious
interference claim because Vincent never contested the
decedent's will. Vincent's allegations of tortious
interference amounted to an undue influence claim, and so this
claim should have been raised during the probate of the will. The
Court explained that Vincent did not have the choice of either
submitting evidence of undue influence in opposition to the probate
of the will or consenting to the allowance of the will and then
attacking it in a tort action in superior court.
Judgment as a matter of law was entered on the wrongful death claim
because, even assuming that Vincent had standing to bring this
claim pursuant to G.L. c. 230, § 5, the decedent's suicide
was an independent intervening cause between Peggy's alleged
conduct and the decedent's death. Although suicide may not be
treated as an independent intervening cause if the defendant
inflicted an injury that caused an uncontrollable suicidal impulse,
or if the decedent was in the defendant's custody and she had
knowledge of the decedent's suicidal ideation, Vincent offered
no such evidence.
Second, in Cosgrove v. Hughes, Case No. 10-P-338, 2011
Mass. App. LEXIS 211 (Feb. 15, 2011), the Appeals Court dealt with
the question of what constitutes "acknowledgement" of
paternity under the intestacy statute, G.L. c. 190, § 7.
The facts of this case are interesting. In a very small nutshell,
they are as follows:
The decedent's intestate estate was substantial. A woman named
Verna who claimed to be the decedent's daughter was appointed
as the administratrix, which led to a dispute as to whether Verna
is indeed the decedent's daughter. A number of the
decedent's nieces and nephews sought a declaratory judgment in
the probate court that Verna is not the decedent's daughter,
and thus that she is not an heir and may not inherit from his
estate. They submitted evidence indicating that the decedent had
lived in Massachusetts for most of his life and had never mentioned
having a wife or child. Verna submitted competing evidence,
including a certificate of marriage, indicating that the decedent
was married to Verna's mother from 1944 until her death in
2006.
Although Verna was born in 1931, some thirteen years prior to her
mother's marriage to the decedent, and although there was
contradictory evidence as to whether the decedent regarded her as
his daughter, the probate court found that there was sufficient
evidence of his acknowledgement of paternity. The Appeals Court
affirmed.
The Court's decision addressed two primary issues: (1) whether
Verna must be the decedent's biological child in order to
inherit under the intestacy statute; and (2) what constitutes a
valid acknowledgement.
As to the first question, the Court held that the intestacy statute
does not necessarily require biological parenthood. For example,
under the statute, adopted children are treated no differently than
biological children. In making this holding, the Court
distinguished the statutory and case law concerning support
obligations, custody and visitation, because the issues at stake in
those kinds of proceedings are dramatically different than in an
intestacy proceeding. Therefore, because biological parenthood is
not required, the genuine issues of fact regarding whether Verna is
the decedent's biological child were rendered immaterial.
As to the second question, the Court explained that the only
requirement for a valid acknowledgement is that it be
unambiguous.
"[N]o formal acts are prescribed by the statute which shall
constitute the acknowledgement required," and "such
recognition may be shown by conduct as well as declarations. . .
." In light of this standard, the Court held that the decedent
had validly acknowledged his paternity in an affidavit he signed in
1944, in which he and Verna's mother were identified as her
"natural parents." The fact that the decedent thereafter
did not consistently assert that Verna was his daughter, even in a
sworn listing of his beneficiaries, does not change the effect of
the acknowledgement in the 1944 affidavit. Once he acknowledged
Verna as his daughter, she was his child and heir, just as if she
had been born in wedlock.
Generally regarding the contradictory evidence as to Verna's
relationship to the decedent, the Court noted that this evidence
must be viewed against the backdrop of the shame and stigma for
both mother and child attendant at the relevant times upon
out-of-wedlock birth.
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