Turkey: Antitrust/Competition Law

The Turkish Competition Board has partially lifted commitments previously imposed on Yemeksepeti, finding that the online food delivery market has evolved from a near-monopoly to a competitive multi-player environment. This decision examines how binding commitments may be reassessed when market conditions materially change, and explores the treatment of most-favoured-nation clauses under both antitrust and abuse of dominance provisions.

The Turkish Competition Authority has issued several significant decisions in August 2026, including conditional approval of Paramount's acquisition of Warner Bros., acceptance of commitments from ETS Tur regarding exclusivity practices in tourism, and administrative fines against Babymall for vertical restrictions. New investigations have been launched into TEVA's patent strategies and information exchange in plant protection markets, while the preliminary pharmaceutical sector inquiry highlights competiti

This article examines the Turkish Competition Board’s (“Board”) Yemek Sepeti Decision[1] (“Decision”), assessing a request for the removal of commitments made binding in 2021, under the “material change” condition of Article 43(4)(a) of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”).

The Turkish Competition Authority has issued several significant decisions in August 2026, including conditional approval of Paramount's acquisition of Warner Bros., acceptance of commitments from ETS Tur regarding exclusivity practices in tourism, and administrative fines against Babymall for vertical restrictions. New investigations have been launched into TEVA's patent strategies and information exchange in plant protection markets, while the preliminary pharmaceutical sector inquiry highlights competiti

The Turkish Competition Authority (“TCA”) recently published its reasoned decision concerning a wide-ranging investigation into undertakings active in the production and sale of ready-mixed concrete in Aydın. The investigation concerned allegations of price fixing, customer and territorial allocation and resale price maintenance under Article 4 of Law No. 4054, which is broadly similar to Article 101 TFEU.

Competition enforcement has never been purely domestic, but the degree to which authorities today actively engage with their foreign counterparts, share investigative methodologies, and benchmark their findings against international practice has reached a level that would have seemed remarkable not long ago. Competition law and policy have, in parallel with globalisation, acquired an increasingly international character; cross-border cooperation between competition authorities is no longer confined to high-profile merger reviews or global cartel prosecutions, but permeates sector inquiries, investigations, and even the verification of individual arguments raised by investigated parties.

On October 26, 2022, the Turkish Competition Board published its reasoned decision dated June 23, 2022 and numbered 22-28/443-180, upon its preliminary investigation initiated against six undertakings ...

The Turkish Competition Board has partially lifted commitments previously imposed on Yemeksepeti, finding that the online food delivery market has evolved from a near-monopoly to a competitive multi-player environment. This decision examines how binding commitments may be reassessed when market conditions materially change, and explores the treatment of most-favoured-nation clauses under both antitrust and abuse of dominance provisions.

This article examines the Turkish Competition Board’s (“Board”) Yemek Sepeti Decision[1] (“Decision”), assessing a request for the removal of commitments made binding in 2021, under the “material change” condition of Article 43(4)(a) of Law No. 4054 on the Protection of Competition (“Law No. 4054”).