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Duane Morris Takeaways: In Johnson, et al. v. Amazon.com Services, LLC, 2026 IL 132016 (Mar. 19, 2026), the Illinois Supreme Court held that unlike the federal Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), Illinois's Minimum Wage Law ("IMWL") requires employers to compensate hourly employees for time spent completing pre-shift COVID-19 screenings and other "preliminary or postliminary" activities. In doing so, the Illinois Supreme Court embraced an employee-friendly interpretation regarding the scope of compensable time under the IMWL. Johnson is a must-read opinion for companies that impacts all employers with hourly, non-exempt employees working in Illinois.
Background
Plaintiffs were former hourly Amazon employees who worked at the company's distribution warehouses in Illinois. In March 2020, in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Amazon began requiring employees to undergo COVID-19 symptom screenings before they could enter the warehouses and clock in for their shifts. According to Plaintiffs, it "took 10 to 15 minutes on average" to complete the pre-shift screenings. See Johnson, 2026 IL 132016,¶ 4.
Plaintiffs subsequently filed a class action lawsuit alleging that Amazon violated the FLSA and IMWL by not paying them and other warehouse employees for time spent undergoing the mandatory screenings.
Amazon moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), arguing that Plaintiffs' claims failed because under the FLSA an hourly employee need not be compensated for time spent on "activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to" the employee's principal work duties. See 29 U.S.C. § 254 (a)(2). In granting Amazon's motion and dismissing Plaintiffs' FLSA and IMWL claims, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois reasoned that "state and federal courts frequently look to case authority interpreting and applying the FLSA for guidance in interpreting the [IMWL]." Johnson, 2026 IL 132016,¶ 7.
Plaintiffs appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit. Rather than ruling on the substance of the appeal, however, the Seventh Circuit certified the following question to the Illinois Supreme Court: "whether Section 4a of [the IMWL] incorporates the [FLSA's] exclusion from compensation for 'employee activities that are preliminary or postliminary to their principal activities.'" Id. ¶ 1.
The Illinois Supreme Court's Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that the IMWL provides "a right of overtime compensation for Illinois employees" and also sets forth 10 "specific exceptions to the general right to overtime compensation." Johnson, 2026 IL 132016,¶ 12 (citing 820 ILCS 105/4a(1)-(2)). Importantly, the Court observed that four of Section 4a(2)'s 10 exceptions incorporate certain provisions of the FLSA and/or related federal regulations, yet none of the exceptions reference FLSA regulations regarding the exclusion of "preliminary or postliminary activities" from the definition of compensable time. See id. ¶¶ 14, 16.
The Illinois Supreme Court further noted that the IMWL gives the Illinois Director of the Department of Labor ("IDOL") authority to define the IMWL's terms. See 820 ILCS 105/10(a). Pursuant to that authority, IDOL promulgated a regulation defining "hours worked" as "all the time an employee is required to be on duty, or on the employer's premises, or at other prescribed places of work, and any additional time the employee is required or permitted to work for the employer." 56 Ill. Adm. Code 210.110. In addition to acknowledging the breadth of this definition, the Illinois Supreme Court emphasized that while IDOL referenced provisions of the FLSA and related federal regulations in certain statutory definitions, IDOL did not reference the FLSA regulations "that establish a preliminary or postliminary activities exclusion from 'hours worked.'" Johnson, 2026 IL 132016 ¶ 16; see also id. ("To the contrary, IDOL defines 'hours worked' to include all time an employee is required to be on the employer's premises, which contradicts the potential applicability of any such exclusion.").
Accordingly, the Illinois Supreme Court held that a plain reading of Section 4a and IDOL's definition of "hours worked" reveals that the Illinois legislature did not incorporate the FLSA's "preliminary and postliminary activities exclusion" into the IMWL. Rather, the legislature delegated the authority to define "hours worked" to IDOL, who "adopted a definition of 'hours worked' that necessarily includes preliminary and postliminary activities, explicitly encompassing all time that an employee is required to be on an employer's premises." Id. ¶ 18.
In so holding, the Illinois Supreme Court rejected Amazon's argument that the FLSA's "preliminary and postliminary activities exclusion" should apply to the IMWL because the IMWL's general overtime provision "is patterned after the general overtime provision found in...the FLSA." Id. ¶ 19. The Court reasoned that "while section 4a of the [IMWL] contains the same general overtime provision of the FLSA, it does not include the preliminary and postliminary activity exclusion that is set forth in the FLSA....[T]o accept Amazon's invitation would be to read exceptions into the statute that depart from its plain language, in violation of our well-established rules of statutory interpretation." Id. ¶ 20.
Implications Of The Decision
The Illinois Supreme Court's opinion in Johnson is required reading for companies with hourly employees working in Illinois. The decision definitively answers the question whether the IMWL incorporates the FLSA's "preliminary or postliminary activities exclusion" – a question that, until now, has been heavily litigated.
Johnson is also a reminder of the importance of complying with federal and state wage-and-hour statutes, as laws in many jurisdictions (including Illinois) impose additional requirements on employers that are not found in the FLSA. See, e.g., Johnson, 2026 IL 132016, ¶ 20 (noting that the overtime provisions of the IMWL and the FLSA "are not parallel but rather state the same general rule with marked differences in their respective statements of exceptions"). Companies must be vigilant to ensure they comply with wage-and-hour laws in all jurisdictions where they have hourly employees.
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