Newsletter For January 2026

ARBITRATION

Date: 07 January 2026

Case Name: Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd. v. Tuticorin Port Trust Civil Appeal of 2026 (arising out of SLP (C) No. 8803 of 2021)

Forum: Supreme Court

The respondent i.e., Tuticorin Port Trust, a statutory authority constituted under the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963, undertook a significant dredging project titled "Deepening of the Channel and Basin to Cater to 12.80 metre Draught Vessels at Tuticorin Port", aimed at enabling the port to accommodate larger vessels. A Notice Inviting Tender ("NIT") dated 15 July 2009 was issued for execution of the project.

The appellant i.e., Jan De Nul Dredging India Pvt. Ltd., a company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and specialising in complex dredging operations, participated in the tender process. Its bid was accepted, and a work order dated 28 October 2010 was issued. A License Agreement incorporating the tender conditions was executed on 27 December 2010 for a contract value of Rs. 465.47 crores. The stipulated time for completion was fourteen months from commencement, i.e., by 28 June 2012.

Clause "C" of the NIT specified indicative dredging equipment including a Cutter Suction Dredger ("CSD"), barges, pipelines, and one Backhoe Dredger ("BHD"), while leaving the choice of technology and equipment to the contractor, subject to the Port Trust's satisfaction regarding adequacy.

The appellant commenced work on 28 December 2010 and deployed equipment exceeding contractual requirements, including two major Cutter Suction Dredgers and a Backhoe Dredger. The project was completed substantially ahead of schedule on 30 August 2011. A joint survey by the Port Trust and the National Institute of Oceanography confirmed satisfactory completion, following which the port was commissioned at the enhanced depth on 19 November 2011. A Completion/Taking Over Certificate was issued on 2 April 2012.

Despite submission of the final bill on 29 May 2012, certain payments remained unsettled, leading to disputes. The appellant invoked arbitration under the License Agreement. A three-member Arbitral Tribunal was constituted on 20 September 2012, before which eleven claims were raised, including Claim No. 7, seeking compensation for idle time of the Backhoe Dredger allegedly caused by the Port Trust's failure to provide timely access to the site.

By an award dated 18 October 2014, the Tribunal allowed Claim No. 7 and granted Rs. 14.66 crores towards idle time charges for the Backhoe Dredger.

The Port Trust challenged the award under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 before the Madras High Court. The Single Judge dismissed the petition on 10 September 2019. However, in appeal under Section 37, the Division Bench set aside the award insofar as Claim No. 7 was concerned by judgment dated 15 March 2021.

Aggrieved, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Issues:

Whether the Division Bench of the High Court was justified, under Section 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, in interfering with the arbitral award on Claim No. 7 after the Single Judge had declined interference under Section 34?

The Court also examined ancillary issues relating to:

1. The categorisation of the Backhoe Dredger as a major or minor dredger;
2. Whether deployment and compensation for a Backhoe Dredger were contemplated under the License Agreement?
3. Whether Clauses 38, 41.1, 41.2 and 51.1 of the Agreement permitted compensation for idle time of such equipment?

Submissions of the Parties:

The appellant contended that the scope of interference under Section 37 is narrower than that under Section 34 and does not permit re-appreciation of evidence or reinterpretation of contractual clauses. It was argued that the Arbitral Tribunal had taken a plausible view of the contract, which the Single Judge rightly upheld. The Division Bench, therefore, exceeded its jurisdiction by substituting its own interpretation merely because an alternative view was possible.

The respondent argued that the award on Claim No. 7 suffered from patent illegality. According to the Port Trust, Clause 38 permitted idle time compensation only for major dredgers, and since the Backhoe Dredger was a minor dredger, compensation was contractually impermissible. It was further contended that the Tribunal wrongly relied on Clause 51.1, which dealt with interruptions due to port traffic, whereas Claim No. 7 arose from delay in handing over the site under Clauses 41.1 and 41.2.

Observations of the Court:

The Supreme Court reiterated that judicial interference with arbitral awards is strictly limited. An appellate court under Section 37 cannot expand the scope of scrutiny beyond what is permissible under Section 34. If an award survives scrutiny under Section 34, it ordinarily cannot be disturbed in appeal.

The Court emphasised that a plausible interpretation of contractual terms by an arbitral tribunal is immune from interference, even if another interpretation is possible. Patent illegality must be apparent on the face of the award; mere erroneous interpretation does not suffice.

The Court held that Clause 38, while referring to idle time charges for major dredgers, did not expressly prohibit compensation for idle time of other equipment. Clauses 41.1 and 41.2, dealing with possession of site, when read with Clause 51.1, did not exclude compensation where equipment was rendered idle due to delays attributable to the Port Trust.

It was further observed that relief need not fail merely because it is traced to a different clause, so long as it is supported by the contractual framework.

The Court noted that the tender documents themselves contemplated deployment of a Backhoe Dredger. The agreement did not prohibit its use, nor did it exclude compensation for its idling. Consequently, the distinction between major and minor dredgers was held to be immaterial in the present context.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the arbitral award granting Rs. 14.66 crores towards idle time charges for the Backhoe Dredger was founded on a plausible and reasonable interpretation of the contract. The Single Judge rightly declined interference under Section 34.

The Division Bench exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 37 by re-appreciating contractual terms and substituting its own interpretation. No patent illegality was made out on the face of the award.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the Division Bench, and restored the arbitral award on Claim No. 7 as upheld by the Single Judge.

This judgment is significant as it reinforces the narrow and supervisory nature of judicial review under Sections 34 and 37 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. It underscores that appellate courts cannot act as courts of appeal over arbitral awards or re-interpret contracts merely because another view is possible. The decision strengthens the finality of arbitral awards, promotes contractual certainty, and affirms India's pro-arbitration jurisprudence by curbing excessive judicial intervention.

CIVIL LAW

Date: 12 January 2026

Case Name: Ansal Crown Heights Flat Buyers Association (Regd.) v. M/s Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd. & Ors Civil Appeal Nos. 8465-8466 of 2024

Forum: Supreme Court

The present appeals arise from the judgment dated 20 June 2024 passed by the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission ("NCDRC"), dismissing the execution applications filed by the appellant against the directors and promoters (Respondents 2 to 9) of the developer company i.e., M/s Ansal Crown Infrabuild Pvt. Ltd. ("ACIPL").

The appellant represents flat buyers who had booked units in a project developed by ACIPL. Due to delay in possession, the appellant filed consumer complaints against ACIPL and its directors. However, NCDRC admitted the complaints only against ACIPL, and declined to issue notice to the directors. The final order directing refund was passed solely against ACIPL. When ACIPL failed to comply with the order and thereafter entered insolvency proceedings, resulting in the imposition of a moratorium, the appellant sought to execute the NCDRC's order against the directors in their personal capacity. The NCDRC, however, declined the said prayer, holding that the decree was executable only against ACIPL and not against its directors.

Issues:

1. Whether execution proceedings can be enforced against directors/promoters of a company who were not parties to the original complaint and against whom no specific order or decree was passed?
2. Whether the corporate veil can be lifted in execution proceedings to fasten liability on directors in the absence of specific pleadings or findings of fraud in the main adjudicatory process?

Submission of the Parties:

The appellant contended that since a moratorium was declared against the ACIPL under the IBC, the decree should be executable against its directors/promoters to ensure the flat buyers are not left remediless. Reliance was placed on a previous Supreme Court order which clarified that the moratorium protects only the corporate debtor and not its directors. The appellant argued that the directors should be held personally liable for the company's failure to deliver possession.

The respondents submitted that they were explicitly dropped from the proceedings at the admission stage itself, and no notice was ever issued to them. They argued that the final order was passed only against the company, and an executing court cannot go behind the decree to fasten liability on non-parties. It was further submitted that a company is a distinct legal entity, and shareholders/directors are not personally liable for the company's dues unless specific guarantees were given or fraud was established, which was not the case here.

Observations of the Court:

The Court observed at the outset that the NCDRC had consciously admitted the complaint only against the ACIPL and declined to issue notice to the directors. This order attained finality, and the proceedings continued solely against ACIPL. The final order did not record any finding of liability against the directors, nor did it direct them to perform any act. The Court held that in the absence of pleadings, evidence, or findings against the directors in the main proceedings, they cannot be brought into the net of execution.

The Court emphasised the settled legal principle that an executing court cannot go beyond the decree. Since the decree was against ACIPL alone, it could not be enforced against the directors. The Court further noted that lifting the corporate veil is an exceptional measure applicable only when fraud or misuse of the corporate form is established through specific pleadings and adjudication, which was absent in this case.

Referring to its earlier order regarding the IBC moratorium, the Court clarified that while the moratorium does not shield directors from liability, such liability must first be independently established in law. The earlier order did not create new liability but merely allowed the appellant to pursue remedies if the directors were "otherwise liable", which the NCDRC correctly found they were not under the subject decree.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeals. The Court held that the NCDRC committed no error in declining to execute the order against the directors/promoters who were not parties to the complaints and against whom no liability had been adjudicated.

This judgment reinforces the principle of separate legal personality of a company. It clarifies that execution proceedings cannot be used as a tool to bypass the adjudicatory process or to fasten liability on directors who were not parties to the original decree. It underscores that lifting the corporate veil requires specific pleading and proof during the trial stage, not at the execution stage.

Date: 15 January 2026

Case Name: Sanjay Paliwal & Anr. v. Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd.

Forum: Supreme Court

The appellants were partners of a firm, Vaishali Builders, which purchased a parcel of land measuring 15 biswa forming part of Khasra No. 436, Khewat No. 8/4, Khatauni No. 36, situated at Ahmedpur Karachh, Jwalapur, District Haridwar, by way of a registered sale deed dated 06 January 1992. The purchase was made from Laxminarayan Jha, the recorded landholder, and Bashir Khan, a Maurusee Kashtkar (Class VIII hereditary tenant). Consequent to the purchase, the firm's name was mutated in the revenue records, and the appellants claimed to be in lawful ownership and possession of the said land.

The disputed portion of land, shown as "ABCD" in the plaint map, abutted a pucca road on the eastern side and was surrounded on the remaining sides by lands belonging to the respondent and others. The appellants asserted that access to the said road was essential for the enjoyment and effective use of their land.

According to the appellants, the respondent i.e., Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. ("BHEL"), initially had only a wire fencing along the roadside, leaving a passage for access. Subsequently, the respondent constructed a permanent boundary wall between points C and D along the pucca road, thereby completely obstructing the appellants' access. Despite repeated requests, the respondent allegedly refused to remove the obstruction, compelling the appellants to institute a civil suit seeking a mandatory injunction for removal of the wall.

Issue:

1. Whether a suit for mandatory injunction for removal of an obstruction is maintainable without a prayer for possession, particularly where title, possession, and identity of the disputed property are in contest?
2. Whether the High Court, in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 ("CPC") was justified in interfering with concurrent findings of fact?

Submissions of the Parties:

The appellants contended that both the trial court and the first appellate court had concurrently held that they were owners in possession of the disputed land and that the respondent had neither title nor lawful possession. It was argued that the High Court, while exercising jurisdiction in second appeal, impermissibly re-appreciated evidence and reversed concurrent findings of fact.

It was further submitted that once possession of the plaintiffs was established, a separate prayer for possession was unnecessary, and a suit for mandatory injunction alone was maintainable. The appellants relied upon Sant Lal Jain v. Avtar Singh and Joseph Severance v. Benny Mathew to contend that mandatory injunction is an appropriate remedy where the plaintiff is in possession and seeks removal of an obstruction.

The respondent supported the judgment of the High Court, submitting that the construction of the wall amounted to dispossession and that the efficacious remedy available to the appellants was a suit for possession. Consequently, a suit confined to mandatory injunction was barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

It was also argued that the appellants failed to establish clear title and identity of the specific 15 biswa claimed out of a larger khasra number, and that in the absence of precise identification and proof, no decree for mandatory injunction could be sustained. Reliance was placed on Anathula Sudhakar v. P. Buchi Reddy to contend that where there is a cloud over title or possession, the proper remedy is a suit for declaration and possession.

Observations of the Court:

The Supreme Court noted that two facts were not in dispute, first, that the appellants had purchased 15 biswa of land forming part of Khasra No. 436 by a registered sale deed, and second, that a wall existed within Khasra No. 436. However, the Court observed that serious disputes existed with respect to title, possession, and the precise identification of the portion of land allegedly belonging to the appellants.

The Court examined the reasoning adopted by the High Court, particularly its conclusion that the suit was barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act due to the absence of a prayer for possession. The Supreme Court also took note of the High Court's findings regarding defects in proof of title, limitations on transferability under revenue law, and lack of precise identification of the disputed wall and land. Emphasis was placed on the limited scope of interference in second appeal under Section 100 CPC, and the need to assess whether the High Court's interference was confined to substantial questions of law or whether it amounted to re-appreciation of evidence. The Supreme Court observed that the High Court rightly noted that there were no measurements whatsoever of the disputed wall, either in the plaint map, or in the judgment and decree passed by the trial court. In the absence of such foundational evidence, the grant of decree for mandatory injunction was wholly unsustainable and could not have been legally issued.

Held:

The Supreme Court held that the High Court while exercising its jurisidiction under Section 100 of the CPC has rightly set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court as well as the confirming judgment of the first appellate court.

The judgment reinforces that a decree for mandatory injunction must be supported by clear and precise evidence establishing title, possession, and exact identification of the disputed property. In the absence of foundational evidence, such as measurements or proper identification of the obstruction, a mandatory injunction is legally unsustainable. The Supreme Court also clarified that where there is a serious dispute regarding title or possession, a suit limited to mandatory injunction is barred under Section 41(h) of the Specific Relief Act, and the appropriate remedy lies in seeking declaratory and possessory reliefs. Further, the decision affirms the High Court's power under Section 100 CPC to interfere with concurrent findings where such findings suffer from legal infirmities or lack evidentiary support.

CRIMINAL LAW

Date: 19 January 2026

Case Name: Nawal Kishore Meena @ N.K. Meena v. State of Rajasthan S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 492 of 2026

Forum: Supreme Court

The present Special Leave Petition challenges the judgment and order dated 03 October 2025 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur. The High Court dismissed the petition filed by the petitioner, an employee of the Central Government, who questioned the jurisdiction of the State Anti-Corruption Bureau ("State ACB") to register and investigate a case against him under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 ("PC Act").

The petitioner contended that being a Central Government employee, only the Central Bureau of Investigation ("CBI") had the exclusive jurisdiction to register a criminal case and investigate offences under the PC Act against him. It was argued that the State ACB was not authorised to proceed without the prior approval or consent of the CBI. Consequently, the petitioner also challenged the validity of the chargesheet filed by the ACB before the competent court without obtaining such approval from the CBI.

Issue:

1. Whether the State ACB has jurisdiction to register a criminal case and investigate offences under the PC Act against a Central Government employee within the State's territorial jurisdiction?
2. Whether the jurisdiction to investigate corruption charges against Central Government employees lies exclusively with the CBI?
3. Whether a chargesheet filed by the State ACB against a Central Government employee without CBI's consent is valid in law?

Submission of the Parties:

The petitioner argued that the CBI, established under the Delhi Special Police Establishment Act ("DSPE Act"), is the specialised agency entrusted with investigating corruption cases against Central Government employees. It was submitted that the jurisdiction of the State ACB is confined to officers and employees of the State Government, and that any action against personnel of the Central Government would necessitate the involvement of, or consent from, the Central Bureau of Investigation, failing which such action would amount to a jurisdictional transgression.

The respondent contended that the PC Act does not bar the State Police or its specialised agency, the State ACB, from investigating offences committed within its territorial jurisdiction, regardless of the employment status of the accused. It was submitted that the powers of the State Police to investigate cognizable offences under Section 156 of the Code of Criminal Procedure ("CrPC") are not ousted by the DSPE Act or the mere existence of the CBI.

Observations of the Court:

The Court observed at the outset that the CrPC is the parent statute governing investigation and trial, and unless a special statute expressly provides a different procedure, the general provisions of the CrPC apply. Section 156 of the CrPC empowers the local police to investigate cognizable offences within their jurisdiction. The Court noted that Section 17 of the PC Act authorises police officers of certain ranks to investigate offences under the act but does not exclude the State Police from investigating cases involving central government employees.

The Court further clarified that while the CBI is a specialised agency often entrusted with cases involving central government employees to avoid duplication, this administrative arrangement does not legally divest the State Police of its statutory jurisdiction to investigate offences committed within the State. Referring to its earlier decision in A.C. Sharma v. Delhi Administration, the Court reiterated that the DSPE Act is permissive and does not oust the jurisdiction of the regular police authorities.

The Court further observed that the High Courts of Madhya Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh have consistently held that the State Police ACB has concurrent jurisdiction to investigate corruption charges against Central Government employees. The Court endorsed this view, stating that the trap laid by the State agency and the subsequent investigation cannot be questioned on the ground of want of jurisdiction.

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the SLP. The Court upheld the High Court's finding that the State ACB of Rajasthan has the jurisdiction to register and investigate the case against the petitioner under the PC Act. The Court held that the CBI does not have exclusive jurisdiction in such matters, and the State agency is competent to proceed against a Central Government employee for offences committed within the State.

This judgment reaffirms the concurrent jurisdiction of State Police agencies to investigate corruption offences involving Central Government employees. It clarifies that the existence of the CBI does not strip the State Police of its statutory powers under the CrPC and the PC Act to investigate cognizable offences committed within its territorial limits.

INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCY LAW

Date: 22 January 2026

Case Name: Gloster Limited v. Gloster Cables Limited & Ors. Civil Appeal No. 2996 of 2024

Forum: Supreme Court

The present appeals arise from the judgment dated 25 January 2024 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal ("NCLAT"), which set aside the order of the National Company Law Tribunal ("NCLT"), Kolkata Bench. The dispute pertains to the ownership of the trademark "Gloster". The appellant i.e., Gloster Limited, is the Successful Resolution Applicant ("SRA") of the Corporate Debtor, Fort Gloster Industries Limited ("FGIL"). The respondent i.e., Gloster Cables Limited ("GCL"), claimed ownership of the trademark based on a series of agreements, including a Deed of Assignment dated 20 September 2017.

During the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process ("CIRP"), the respondent filed an application before the NCLT seeking exclusion of the trademark "Gloster" from the assets of the Corporate Debtor. The NCLT, while approving the Resolution Plan submitted by the SRA, dismissed respondent's application but simultaneously recorded a finding that the trademark was an asset of the Corporate Debtor, thereby vesting title in the SRA. The respondent appealed to the NCLAT, which held that the NCLT lacked jurisdiction to decide questions of title but proceeded to hold in favour of the respondent on merits, setting aside the NCLT's finding. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant approached the Supreme Court.

Issue:

1. Whether the Adjudicating Authority has the jurisdiction under Section 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 ("IBC") to adjudicate upon and declare title to assets, specifically a trademark, involving third parties?
2. Whether the NCLT could declare the trademark as an asset of the Corporate Debtor when the Resolution Plan itself recognised the existence of rival claims?

Submission of the Parties:

The appellant contended that the respondent was estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the NCLT as it had invoked the same by filing the application. It was submitted that the question of whether the trademark was an asset of the Corporate Debtor arose "in relation to" the insolvency resolution and thus fell within Section 60(5) of the IBC. The appellant further argued that the assignment of the trademark to the respondent was mala fide, undervalued, and hit by Sections 43 and 45 of the IBC. It was further argued that the registration of the trademark in GCL's name during the moratorium period was void.

The respondent contended that the NCLT has no jurisdiction to decide complicated questions of title which are not directly related to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. It was submitted that under the guise of Section 60(5) of the IBC, the NCLT cannot usurp the jurisdiction of civil courts or statutory authorities under the Trade Marks Act. The respondent relied on the principle that the appellant being the SRA cannot get more rights than what is provided in the approved Resolution Plan, which explicitly acknowledged the rival claim and did not assert absolute ownership.

Observations of the Court:

The Court observed at the outset that the jurisdiction of the NCLT under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC is limited to questions of law or fact "arising out of or in relation to" the insolvency resolution. Referring to its earlier decisions in Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Amit Gupta, the Court reiterated that the residuary jurisdiction of the NCLT cannot be stretched to decide matters dehors the insolvency proceedings, especially when they involve disputes of title with third parties that require detailed evidence.

The Court examined the Resolution Plan approved by the Committee of Creditors ("CoC") and noted that the plan itself recorded the appellant's "belief" and "understanding" regarding the title but recognised the existence of rival claims. The Court observed that the SRA took over the Corporate Debtor with full knowledge of the dispute. The Court held that any declaration of title by the NCLT in favour of the Corporate Debtor would amount to a modification of the approved Resolution Plan, which is impermissible.

The Court further observed that the Resolution Professional had not filed any application under Sections 43 or 45 of the IBC regarding preferential or undervalued transactions. In the absence of such proceedings, the NCLT could not have collaterally adjudicated on the validity of the assignment deed while deciding an application filed by a third party. The Court held that the NCLAT was correct in holding that the NCLT lacked jurisdiction but erred in proceeding to decide the title on merits itself.

Held:

The Supreme Court disposed of the appeals. It set aside the findings of the NCLT regarding the title of the trademark "Gloster" being vested in the Corporate Debtor. The Court held that the issue of title to the trademark was not "in relation to the insolvency proceedings" on the facts of the present case. It clarified that the parties are free to litigate the issue of title before a competent civil court or authority, uninfluenced by the observations of the NCLT or NCLAT.

This judgment clarifies the limits of the NCLT's residuary jurisdiction under Section 60(5) of the IBC. It reaffirms that the Adjudicating Authority cannot assume the role of a civil court to adjudicate complex title disputes with third parties that are not directly linked to the insolvency resolution process. The decision underscores the sanctity of the approved Resolution Plan and prevents the creation of new rights or assets through summary proceedings under the IBC.

WHITE COLLAR CRIMES

Date: 09 January 2026

Case Name: Yerram Vijay Kumar v. The State of Telangana & Anr Criminal appeal of 2026 (arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 11530 of 2024)

Forum: Supreme Court

The present appeals arose from the judgment of the Telangana High Court dismissing a petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 ("CrPC") seeking to quash criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 58 of 2022. The complainant filed a private complaint against the appellants i.e., former directors alleging that they illegally convened an EOGM, appointed new directors, and filed false forms (DIR-12) with the Registrar of Companies. The Special Court took cognizance of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Companies Act, 2013 ("the Act, 2013"), and various sections of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 ("IPC") including Sections 420, 468 etc.

The appellants contended that Section 448 of the Act, 2013 renders a person liable for punishment under Section 447. Therefore, the bar under Section 212(6) of the Act, 2013 applies, which mandates that cognizance for offences covered under Section 447 can only be taken on a complaint by the Serious Fraud Investigation Office ("SFIO") or an authorised Central Government officer, not on a private complaint.

Issue:

1. Whether cognizance of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Act, 2013 can be taken on a private complaint, or is it barred by Section 212(6) the Act, 2013?
2. Whether the Special Court can continue to try IPC offences if the Companies Act offences are quashed?

Submission of the Parties:

The appellants submitted that Section 448 explicitly states that a person making a false statement "shall be liable under Section 447". Section 212(6) provides that for any "offence covered under Section 447", cognizance can only be taken on a complaint by the SFIO/Government. Thus, the private complaint was barred by law.

The respondents argued that Section 212(6) restricts cognizance only for the specific offence of "Fraud" defined under Section 447. They submitted that Section 448 is a distinct offence regarding false statements and the reference to Section 447 is only for the quantum of punishment. Therefore, a private complaint is maintainable.

Observations of the Court:

The Court observed that Section 448 does not prescribe a separate punishment but links the liability directly to Section 447. The phrase "offence covered under Section 447" in Section 212(6) is broad enough to include Section 448. The Court held that the legislative intent behind the bar in Section 212(6) is to prevent frivolous complaints regarding serious corporate fraud and ensures that such prosecutions are initiated only after proper investigation by specialised agencies like the SFIO.

The Court noted that permitting a private complaint for Section 448 would bypass the statutory safeguard provided under Section 212(6). Thus, the Special Court erred in taking cognizance of Sections 448 and 451 on a private complaint.

Regarding the IPC offences, the Court observed that under Section 436(2) of the Act, 2013, a Special Court can try IPC offences only when it is trying an offence under the Companies Act at the same trial. Since the Companies Act offences were liable to be quashed, the Special Court lacked jurisdiction to try the remaining IPC offences.

Held:

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals in part. The proceedings in respect of offences under Sections 448 and 451 of the Act, 2013 were quashed. Regarding the IPC offences (Sections 420, 468, etc.), the Court directed the Special Court to transfer the case to the appropriate Magistrate having territorial jurisdiction for adjudication in accordance with law.

This judgment clarifies the procedural hurdles in prosecuting corporate fraud. It establishes that offences under Section 448 of the Act, 2013, which attract punishment under Section 447, are subject to the rigours of Section 212(6), barring private complaints. It also delineates the jurisdiction of Special Courts, holding that they cannot try standalone IPC offences once the Companies Act charges fall.

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