Supreme Court Finds that Pet Care is an Attendant Care Service

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In Brief

The words "...services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks.." in the definition of "attendant care services" in section 1.4 are the operative words.
The words "...and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services" provide guidance as to what an "attendant care service" might be but other kinds of services might also be an "attendant care service".
Pet care is an "attendant care service" because it aims to provide assistance to an injured person with an everyday task.

Facts

The Supreme Court handed down its decision in Insurance Australia Limited t/as NRMA Insurance v Chowdhury [2025] NSWSC 1392 on 26 November 2025.

The Claimant was involved in a motor accident on 11 November 2024. He sustained a fractured right ankle and a left wrist injury.

The Claimant subsequently sought to recover the cost of caring for his three cats as a treatment expense within the statutory benefits regime in Part 3.4 of MAIA. The care included feeding the cats, changing the litter tray and filling the cats' water bowl.

The Insurer declined to meet the cost of the Claimant's pet care on the grounds that that kind of care did not fall within the definition of "attendant care services" and it follows that the pet care was not "treatment and care" within the meaning of s 1.4 of MAIA

At first instance, Member Cassidy concluded that services to assist the Claimant care for his cats were "attendant care services". The Insurer sought judicial review in the Supreme Court.

Relevant Definitions

Section 3.24 of the MAIA states, in general terms, that an injured person is entitled to statutory benefits for treatment and care provided to the injured person, provided the treatment and care is reasonable and necessary and related to the injuries sustained in the motor accident.

Section 1.4 of MAIA provides a definition of "treatment and care", which includes an exhaustive list of eleven types of treatment and care. One of those items is "attendant care services".

Section 1.4 of MAIA defines "attendant care services" as "services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks, and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services".

The Supreme Court's Decision

Breaking Down the Definition of "Attendant Care Services"

Justice McHugh, at [16], observed that the words "...services that aim to provide assistance to people with everyday tasks" are the operative part of the definition and disclose a purposive intent.

More specifically:

The relevant services merely aim to provide assistance with an everyday task. They may not succeed in their ambition.
The services may or may not involve performing the identified task. The services could aim to achieve the desired outcome in another way.
The descriptor "everyday" applies to the task which the claimant previously performed, rather than the service being sought.

His Honour added that "attendant care services" includes services that fall outside the concepts of "personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services".

In other words, a task can be an "attendant care service" even if it is not personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance or domestic services.

Responding to the Insurer's Arguments

His Honour responded to the arguments raised by the Insurer as follows:

1. The Insurer argued that damages are not recoverable at common law for the value of gratuitous pet care services

The decision in Geaghan v D'Aubert [2002] NSWCA 260 was about whether the value of gratuitous pet care services could be recovered at common law. It was not about whether a plaintiff could recover the cost they incurred in replacing the pet care they previously provided. The statutory benefits regime in Part 3.4 of MAIA is about the latter, not the former.

2. MAIA uses similar or identical language to the Motor Accidents Act 1988 and the Motor Accidents Compensation Act 1999 which were designed to regulate gratuitous care claims only and should be understood not to extent to pet care

Neither MAA nor MACA prevented a plaintiff from recovering the actual cost of pet care they incurred as a consequence of their injuries.

3. The objects and secondary materials for MAIA are inconsistent with any intention to expand common law rights and express an intention to reduce scheme costs

Many aspects of MAIA expand a claimant's rights, beyond their common law entitlement, including a right to statutory benefits for 52 weeks irrespective of fault.

Conclusion

Justice McHugh, therefore, concluded that:

"Attendant care services" should be given its ordinary English meaning.
The evident purpose of s 3.24(1) of MAIA is to secure assistance to injured persons with everyday tasks, including in and around the home.
Providing food and water to the Claimant's cats and changing their litter were such tasks.
Services that are aimed to assist an injured person with pet care tasks fall comfortably within the ordinary meaning of "attendant care services".

The Insurer's application was, therefore, dismissed.

Why This Case is Important

The Supreme Court's Decision in Chowdhury provides some useful insights into how treatment and care disputes should be assessed.

Pet Care

Firstly, and most obviously, given this decision, a claim to recover the cost of providing care to pets will ordinarily constitute a claim for "attendant care services" which is recoverable pursuant to s 3.24(1) of MAIA.

Whether the claimed pet care costs are reasonable and necessary and related to the accident depends on the facts of each case. Any dispute can be referred to the Commission as a medical assessment matter.

"For the Injured Person"

Section 3.24(1) provides thatan injured person may recover expenses incurred in connection with providing treatment and care "for the injured person".

There have been PIC decisions which suggest that the words "for the injured person" in s 3.24(1) mean that the treatment and care must actually be provided to the claimant. See, for example, Warner v IAG.

In obiter remarks, however, McHugh JA interpreted "for the injured person" more broadly by finding that the treatment and care must be for the claimant's benefit, rather than directly to the claimant's person or exclusively for their benefit.

The distinction was important in this dispute because the attendant care services were directed to the Claimant's pets but they were, more broadly, for the Claimant's general benefit. He got to enjoy having his cats and he didn't risk further injury by looking after them himself.

"Reasonableness"

Justice McHugh proceeded on the footing, agreed between the parties, that the question was whether the Claimant was reasonably able to perform the tasks without treatment or care, as opposed to whether the task itself was reasonable.

"Everyday Tasks"

In obiter remarks, his Honour observed that there were two ways of interpreting the words "...and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services" in the definition of "attendant care services":

The words import into the natural meaning of "everyday tasks" activities which would not, ordinarily, be considered an "everyday task". His Honour used the example of clearing the gutters of a three-storey house with the requirement to attach a harness to a point on the roof. That task would not ordinarily constitute an "everyday task". But the concept of "home maintenance" in the definition may expand how "everyday task" is understood.
The words assist in understanding the meaning and scope of "everyday tasks" and, again, expand the ordinary meaning of that phrase. Using the same example, if clearing the guttersof a three-storey houseis "home maintenance", that would suggest a broader understanding of what constitutes an everyday task.

There have been a number of PIC decisions which proceed on the basis that the concept of "everyday tasks" operates to limit what constitutes an "attendant care service".

Our Case Notes on those decisions can be found in the links below:

Based on his Honour's obiter remarks, however, it is possible that the words "...and includes (for example) personal assistance, nursing, home maintenance and domestic services" operate to expand the ordinary English meaning of "everyday tasks". How that possible interpretation might be applied in practice is yet to be seen.

If you would like to discuss this case note, please don't hesitate to get in touch with CTP Practice Group Leader Peter Hunt today.

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