Texas Supreme Court Unanimously Rules That 1951 Royalty Deed Rebuts Van Dyke Presumption

Last week, the Texas Supreme Court provided long-awaited guidance on the recurring issue of how to interpret “double fractions” in mineral conveyances. In Clifton v. Johnson, No. 23-0671 (Tex. Mar. 13, 2026), the Court held that a 1951 deed's conveyance of “a 1/128 (1/16 of the usual 1/8 royalty)” equated to a fixed 1/128 royalty based on its literal arithmetical meaning. The case represents the first time the Court has held that a mineral instrument's language rebuts the Van Dyke presumption that double fractions indicate a floating royalty.

Case Facts and Holding

The Johnson deed conveyed “a 1/128 (1/16 of the usual 1/8 royalty) part of all of the oil, gas and other minerals taken and saved,” which for nearly 70 years all parties treated as providing a fixed 1/128 royalty. In 2020, however, the grantee's successor argued that the deed conveyed a 1/16 royalty that “floats” with subsequent lease royalties (which today tend to be larger fractions than the 1/8 common in years past). The El Paso Court of Appeals agreed, relying on Van Dyke v. Navigator Group, which held that antiquated legal instruments that use 1/8 within a double fraction “raise a presumption” that 1/8 was not used in its ordinary arithmetical sense, but instead as a term of art referring to the entire mineral estate or “future royalties generally.” 688 S.W.3d 353, 360, 363 (Tex. 2023).

In a unanimous opinion, the Texas Supreme Court reversed, holding that the 1951 deed conveyed a fixed 1/128 royalty interest. “[T]he deed's language,” the Court wrote, “amply contains the kind of textual indicia” sufficient to rebut the Van Dyke presumption. The Court focused on the fact that both the granting and future-lease clauses expressly stated a single fraction, 1/128, which was the multiplied product of the double fractions in the future-lease clause. “By expressly multiplying the fractions to arrive at a single fraction, the parenthetical containing the double fraction explains how the parties reached their 1/128 future-royalty figure.”

While declining to definitively rule on the presumed-grant doctrine, the Johnson Court noted that the doctrine, while “distinct” from a textual analysis, helped “ensure [textual] accuracy in double-fraction cases.” The Court stated that the parties' consistent, decades‑long treatment of the interest as a fixed 1/128 royalty would have led “to the same result as our reading of the deed.”

Key Insights

• Since Van Dyke's groundbreaking decision three years ago, the bench and bar have awaited guidance on just what type of language would be sufficient to rebut Van Dyke's “readily and genuinely rebuttable” presumption of a floating royalty in double-fraction cases. Johnson now provides at least one example, which likely has textual parallels in other instruments.
• The Court will continue to strive to harmonize all of the deed's language and fractions, and in doing so may give substantial weight to a single fraction in the granting clause as a multiple of a later-referenced double fraction.
• Restating double fractions as a single multiplied product strongly indicates arithmetical meaning, particularly when the same single fraction appears in numerous places throughout the instrument.

• The Court's presumed-grant discussion confirms Van Dyke's revitalization of that doctrine, giving lower courts the green light to construe antiquated legal instruments based on their long, uncontested interpretation, even without examining the text.

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