The “simple” $12.5 Billion Los Angeles Lakers Flip

In January 2025, Mark Walter, CEO of Guggenheim Partners, owner of the Los Angeles Dodgers, and one of the savviest dealmakers in American sports, bought the Los Angeles Lakers for $10 billion.¹ Fourteen months later, he sold them to Josh Kushner and Bob Iger for $12.5 billion in a deal which took just three days to close.²

That marks a $2.5 billion profit in just 14 months. The Lakers have been sold six times in their history, and every prior owner has held the team for at least 14 years.

Setting aside Walter’s motivations for selling, the transaction raises a new question for the NBA: if a franchise can flip this quickly and profitably, what happens to the league if this becomes the norm?

Three days to close a 12.5 billion-dollar deal

The most expensive sports franchise transaction in history was completed in just three days and was described as “simple” by Iger himself. Iger told the California Post:

We were involved in pursuing the new franchise in Vegas […] and while that happened, it was suggested to us that maybe Mark Walter would be interested in selling his stake in the Lakers. And we immediately decided that, given the value of the franchise and the iconic nature of the team, that we would be really smart to pursue it. The deal came together in three days. It’s that simple.³

Is team flipping the new norm?

Dr. Jerry Buss bought the Lakers for $16 million in 1979. His family held the team for 46 years before selling to Walter. While every previous owner held the team for at least 14 years, Walter only held on for 14 months total (11 as majority owner).

Over in the NFL, the league has long maintained an informal norm against franchise flipping. This is no accident. The NFL bans private equity, caps debt, and requires a single human being to write a billion-dollar check. A single owner must hold at least 30% of the team’s equity, and any sale needs approval from 24 of the 32 franchise owners.⁴ Why the ban on private equity? Those funds have expiration dates, which means forced exits leading to high turnover rates (on the market, not on the field).

The NBA doesn’t play by the same rules. With no holding period or capital gains deterrence, the incentive to flip has never been higher, and the numbers prove it: the 12 priciest U.S. sports team sales have all happened since 2019, and nine of them were NBA teams:⁵

Numbers like these attract a different kind of buyer: not someone who wants to build a championship roster but someone who wants to time the market. The issue is NBA owners are active participants; they vote on labour deals, revenue sharing, expansion, and media rights. The owners shape the league, and active participants can’t change every 14 months. Walter’s flip may set a dangerous precedent that could have a lasting impact on the league’s future.

What can the NBA do to prevent flipping?

The league has many options at its disposal to prevent this new trend of flipping franchises. For example, the NBA could adopt a minimum holding period as a condition of ownership approval (five years would be reasonable). It could impose transfer fees on rapid resales similar to how FIFA charges solidarity payments when players move between clubs.⁶ Additionally, the league could mandate that resales within a defined window (three to five years) be subject to a right of first refusal by the league or existing owners.

Or the league could simply ask harder questions during the approval process: “What’s your five-year plan?” and “Under what circumstances would you sell within five years?” are not unreasonable asks. If a buyer can’t articulate a long-term vision, then maybe the NBA isn’t the place for them.

As it currently stands, the NBA has done none of these things prior to the current acquisition and while the Board of Governors hasn’t yet approved the Kushner/Iger sale,⁷ it’s hard to imagine they’ll say no.

The bigger picture

The Walter transaction proved something: NBA franchises are appreciating assets, and a $2.5 billion gain in 14 months is a formula that investors won’t ignore. While the next flip won’t necessarily involve the Lakers, there are 30 NBA franchises, most of which have appreciated at double-digit rates over the past decade. If ownership approval carries no meaningful commitment to hold, the rational play for any sufficiently wealthy buyer is to treat every franchise as a potential trade. Buy when the media deal is about to reset. Sell once the valuation bumps. Repeat.

This formula changes what it means to own an NBA team. Historically, franchise ownership came with civic obligations, even if they were unwritten. You invested in the arena. You built relationships with the city. You were in the community for decades, not quarters. When owners are playing a 14-month game, none of those incentives hold. An owner focused on resale has no reason to pay luxury tax to keep a contender together, fund a new training facility, or absorb a losing season to develop young players. Every dollar spent building the franchise is a dollar that cuts into the resale margin.

The downstream effect hits everyone. Players and front offices can’t plan around ownership that might disappear in a year. Cities that invest public money in arenas and infrastructure end up subsidizing private speculation when the owner flips and leaves. If this becomes the norm, the relationship between a franchise and its city starts to look a lot more like a landlord and tenant than a partnership. As a result, the fans may lose the one thing that made franchise ownership different from any other investment: the sense that the person at the top actually cared about the team winning, not just appreciating.

The question isn’t whether someone will try this again. It’s whether the NBA will do anything to stop it.

Read the original article on GowlingWLG.com

Footnotes

1. Jacob Lev & Matt Egan, “Los Angeles Lakers Sale”, CNN Sports (18 June 2025), online: <https://www.cnn.com/2025/06/18/sport/los-angeles-lakers-sale-spt>.

2. Chris Isidore & Matt Egan, “LA Lakers sell for a record $12.5 billion to ex-Disney CEO Iger and Jared Kushner’s brother Josh”, CNN Business (12 August 2026), online: <https://www.cnn.com/2026/08/12/business/la-lakers-iger-josh-kushner-12-billion>.

3. Khobi Price, “Bob Iger reveals timing, intimate details of Lakers ‘extraordinary’ purchase”, New York Post (12 August 2026), online: <https://nypost.com/2026/08/12/sports/bob-iger-reveals-details-of-lakers-purchase-its-extraordinary/>.

4. National Football League, Constitution and Bylaws of the National Football League (effective 1 February 1970, revised 14 September 2016), online (pdf): <https://www.acerislaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2026/02/NFL-constitution.pdf>.

5. ESPN, “Lakers' $12.5 billion purchase tops record U.S. sports team sales”, ESPN (12 August 2026), online: <https://www.espn.com/nfl/story/_/id/34060289/most-expensive-sports-franchise-sales>.

6. FIFA TMS Help Centre, “Solidarity mechanism”, (last accessed 21 August 2026) online: <https://support.fifatms.com/en/support/solutions/articles/7000097497-solidarity-mechanism>.

7. Dave McMenamin, “Lakers sold at $12.5 billion valuation: NBA execs, agents react”, ESPN (13 August 2026), online: <https://www.espn.com/nba/story/_/id/49599895/los-angeles-lakers-sold-125-billion-valuation-nba-execs-agents-reaction-walter-kushner-iger-luka>.