California Federal Court Slams The Brakes On Driver Class Action

Duane Morris Takeaways: On August 18, 2026, in Maynor Mejia v. RXO Last Mile, Inc., No. 22-CV-08976, 2026 WL 2415257 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 18, 2026), Judge Susan Illston of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied a motion to certify a class of independent-contractor drivers and others who provided services to assist with the delivery of goods who alleged they were misclassified under California law. This decision underscores that even a facially strong misclassification theory can fail under Rule 23 if there is a conflict between the named plaintiff and the class the plaintiff seeks to represent. Courts will look beyond a uniform contracting framework and probe whether the class representative’s individual circumstances make the representative typical and adequate and will pay close attention to all asserted legal theories that may undermine any effort to seek class certification.

Background:

Plaintiff Maynor Mejia (“Plaintiff”) worked as a contract carrier and delivery driver providing last-mile delivery services for Defendant RXO Last Mile, Inc. (“RXO”) by picking up merchandise at merchants’ stores or warehouses and delivering and installing the merchandise at customers’ homes or businesses. Id. at 1-2. Like other contract carriers in RXO’s network, Plaintiff contracted with RXO as an independent contractor rather than as a direct employee, and his work was governed by a Delivery Service Agreement (DSA) that set out the terms of the parties’ independent-contractor relationship, including the screening, qualification, and approval requirements imposed on contract carriers and the employees of the contract carriers. Id. at 2-3.

On April 10, 2026, Plaintiff moved to certify a class for all persons who performed delivery services for RXO that were classified as independent contractors or otherwise worked as non-employees during the class period and cursorily suggested in the alternative that Judge Illston certify three sub-classes of contract carriers, drivers, and helpers. Id. at 3. Following a hearing on June 12, 2026, Judge Illston ordered additional briefing from Plaintiff clarifying, among other things, Plaintiff’s proposed sub-classes and how each sub-class independently meets the Rule 23(a) and (b) requirements. Id. at 4. On June 26, 2026, Plaintiff proposed three sub-classes for (1) contract carriers, defined as individuals who executed a DSA with RXO; (2) drivers, defined as individuals engaged by a contract carrier to perform deliveries for RXO who did not themselves execute a DSA with RXO; and (3) helpers, defined as individuals who performed delivery services for RXO as non-employee helpers (the latter two are the “Driver and Helper subclasses”). Id. at 4. Plaintiff contended that RXO’s standardized contracting model and uniform operational requirements misclassified the persons in the sub-classes as independent contractors when they should have been treated as employees. Id. at 1. 

Through discovery, RXO identified 2,485 class members, including 652 contract carriers, 1,251 drivers, and 582 helpers. Id. at 9. Plaintiff testified in his deposition that, as a contract carrier, he treated at least some of the members of the Driver and Helper subclasses as his own employees: he paid taxes on their behalf, engaged them as his “‘employees’” paid them, issued W-2s, paid them overtime, instructed them to take meal breaks, and assigned them routes based on their performance.” Id. at 11.

The Court’s Findings:

Judge Illston denied certification, finding that Plaintiff failed to satisfy Rule 23’s commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements. Id. at 13.

As a threshold matter, Judge Illston determined that Plaintiff satisfied the numerosity and ascertainability requirements. Id. at 8-9. Specifically, Judge Illston found the proposed class ascertainable because Plaintiff adequately identified the class members, and RXO confirmed through its discovery responses that 2,485 individuals fell within that class definition. Id.

For the commonality requirement, however, Judge Illston found that Plaintiff failed to meet his burden, at least with respect to the Driver and Helper sub-classes, because Plaintiff’s reliance on the ABC test is incompatible with the joint employment theory of liability Plaintiff intended to pursue against RXO on behalf of those sub-classes. Id. at 10-11. The ABC test, adopted by the California Supreme Court in Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018), and later codified by Assembly Bill 5, presumes that a worker is an employee unless the hiring entity establishes that: (A) the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work; (B) the worker performs work outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and (C) the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed. Id. at 6-7.

Judge Illston observed that Plaintiff’s motion to certify “focused almost entirely on the ABC test [which Plaintiff argued] encompasses all claims in the [Complaint] and applies to all three sub-classes.” Id. at 10. However, in Plaintiff’s reply brief and at the certification hearing, Plaintiff confirmed his intent to pursue a joint employment theory of liability as to the Drivers and Helpers who did not sign a DSA. Id. This created a fundamental tension in Plaintiff’s case, as the ABC Test applies to misclassification claims, where the question is whether a worker is an employee or independent contractor, but it does not apply to joint employment claims, where the worker is already recognized as an employee of one entity and the question is whether a second entity is also liable as a joint employed. Id. at 10-11. Judge Illston’s analysis was guided by the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Bowerman v. Field Asset Servs., Inc. 60 F.4th 459, 473 (9th Cir. 2023), which established that because the “reasons for selecting the ABC test are uniquely relevant to the issue of allegedly misclassified independent contractors, the ABC test does not extend to the joint employment context, where those concerns are no longer present.” Id. at 10. 

Judge Illston also rejected Plaintiff’s alternative argument that RXO was a joint employer of Driver and Helper sub-classes under the Martinez test. Id. at 11. Under Martinez v. Combs, 49 Cal. 4th 35, 64 (2010), a joint employment relationship exists where the alleged joint employer: “(1) have exercised control over the workers’ wages, hours, or working conditions; (2) suffered or permitted them to work; or (3) engaged them, thereby creating a common law employment relationship.” Id. Judge Illston found this argument “unavailing” because Plaintiff failed to “explain how the joint employment test would apply and how it would not require an individualized inquiry” into the employment practices of each Contract Carrier. Id.

Judge Illston next considered the typicality and adequacy requirements together, noting that the considerations underlying these two prerequisites “overlap considerably.” Id. at 11. Judge Illston concluded that Plaintiff satisfied neither requirement with respect to the Driver and Helper subclasses because he had a conflict of interest with those sub-classes. Id. at 12. Specifically, under Section 5(d) of the DSA, Plaintiff agreed to “assume sole responsibility” for his workers’ compliance with “all applicable laws, rules, and regulations, including but not limited to wage and hour laws…” Id. Thus, Plaintiff could be individually liable to the members of the Driver and Helper subclasses for the very claims he seeks to represent on their behalf. Id. As Judge Illston explained, “in order for [Plaintiff] to argue that his Drivers and Helpers were deprived of accurate wage statements, breaks, pay, and other employment protections, he would also have to admit that he deprived them of such employee benefits, creating antagonistic interests between [Plaintiff] and the subclasses he seeks to represent.” Id.

Having concluded that Plaintiff failed to carry his burden on the commonality, typicality, and adequacy requirements under Rule 23, Judge Illston denied Plaintiff’s motion for class certification in its entirety. Id. at 13.

Implications for Companies

This decision carries practical implications for companies utilizing independent-contractor structures. Companies should ensure their contracting agreements expressly allocate wage-and-hour compliance obligations to downstream contractors, as such provisions expose named plaintiffs to individual liability for the very claims they assert on behalf of a class, creating conflicting interests that defeat typicality and adequacy.

The decision also serves as a useful reminder to be pragmatic and to scrutinize whether a plaintiff’s legal theories are consistent with binding precedent. Companies should pursue early discovery into the working relationship between a plaintiff and workers. As this case demonstrates, a named plaintiff’s personal employment practices can defeat certification even where a uniform contracting template governs the workforce.