District Of Columbia Federal Court Declines To Narrow EEOC's Pregnancy-Bias Suit Against Security Firm

Key Takeaways: In EEOC v. Security Assurance Management Inc., No. 25-CV-00181, 2025 WL 2911781 (D.D.C. Oct. 14, 2025), Judge Rudolph Contreras of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia refused to pare back the EEOC's pregnancy and lactation claims against Security Assurance Management, Inc. ("SAM"), leaving all five causes of action under the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act (PWFA) and both Title VII counts intact. Applying Rule 12(c), the Court held – in an order denying Defendant's Partial Motion to Dismiss – the "heavy burden" on a defendant seeking judgment on the pleadings and determined that the EEOC's theories — though factually overlapping — targeted distinct harms and therefore were not "duplicative." The Court's refusal to dismiss any of the EEOC's PWFA counts sends a clear signal that defendants will face an uphill battle when trying to narrow pregnancy-related claims at the pleadings stage, particularly after filing an answer.

Case Background

The EEOC filed suit under Title VII and the PWFA on behalf of Simone Cooper, a special police officer who was reassigned after the client at her post did not want her working at the site while pregnant. (Compl. ¶ 17). As the court summarized, the EEOC "brings this employment discrimination action against Security Assurance Management, Inc. pursuant to Title VII ... and the Pregnant Workers Fairness Act," alleging that SAM "disciplined and removed an employee, Simone Cooper ('Ms. Cooper'), from her assignment due to her pregnancy-related condition and her need for accommodations." Id. at *3.

After her maternity leave, Cooper was placed at a Hampton Inn post where she "was breastfeeding and had the pregnancy-related medical condition of lactation." Id. The court noted that she "could nonetheless perform the essential functions of her job as an Unarmed Special Police Officer," but SAM "repeatedly denied or ignored Ms. Cooper's accommodation requests." Id. The consequences were significant, as "Ms. Cooper leaked through her clothing during the workday on at least two occasions," and because SAM provided no adequate space, "Ms. Cooper had to pump in her car in the Hampton Inn parking lot." Id.

Despite outreach by Cooper, her union representative, and her attorney, the company allegedly did not engage in any interactive process. SAM eventually issued a written warning for "excessive absenteeism" that included days she was not scheduled and the day she left after leaking through her uniform. Id. at *4. She was later removed from the schedule entirely.

The complaint asserts seven claims, including two under Title VII and five under the PWFA for failure to accommodate, adverse action based on accommodation requests, denial of employment opportunities, retaliation, and interference. After it filed its Answer, SAM filed a partial motion to dismiss seeking dismissal of three of the counts as purportedly duplicative.

The Court's Ruling

Because SAM filed an Answer before seeking dismissal, the court treated the request as a Rule 12(c) motion. As Judge Contreras explained, such a motion "will be granted only if Defendant can demonstrate that no material fact is in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," and at this early stage the movant "shoulders a heavy burden of justification." Id. at *6.

The Court began with its definition, citing from Wultz v. Islamic Republic of Iran's "duplicative claim test." It explained that "duplicative claims are those that stem from identical allegations, that are decided under identical legal standards, and for which identical relief is available." Id. at *7 (quoting Wultz, 755 F. Supp. 2d 1, 81 (D.D.C. 2010)). SAM argued that several PWFA claims were repetitive, but after analyzing each count, the Court held otherwise.

Most notably, SAM asserted that the "Adverse Actions" claim duplicated the PWFA retaliation claim because both concerned similar employment decisions. Judge Contreras disagreed, emphasizing that the counts "assert different motivations for Defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct." Id. at *8. The adverse-action theory centers on actions taken "on account of" Cooper's accommodation requests, while retaliation requires adverse treatment because she opposed unlawful practices. "Because Count Two (Adverse Actions) and Count Four (Retaliation) arise from different allegations," the court concluded, "the claims are not duplicative." Id. at *9.

The Court applied the same reasoning to SAM's attempt to collapse the PWFA adverse-action, denial-of-opportunities, and interference counts into the single failure-to-accommodate claim. Those theories, Judge Contreras explained, each addressed different harms and are evaluated under distinct legal standards. As a result, "none are duplicative," and the Court denied the motion in full. Id. at* 7.

Implications For Employers

This opinion is a reminder that overlapping facts do not automatically render multiple statutory claims redundant — especially under the PWFA, where Congress created several discrete causes of action aimed at different workplace harms. Courts are giving each theory breathing room rather than collapsing them into a single "pregnancy discrimination" count.

Procedurally, the decision warns defendants against using post-Answer motions to trim suits. Under Rule 12(c), the movant faces a "heavy burden," and close questions typically favor allowing the case to proceed to discovery.

Substantively, the facts the Court credited (removing a visibly pregnant worker at a client's request, ignoring repeated lactation-related accommodation needs, forcing pumping in a car, and disciplining a worker for consequences of inadequate accommodations) are the kinds of scenarios likely to support claims not just under the PWFA, but also under Title VII.

The decision reinforces that the PWFA is a powerful, stand-alone statute with multiple actionable theories. Courts will not readily prune these claims at the pleading stage, and the EEOC is deploying them aggressively. Employers should treat pregnancy-related accommodation requests with the same rigor as disability accommodations – engage promptly, document communications, provide appropriate space and break time, and avoid client-driven decisions that move or remove pregnant workers.

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