Seventh Circuit: Text Messages Are Not Telephone Calls

In today’s digital age, the ubiquity of cell phones offers a powerful opportunity for companies to deliver targeted advertisements directly to consumers. While unsolicited messages can be irritating, they also open new avenues for direct engagement with customers. Recognizing the need to protect consumers from unwanted interruptions, Congress enacted the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA) in 1991 — aimed at reducing the nuisance and intrusion caused by unwanted telephone calls.

Traditionally, the TCPA allowed consumers to add their numbers to the National Do Not Call Registry to block unwanted telemarketing calls. However, as marketing strategies evolved, many companies have shifted their focus from traditional telephone calls to text messaging. Now, for the first time, a federal appellate court has adopted the position that unsolicited text messages are not automatically prohibited under the TCPA — even if a consumer is on the Do Not Call Registry. This development could significantly impact how businesses approach mobile marketing and consumer communications moving forward.

In Steidinger v. Blackstone Medical Services, the Seventh Circuit became the first federal court of appeals to hold that text messages are not “telephone calls” under Section 227(5) of the TCPA and eradicated a private right of action for consumers who receive unwanted marketing texts in the Seventh Circuit.¹

Plaintiff Steidinger and a putative class received marketing text messages from Blackstone Medical Services promoting home sleep tests. Plaintiffs alleged that these messages continued even after they opted out by replying “STOP” or registering on the National Do Not Call Registry. Plaintiffs asserted claims under Section 227(c)(5) of the TCPA and the Florida Telephone Solicitation Act (FTSA). The district court dismissed the TCPA claim, reasoning that the private right of action extends only to telephone calls, not text messages. It declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the FTSA claim and dismissed the lawsuit.

A unanimous panel for the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court. In a textualist opinion, the court first focused upon the ordinary public meaning of “telephone call” in 1991, when Congress enacted the TCPA. Citing contemporaneous dictionary definitions, the court found that a telephone was “[a]n instrument for reproducing sounds at a distance” and that, in 1991, a “telephone call” referred to communication by sound.² The court concluded that text messages do not reproduce sounds and therefore did not qualify as a telephone call.

The court also reasoned that the provisions surrounding Section 227(c)(5) provided further support that it didn’t create a private right of action for text messages. Although Section 227(c)(5) creates a private right of action only for “telephone calls,” other subsections of Section 227 use the broader term “telephone solicitation,” which Section 227(a)(4) defines as both “a telephone call or message.”³ The court concluded that because Congress used different terms in adjacent subsections, it must have intended different meanings.⁴ The court also found that the “best reading” of the statute is that which provides a “narrower remedy than recovery for all forms of telephone solicitation.”⁵

Critically, the court did not defer to the FCC’s contrary interpretation. It concluded that, although the FCC extended the Do-Not-Call Registry protections to text messages, that extension was made under Section 227(c)(3) (“telephone solicitations”) and not under Section 227(c)(5) (“telephone calls”). The court also concluded that Congress’s failure to amend Section 227(c)(5) to cover text messages went against the plaintiffs’ argument that text messages were actionable.

The Seventh Circuit’s decision is in stark contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Howard v. Republican Nat’l Committee, where the court held text messages are “calls” under Section 227(b) of the TCPA.⁶ In Howard, the Ninth Circuit considered whether a text message attaching a video including the use of an artificial or prerecorded voice could be a violation of Section 227(b). The court’s holding focused on the text qualifying Section 227(b)’s restriction to ultimately affirm dismissal because the text message at issue only “included” but “was not ‘ma[d]e’ or ‘initiat[ed]’ using an artificial or prerecorded voice.”⁷

While the Supreme Court may ultimately weigh in on this circuit split, it is inevitable that plaintiffs will continue to file putative TCPA class actions anchored in text messages outside of the Seventh Circuit. Moreover, state law claims remain and can provide plaintiffs with viable causes of action.

Businesses, therefore, should maintain robust compliance programs, including: (1) obtaining and documenting prior express written consent before sending marketing texts; (2) honoring opt-out requests promptly; (3) maintaining Do-Not-Call compliance; (4) reviewing consent records; and (5) monitoring developments in state law.

Buchanan’s consumer defense attorneys monitor and leverage these legal developments to both advise our clients and successfully defend them against TCPA claims. Reach out with any questions you may have regarding TCPA compliance or defense-related issues your company may be facing.

Footnotes

1 No. 25-2398, 2026 WL 2028517 (7th Cir. July 14, 2026).

2 Id. at *2.

3 Id. at *2-3 (citing FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000)) (emphasis added).

4 Id. at *3 (citing Sw. Airlines Co. v. Saxon, 596 U.S. 450, 457–58 (2022)).

5 Id.

6 16 F.3d 1119 (9th Cir. 2026).

7 Id. at 1127-28.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.