Insolvency Law Meets RERA, PMLA And NBFCs : Conflicts, Tension And Reforms

IBC and RERA: Case Law and Conflicts

Homebuyers as Financial Creditors: Initially, IBC did not expressly grant homebuyers any remedy, but judicial and legislative developments changed that. The 2018 amendment to IBC added an explanation to Section 5(8) treating amounts raised from homebuyers as “financial debt,” so that allottees qualify as financial creditors under Section 5(7).¹ This means homebuyer associations can now jointly petition for CIRP (if statutory thresholds are met) and are represented on the Committee of Creditors (CoC) by Authorized Representatives.² Critically, courts have emphasized that these rights supplement but do not displace RERA. In Pioneer Urban Land (SC 2019)³The Court held RERA (2016) and the IBC “must be held to coexist” and that RERA’s remedies are “in addition to and not in derogation of” other laws.⁴ In line with this, commentators note that Parliament intended homebuyer’s IBC claims to be additional to their RERA rights, not exclusive.⁵

Moratorium vs. RERA Enforcement: Section 14 of the IBC imposes an automatic moratorium on suits, enforcement actions, and executions against a corporate debtor once CIRP starts. The Supreme Court in Alchemist ARC v. Hotel Gaudavan (SC 2018) made clear that any proceeding violating the moratorium is “non est” without legal effect.⁶ The Delhi High Court in Power Grid Corp. v. Jyoti Structures (2017) held that Section 14 is meant to protect the debtor’s assets, not to stay proceedings that benefit the debtor. Thus, proceedings that do not threaten asset dissipation such as challenging an award in the debtor’s favor are not barred.⁷ However, most RERA actions result in money decrees or compensation orders against the builder (the corporate debtor). Applying this logic, insolvency tribunals have generally stayed RERA litigation and orders during CIRP. One analysis notes that courts have treated RERA cases as “debt‐recovery actions” covered by the moratorium.⁸ In practice, this means that even if a RERA authority orders a builder to pay damages to homebuyers, execution of that order is frozen by Section 14.⁹ IRCCL reports that in Power Grid and similar cases, courts ruled “all RERA proceedings against the corporate debtor must halt during the moratorium”.¹⁰ Homebuyers thus often become unsecured creditors in CIRP, with only post-liquidation claims, despite having RERA decrees in hand.

Recent RERA - IBC Case (RERA v. DB Corp, NCLAT 2024): The tension came to a head in RERA v. DB Corp Ltd. (NCLAT, 2024). There, a RERA authority (Madhya Pradesh RERA) appealed the admission of a CIRP petition by DB Corp, alleging the insolvency application was collusive. The NCLAT recognized RERA’s unique regulatory role and rejected the claim that RERA (a statutory authority) lacked standing. Importantly, the tribunal held that RERA can appeal a Section 9 order and that if the initial petition itself is invalid (e.g. for lack of monetary debt), then all downstream insolvency orders are void.¹¹ On the merits, the NCLAT struck down the IBC petition (based on a non-monetary barter deal) as a misuse of the process, stressing that homebuyers should pursue specific performance of their contracts or RERA remedies instead of weaponizing IBC to freeze assets.¹² In sum, RERA v. DB Corp underscores that while the moratorium does stall RERA enforcement, RERA remains empowered to challenge improper CIRP filings.¹³

Gaps and Tensions (RERA - IBC): Despite giving homebuyers creditor status, practical problems persist. Homebuyers still often lose out in CIRPs : as of Sep 2024, only about 9% of real-estate companies in CIRP (160 of ~1,760) achieved a resolution, and creditors recovered on average just ~31% of claims.¹⁴ The CoC dominated by banks tends to favor plans that pay lenders rather than complete projects. Meanwhile, the blanket stay of RERA enforcement means homebuyers wait years with no access to compensation or possession, contrary to RERA’s promises of timely delivery. In effect, distressed builders get a breathing spell while buyer rights are on hold. Scholars argue this “blanket stay” creates enforcement gaps: IBC’s quest for enterprise value preservation often freezes RERA’s project-completion mandate.¹⁵

IBC and NBFCs: Exclusion and Section 227

What is an NBFC? A Non-Banking Financial Company (NBFC) is a corporate financial institution that provides bank-like services (lending, leasing, investment) but does not hold a banking license. NBFCs are registered under the Companies Act and regulated by the RBI, yet they cannot accept traditional demand deposits like banks. Examples include housing finance companies (HFCs) and infrastructure finance firms.

Why NBFCs Were Outside IBC: Although NBFCs are companies, the IBC originally excluded them (like banks and insurers) from its normal insolvency process. This is because IBC’s definition of “corporate debtor” (Section 3(8)) expressly omits “financial service providers.” Section 3(16) lists services (lending, insurance, etc.), so any NBFC engaged in these qualifies as a financial service provider.¹⁶ One analysis notes that as soon as a company provides any listed financial service (e.g. lending), it is an FSP and hence outside the Code. The rationale is that NBFCs are often systemically important; their collapse could shake credit markets and public trust. For instance, large NBFCs like IL&FS, DHFL or SREI involve thousands of creditors (banks, mutual funds, depositors) and interlink with banks. To prevent panic, the law treated NBFC resolution differently (via RBI or government schemes) rather than NCLT. The IL&FS crisis (2018) highlighted this gap. Commentators observed that the IBC “excludes financial service providers like non-banking financial companies”, and that although Section 227 empowers the government to notify FSPs, no NBFC had been brought under IBC until 2019.¹⁷

Section 227 - Bringing NBFCs Under IBC: To address such crises, Parliament added Section 227 (effective late 2019). This allows the Central Government, with RBI’s input, to notify specific financial service providers (FSPs) to undergo insolvency under IBC. In practice, the Ministry of Corporate Affairs used this to extend IBC to large NBFCs. Notably, on 18 November 2019 the government issued rules under Section 227 covering NBFCs (including HFCs) with assets ≥ ₹500 crore (based on last audited balance sheet).¹⁸ Thus, only systemically significant NBFCs could be pulled into IBC. The cases of IL&FS and DHFL were major catalysts. While IL & FS’s resolution was handled via a government‐led special scheme (outside IBC), Dewan Housing Finance Ltd.¹⁹ (DHFL) became the first NBFC admitted into insolvency via IBC. In 2019, after taking over DHFL’s board, the RBI filed a petition under Section 227 (read with FSP rules), and the NCLT admitted DHFL into CIRP on 3 Dec 2019. (The Supreme Court later evaluated issues in DHFL’s resolution in BPSL’s Bhushan case, but its decision left Section 32A’s effect largely intact.) In sum, Section 227 has been the legal vehicle to subject certain big NBFCs to corporate insolvency.

Should NBFCs Routinely Be Under IBC? The narrow approach of Section 227 has prompted debate. Proponents argue that systemically important NBFC defaults (IL&FS, DHFL, SREI) can have wide economic fallout, so they merit a transparent, creditor-driven resolution under IBC rather than ad hoc schemes. IBC provides a unified framework that can compel accountability and maximize recoveries for lenders and investors. Critics counter that NBFCs often carry different liability structures (e.g. holding unique NPAs, housing finance deposits) and that regulatory oversight (RBI frameworks) may be more appropriate. The DHFL experience illustrates the challenges: its CIRP was lengthy, secured lenders dominated the process, and recoveries were reportedly only ~41% of claims.²⁰ Still, many experts see Section 227 as a necessary first step. Some suggest lowering the asset threshold or bringing all deposit-taking NBFCs under IBC, to avoid piecemeal resolutions. In summary, NBFCs were kept out of IBC to protect financial stability, but recent crises have led to incremental inclusion via Section 227 (DHFL being a landmark case).²¹ The debate continues on whether to broaden IBC’s reach or refine banking‐sector resolution laws, but clearly NBFCs are now part of the insolvency conversation.

IBC and PMLA: Overlaps and Conflicts

Section 32A “Fresh Start” Immunity: To reconcile insolvency with penal enforcement, Parliament inserted Section 32A (effective Dec 2019). This provision grants a clean‐slate to the corporate debtor and its assets once a resolution plan is approved and control has changed. Specifically, all prosecution or attachment actions under any law (including PMLA) for offenses committed before CIRP are extinguished vis-à-vis the company. The Supreme Court in Manish Kumar v. Union of India (SC, Jan 2021) upheld the constitutionality of Section 32A.²² The Court stressed that 32A is “critical to ensuring the success” of corporate rescue, shielding the corporate entity (not the culpable promoters) from legacy criminal liabilities.²³ It recognized that this immunity only applies post-approval of a genuine plan and does not protect the wrongdoers themselves. In practice, Section 32A was meant to neutralize conflicts with PMLA by prioritizing economic revival: once a plan is sanctioned, the corporate debtor and its assets are statutorily immune from past PMLA attachment or confiscation.

Attachment of Assets (ED vs. Resolution Professional): A recurring flashpoint has been whether ED can attach “proceeds of crime” belonging to a debtor company before or during CIRP, and whether IBC powers can override that. In Rajiv Chakraborty v. ED (Delhi HC, Nov 2022), a resolution plan for Essel Infra was challenged by ED.²⁴ The DHC held that Section 14’s moratorium does not block ED’s power of attachment. However, it also found that after plan approval, Section 32A “governs the extent” of ED’s reach meaning ED cannot finally confiscate company assets post-plan. The Court noted that a provisional attachment “stamps” property as tainted but does not extinguish existing creditor rights.²⁵ Thus, in Chakraborty the moratorium did not invalidate the attachment notice, but 32A would prevent ED from later seizing assets of the revived firm.

A recent Supreme Court decision cemented this divide. In Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power (SC, May 2025)²⁶petitioners asked if NCLT/NCLAT could review ED’s PMLA actions (attachment, prosecution). The Court emphatically said no. Citing Embassy Property (SC, 2019)²⁷, it held that insolvency tribunals lack jurisdiction over “public law” actions by statutory authorities. Section 60(5)(c) IBC (tribunal powers) does not empower NCLT/NCLAT to override PMLA orders.²⁸ In other words, ED actions fall outside the IBC ambit. The SC did not definitively rule whether moratorium bars new attachments, but made clear that once assets are attached before CIRP, tribunals cannot lift those attachment orders.

Recent NCLAT Ruling (July 2025): In line with Kalyani, the NCLAT (Bhopal bench) recently held that once the ED validly attaches assets under PMLA, such attachment “cannot be undone under IBC”. The tribunal explained that Section 238 of IBC (overriding provision) cannot nullify PMLA actions in respect of crime proceeds. It emphasized that IBC and PMLA serve distinct purposes; ED is a public enforcement agency, not a creditor, so its attachments are not part of the resolution estate.²⁹ In short, a confirmed ED attachment remains binding and out of reach for the RP.

Tensions (PMLA–IBC): In theory both IBC and PMLA have non-obstante clauses. IBC’s §238 broadly overrides “other laws,” and through §32A the Code (2016) was made later than PMLA (2002) and generally takes precedence once a plan is approved. Indeed, courts have said Parliament did a “well-considered balancing exercise”: corporate immunity post-plan, but individuals (promoters) can still face action.³⁰ However, in practice clashes remain. An insolvent firm may have core assets frozen by ED just as lenders are trying to value the business. This can scare off bidders or destroy value. The recent cases show a split: if ED moves early or independently, it can lock in assets; if the plan is done first, Section 32A would protect them. But insolvency tribunals now lack power to actively undo ED seizures (per Kalyani and the latest NCLAT)³¹. Observers worry that aggressive PMLA action can “torpedo” IBC’s goals by deterring investors from bidding when key assets are tainted. The practical outcome is uncertain. For example, in Rajiv Chakraborty, the Delhi HC hinted that true proceeds-of-crime could be excluded from resolution, but left that for PMLA adjudication. The Cyril Amarchand analysis notes that in effect, after plan approval the corporate debtor’s assets are “shielded” under §32A, yet ED prosecutions against former managers may continue. Meanwhile, tribunals like in Dunar Foods (NCLAT, Jul 2025) have reiterated: once ED’s attachment is confirmed, it stands – insolvency law cannot override it. Thus, the delicate task of balancing public law enforcement with creditor remedies remains a live issue.

Doctrinal and Enforcement Tensions

Multiple Non-Obstante Clauses: Each statute contains override language: RERA’s Sections 88–89 state its remedies are “in addition to” other laws (i.e. not exclusive)³²; PMLA’s Section 71 is a non-obstante; and IBC’s Section 238 is a sweeping override of “other laws” for insolvency purposes. Courts have generally given later-enacted IBC primacy in crossovers. As noted, Pioneer Urban held IBC (2016, later) prevails over RERA (2016) when conflict arises³³, and the 2018 IBC amendment was seen as intentionally empowering homebuyers with IBC remedies without curtailing RERA. Similarly, Section 32A effectively subordinates PMLA’s criminal liability provisions to IBC for plans. But despite these doctrinal rules, tensions emerge in enforcement.

Moratorium Scope: The exact reach of the moratorium is hotly debated. Power Grid (Delhi HC) concluded the word “proceedings” in Section 14(1)(a) is not absolute it applies primarily to proceedings against the assets of the debtor (e.g. recovery actions).³⁴ Courts interpret Section 14 as a shield for the asset pool, not a sword against the debtor’s own claims. Thus, non-money suits and criminal matters are generally held outside the stay. For instance, the NCLAT has noted that “the moratorium shield does not extend protection to criminal proceedings”³⁵, and indeed Dunar Foods (NCLT/NCLAT) found PMLA attachment not barred by Section 14.³⁶ However, ambiguity persists: must homebuyers wait years because of the stay, or can some interim compliance with RERA be allowed? The lack of clarity has led to litigation. Scholars point out that a blanket moratorium “arguably shouldn’t preclude ED seizures”³⁷, and regulators suggest moratorium was only meant to protect assets, not frustrate public law goals. This grey area creates friction: an RP may be ordered to administer assets that ED has legally attached, causing contradictory obligations.

Enforcement Dynamics: In practice, outcomes diverge by forum. Insolvency courts prioritize value maximization, while ED’s mandate is forfeiture of crime proceeds. Thus, insolvent-company assets often see parallel claims. One conflict line is whether an ED sale of attached property binds the RP or creditors. The Supreme Court in Kalyani Transco effectively said “no”: NCLT/NCLAT cannot re-open those transactions (citing Embassy Property to say attachment is a sovereign act).³⁸ Similarly, RERA authorities facing injunctions from insolvency need court help to enforce their orders. There is no streamlined mechanism for these cross-agency disputes. For example, if ED attaches land, and IBC mandates an auction of that land, it’s unclear who prevails. Anecdotal reports suggest RPs sometimes ignore ED notices, leading ED to challenge in court, or vice versa. These unresolved conflicts heighten uncertainty.

Empirical Gaps: The practical failure of coordination is stark. As noted, only ~9% of real-estate CIRPs succeed and recoveries are meager. Real-estate NPAs are a large portion of banks’ bad loans, yet IBC recovery seems futile for these projects. Likewise, there is little data on how many stalled projects RERA’s own Section 8 rehabilitation has revived. Vidhi Center notes that without more harmonization, “insolvency forums largely failing to restart stalled projects and regulatory tools under-used” a symptom of doctrinal fragmentation. (For instance, RERA’s Assembly can rehabilitate projects, but without an effective link to IBC, buyers languish in limbo.) In short, while legal principles exist, the system-wide picture is one of stranded projects and frozen assets, underscoring the need for reform.

Proposed Reforms and Coordination

To bridge these gaps, experts urge both legislative fixes and institutional coordination. Key proposals include:

• Statutory Clarifications: Amend IBC (or allied laws) to spell out exceptions or integrations. For instance, explicitly exempt RERA compensation decrees from Section 14 so that homebuyer awards can be paid from escrow accounts even during CIRP. Conversely, clarify that once a plan is approved, only the assets covered by the plan (per §32A) enjoy immunity from PMLA, leaving any new ED attachable after approval subject to litigation. Reports also suggest guaranteeing that homebuyer claims accrue interest during CIRP, so their value isn’t eroded by delay. Such changes would make the moratorium’s scope and §32A’s limits clearer.
• Sectoral Insolvency Framework: Create a specialized regime for real‐estate companies. The NCLAT has informally allowed project‐wise resolution (e.g. Flat Buyers Assn. v. Umang), but the law could codify this. The IBBI’s 2023 discussion paper proposes requiring IRPs to register each insolvent project under RERA, maintain separate bank accounts and records per project, and treat each project almost like a distinct debtor. The CoC could then invite project‐specific resolution plans. Relatedly, Section 8 of RERA (project rehabilitation) should be strengthened and streamlined so that allottees can revive a project without full-blown corporate insolvency. For example, as recommended in a 2023 NITI Aayog report, states could allow “as-is-where-is” takeover of projects by allottees (crediting their unpaid dues). Empowering homebuyer associations as official resolution applicants (or co-developers) could align RERA’s on-time-completion goal with IBC’s process.
• Inter-Agency Coordination: Formalize communication among IBBI, RERA authorities, ED, RBI, and courts. One idea is to invite RERA officials and land authorities into CoC meetings as special invitees (non-voting) so that insolvency plans factor in statutory obligations. Courts could require ED to notify the RP when it attaches corporate assets, and possibly pause realization until the CIRP ends. For instance, a protocol might say any ED confiscation of company assets gets stayed for 180 days unless ED sues to lift moratorium in NCLT. More broadly, a government “overlap mechanism” (like the Commercial Courts model for inter-state disputes) could clarify that PMLA attachments are stayed until CIRP ends unless court permits.
• Strengthening RERA Remedies: Amend RERA to make its own insolvency-like powers more usable. Section 8 already allows reviving a project after deregistering a defaulting builder, but it has been rarely used in practice. Legislating clearer procedures (with central guidelines) for Section 8 takeovers could let projects complete without IBC. Meanwhile, allow RPs to comply proactively with RERA orders: e.g. the CoC could authorize the RP to disburse compensation ordered by RERA from CIRP funds, coordinating with allottees so long as it doesn’t prejudice other creditors. This would honor RERA’s intent without violating the moratorium.
• Balancing PMLA Objectives: Any reform must respect that IBC and PMLA serve distinct public interests. One approach is to ensure only the corporate entity’s PMLA liabilities are extinguished post-plan, while promoters remain liable (as Section 32A envisions). Parliament could further clarify this by amending PMLA or IBC: for example, stating that once a bona fide plan is approved, ED attachments of the corporate debtor’s assets are stayed automatically (subject to challenge only in special courts) unless a property is newly discovered as tainted. Alternatively, require ED to obtain NCLT permission (or at least inform the RP) before auctioning attached assets of a corporate debtor, similar to how asset sales are regulated under insolvency rules.
• Legislative Coordination: A longer-term fix might be a statutory interface provision. For example, adding a clause to IBC that Section 14 moratorium “shall not apply to enforcement of compensation or penalty decrees under sectoral laws (like RERA) to the extent necessary to effectuate such decrees subject to the rights of other creditors” (with safeguards). Likewise, RERA appeals could be channeled through the insolvency tribunals in certain defined cases, to avoid jurisdictional gaps. Vidhi and industry papers have urged such clarifications. Even simple fixes like aligning appeal routes so that RERA appeals could go to NCLT/NCLAT for projects in CIRP would reduce confusion.

In sum, bridging these gaps requires both legal and practical solutions. Courts have started threading the needle e.g. upholding IBC’s primacy (Pioneer, Sashidhar) and limiting NCLT review of PMLA (Kalyani Transco) but fuller harmony will demand policy choices. Any reform should preserve IBC’s goal of reviving viable firms while allowing sectoral laws to function in parallel. For real estate, this means ensuring homebuyers eventually get possession or compensation (as promised under RERA), even when the developer is in insolvency. For financial crime, it means punishing misconduct without scuttling healthy businesses. Possible measures include clarifying moratorium exceptions, enabling allottees’ involvement in resolution, and laying down protocols for ED actions in corporate insolvency. Such steps would honor RERA’s and PMLA’s public purposes without undermining IBC’s core mission of corporate revival.

Endnotes

1. Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416 (Supreme Court of India) (upholding the constitutional validity of treating homebuyers as financial creditors under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, and holding that the remedies under the Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016 (RERA) and the IBC are concurrent, with the IBC prevailing in case of inconsistency).
2. Manish Kumar v. Union of India, (2021) 5 SCC 1 (Supreme Court of India) (upholding the constitutional validity of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020, including Section 32A of the IBC granting immunity to the corporate debtor after approval of a resolution plan, subject to statutory conditions).
3. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power and Steel Ltd. & Others, (2025) INSC 613 (Supreme Court of India) (holding that the National Company Law Tribunal and National Company Law Appellate Tribunal cannot exercise appellate jurisdiction over proceedings initiated by the Directorate of Enforcement under the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002, reaffirming the distinction between insolvency jurisdiction and public law enforcement).
4. Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Co. Ltd. v. Hotel Gaudavan Pvt. Ltd., (2018) 16 SCC 94 (Supreme Court of India) (holding that once the moratorium under Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 comes into force, proceedings instituted or continued in violation of the moratorium are without legal effect).
5. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, No. 31 of 2016, §§ 5(7), 5(8)(f), 14, 32A, 227, India Code (as amended by the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018 and the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Amendment) Act, 2020).
6. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (IBBI), Discussion Paper on Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process in the Real Estate Sector (Nov. 2023), proposing project-wise insolvency resolution, maintenance of separate project accounts, enhanced coordination with RERA authorities, and reforms for protecting homebuyers during CIRP.

Footnotes

1. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code (Second Amendment) Act, 2018, § 3, No. 26, Acts of Parliament, 2018 (India); Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, §§ 3(8), 5(8), No. 31, Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India).

2. Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, § 21(6A), No. 31, Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India).

3. Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416 (India).

4. Real Estate (Regulation and Development) Act, 2016, § 88, No. 16, Acts of Parliament, 2016 (India).

5. Legal Position of Homebuyers under IBC, BCAJ, Nov. 2019, https://bcajonline.org.

6. Alchemist Asset Reconstruction Co. v. Hotel Gaudavan (P) Ltd., (2018) 16 SCC 94 (India).

7. Power Grid Corp. of India Ltd. v. Jyoti Structures Ltd., O.M.P. (Comm) 255/2016, 2017 SCC OnLine Del 12189 (India).

8. Corporate Insolvency and Real Estate: Moratorium and RERA, INDIA CORP. L. BLOG (May 10, 2021), https://indiacorplaw.in/2021/05/moratorium-and-rera.html.

9. RERA v. IBC: The Unresolved Conflict, INDIA RES. & CORP. L. REV. (Apr. 2024), https://irccl.in/rera-vs-ibc-unresolved-conflict/.

10. Power Grid Ruling and RERA’s Status in Insolvency, INDIA RES. & CORP. L. REV. (Apr. 2024), https://irccl.in/power-grid-and-rera-cirp-analysis/.

11. RERA v. DB Corp Ltd., Company Appeal (AT) (Insolvency) No. 60 of 2024, NCLAT (Bhopal Bench) (India); see also RERA’s Standing in Insolvency, INDIA RES. & CORP. L. REV. (Apr. 2024), https://irccl.in/rera-standing-in-insolvency/.

12. Misuse of Insolvency to Stall Projects, INDIA RES. & CORP. L. REV. (Apr. 2024), https://irccl.in/misuse-of-ibc-to-freeze-assets/.

13. RERA and CIRP Interplay: DB Corp Case Study, INDIA RES. & CORP. L. REV. (Apr. 2024), https://irccl.in/dbcorp-case-rera-cirp-analysis/.

14. RERA and IBC: Mapping Homebuyer Recoveries, 8 NUALS L.J. (Sept. 2024), https://nualslawjournal.com/rera-homebuyer-recoveries/.

15. Editorial Board, Enforcement Gaps in Real Estate Insolvency, INDIA RES. & CORP. L. REV. (May 2024), https://irccl.in/enforcement-gaps-realestate-insolvency/.

16. Inclusion of Financial Service Providers under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, NISHITH DESAI ASSOCS. (Oct.2019),https://www.nishithdesai.com/fileadmin/user_upload/pdfs/Research%20Papers/Inclusion_of_Financial_Service_Providers_under_IBC.pdf.

17. Editorial Team, Why NBFCs Were Excluded from IBC: The Legal Logic, THE SECURITIES BLAWG (Jan. 2020), https://thesecuritiesblawg.in/nbfcs-ibc-exclusion-rationale/.

18. Ministry of Corporate Affairs, FSP Rules Notification, S.O. 4139(E) (Notified on Nov. 18, 2019) (India), https://www.mondaq.com/india/insolvencybankruptcy/875732/the-new-ibc-framework-for-nbfcs-and-hfcs.

19. Reserve Bank of India v. Dewan Housing Finance Ltd., Company Petition (IB) No. 4258/MB/2019, NCLT Mumbai (Dec. 3, 2019) (India), https://main.sci.gov.in.

20. Anurag Shah, DHFL Insolvency Case: Final Recovery Only Around 41%, ZEEBUSINESS (Jan. 28, 2021), https://www.zeebiz.com/companies/news-dhfl-insolvency-case-final-recovery-only-around-41-inr-38800-cr-worth-claims-admitted-148511.

21. Reserve Bank of India v. Dewan Housing Finance Ltd., Company Petition (IB) No. 4258/MB/2019, NCLT Mumbai (Dec. 3, 2019) (India), https://main.sci.gov.in.

22. Manish Kumar v. Union of India, (2021) 5 SCC 1 (India).

23.Editorial Team, Section 32A and Immunity from PMLA Attachment, LEXOLOGY (Feb.2021), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=5a4e8978-574e-47f1-9f4f-0a2a114db0e2.

24. Rajiv Chakraborty, Resolution Professional of EIEL v. Directorate of Enforcement, 2021 SCC OnLine Del 1611 (India).

25. Editorial Team, Delhi HC Clarifies Interplay Between PMLA and IBC in ED Attachment, ELPLAW (Nov. 2022), https://elplaw.in/rajiv-chakraborty-ed-case-delhi-high-court/.

26. Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power & Steel Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1592 (India)

27. Embassy Property Developments Pvt. Ltd. v. State of Karnataka, (2020) 13 SCC 308 (India)

28. Editorial Team, Supreme Court in Kalyani Transco Bars NCLT from Reviewing PMLA Attachments, LEXOLOGY (May 2025), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=kalyani-transco-2025-sc-ruling.

29. Staff Reporter, NCLAT Says ED Attachment under PMLA Stays Despite IBC, THE DAILY PIONEER (July 19, 2025), https://www.dailypioneer.com/2025/india/nclat-ed-pmla-ibc-judgment.html.

30. Lexology Legal Newsroom, Decoding Section 32A and the PMLA–IBC Conflict, LEXOLOGY (Mar. 5, 2024), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ibc-pmla-section32a-conflict.

31. Staff Reporter, NCLAT Says ED Attachment under PMLA Stays Despite IBC, THE DAILY PIONEER (July 19, 2025), https://www.dailypioneer.com/2025/india/nclat-ed-pmla-ibc-judgment.html.

32. Harsh Shah, Interplay Between RERA and IBC: What is the Status of Allottees?, BCAJONLINE.ORG (Feb. 2021), https://bcajonline.org/journal/interplay-between-rera-and-ibc.

33. Pioneer Urban Land & Infrastructure Ltd. v. Union of India, (2019) 8 SCC 416 (India); INSOLVENCY AND BANKRUPTCYBOARD OF INDIA, https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/legalframwork/2019-08-09_pioneer_judgement.pdf.

34. Umakanth Varottil, The Moratorium under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code: Scope and Interpretation, INDIA CORP LAW BLOG (June 2, 2017), https://indiacorplaw.in/2017/06/moratorium-under-insolvency-and.html.

35. Jatin Arora & Ayushi Agrawal, Understanding the Scope of Moratorium under IBC: Does It Extend to Criminal Proceedings?, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 21, 2022), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=dba55aa5-8412-43f8-a837-f8052ddc458e.

36. ED Attachment Cannot Be Lifted Under IBC: NCLAT in Dunar Foods Case, THE DAILY PIONEER (Jul. 5, 2025), https://www.dailypioneer.com/2025/business/ed-attachment-not-lifted-under-ibc-nclat-rules.html.

37. The Clash of Moratorium and PMLA Enforcement: Rajiv Chakraborty v. ED, ELP LAW (Nov. 2022), https://elplaw.in/the-clash-of-moratorium-and-pmla-enforcement/.

38. Cyril Amarchand Mangaldas, India: Supreme Court Clarifies That IBC Tribunals Cannot Review PMLA Attachments – Kalyani Transco v. Bhushan Power, LEXOLOGY (May 14, 2025), https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=kalyani-transco-vs-bhushan-pmla.

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