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In a significant pronouncement that bridges the gap between rigid administrative procedures and constitutional compassion, the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench, has set aside the dismissal of a pregnant woman candidate's petition and directed the Uttar Pradesh authorities to permit her to undergo the Physical Efficiency Test for the posts of Forest Guard and Wildlife Guard. The judgment, delivered by a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice Arun Bhansali and Justice Jaspreet Singh in Special Appeal No. 318 of 2026, reiterates a foundational principle: that motherhood cannot be treated as a disqualification from public employment, and that the absence of a specific rule cannot be weaponised to deny relief in extraordinary circumstances.
The case arose from an advertisement issued by the Uttar Pradesh Forest Department on 12 September 2023, inviting applications for the posts of Forest Guard and Wildlife Guard. The appellant, Komal Jaiswal, submitted her application and appeared for the written examination, which was held on 9 November 2025. She was declared successful on 8 January 2026. Between the advertisement and the examination, a span of more than two years had elapsed. During this period, the appellant married in November 2023 and conceived in May 2025. By the time the Physical Efficiency Test was scheduled to be conducted between 10 February 2026 and 19 February 2026, she was in the ninth month of her pregnancy. The PET required candidates to walk fourteen kilometres on foot within four hours, a requirement that was neither medically advisable nor physically possible for a woman at such an advanced stage of pregnancy.
The appellant, demonstrating both diligence and foresight, approached the Commission on 27 January 2026 and informed the Controller of Examination about her condition. She sought not an exemption from the PET, but merely a postponement of approximately one month post-delivery so that she could undergo the same test on terms of equality with other candidates. The Commission did not respond. Left with no alternative, the appellant approached the High Court on 13 February 2026, just before the scheduled dates of the PET. On 18 February 2026, the Court directed the respondents to file a short counter affidavit. However, on the very same day, the Commission rejected her prayer, citing the absence of any provision in the U.P. Forest Department Lower Subordinate Service Rules, 2015, for postponement of the PET on grounds of pregnancy.
The respondents defended their rejection by arguing that the selection process was substantially complete. They pointed out that against 709 advertised posts, 332 women candidates had already cleared the medical examination and the final result was being forwarded to the concerned authorities. The learned Single Judge, without examining the substantive merits of the appellant's plea or the constitutional dimensions of her claim, dismissed the writ petition on 6 July 2026, swayed primarily by the administrative argument that the process had advanced too far to accommodate her. The appellant, aggrieved by this dismissal, filed the present Special Appeal before the Division Bench.
Before the Division Bench, the appellant's counsel forcefully contended that the Single Judge had erred in dismissing the petition without adverting to the genuine and extraordinary hardship faced by her. The two-year delay between the advertisement and the written examination was a systemic delay for which the appellant could not be blamed. She had not concealed her pregnancy; she had proactively sought a brief postponement. The absence of a specific provision in the Rules of 2015, it was argued, could not be a ground to deny relief when the circumstance itself was unforeseen and extraordinary. Forcing a woman to choose between bearing a child and pursuing public employment, the appellant's counsel submitted, violated both her reproductive rights and her right to employment under the Constitution. The fact that 332 other women candidates had cleared the medical examination, it was emphasised, was irrelevant to the appellant's individual right to be given a fair opportunity to compete.
The respondents, represented by the Commission, insisted that the rejection was justified because the Rules of 2015 contained no enabling provision for postponement of the PET. They maintained that the recruitment process was in an advanced stage and that the absence of a statutory provision left them with no discretion to accommodate the appellant. When queried by the Court about the status of appointments, the Commission's counsel admitted that appointments were yet to be made, a fact that would prove crucial to the Court's reasoning.
The Division Bench framed the central issue with remarkable clarity. The question before the Court was whether the right of a woman candidate to seek public employment could be denied merely because an unforeseen inability, such as pregnancy or childbirth, occurred during the pendency of the selection process. The Court answered this question with an emphatic negative.
The Bench began its analysis by noting that a married woman is not disqualified for appointment as a Forest Guard or Wildlife Guard. Pregnancy, in itself, is neither a disqualification nor a bar to appointment under the Rules of 2015. The Court observed that motherhood is a most natural phenomenon in the life of a woman. Given the two-year gap between the advertisement and the written examination, the appellant's marriage and conception were natural developments that occurred in the ordinary course of life. The Commission, the Court held, was expected to be considerate and sympathetic towards the appellant's physical difficulty in undergoing a fourteen-kilometre walk in four hours at nine months of pregnancy.
The Court then addressed the Commission's defence of statutory silence. It held that the Rules of 2015 are silent on the aspect of providing postponement of the PET, which means there is no specific bar in this regard either. The Commission retains the power, in given extraordinary circumstances, to postpone the PET qua an individual candidate. The denial on the ground of absence of any provision in the Rules cannot be sustained. The Court highlighted that administrative rules are meant to facilitate the selection of suitable candidates, not to erect arbitrary barriers that defeat constitutional rights.
In a particularly powerful passage, the Court observed that the denial of postponement essentially forces a woman to have a choice of either bearing a child or seeking employment. This cannot be permitted, the Bench held, because it interferes with both her right of reproduction and her right to employment. The respondents were required to be more sympathetic and alive to the extraordinary circumstances of the case. The Court also rejected the administrative argument that the advanced stage of the recruitment process was a valid ground for denial. The mere fact that 332 women candidates had cleared the medical examination, by itself, could not be a reason to deny the appellant the opportunity to undergo her PET. If she cleared the PET and the subsequent medical examination and stood in merit in her category, the consequences would follow accordingly. The recruitment process, the Court noted, was still open since appointments had not yet been made.
The Division Bench was firmly of the opinion that the rejection of the appellant's prayer for postponement could not be sustained. The Court allowed the Special Appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 6 July 2026, and allowed the writ petition. The respondents were directed to permit the appellant to undergo the PET pursuant to the advertisement dated 12 September 2023. The Court further directed that the PET be conducted and completed within a period of four weeks. If the appellant cleared the PET, she would be subjected to the further selection process as required. If she stood in merit, she would be accorded appointment with effect from the date on which a person lower in merit to her was granted appointment, in case appointments were made before the declaration of her result. Finally, since the Commission had already recommended the matter to the State Government, the respondents were directed to keep one post in the appellant's category, that is, OBC woman, vacant until her result was declared.
This judgment is a timely reminder that administrative rigidity must yield to constitutional values. It reaffirms that recruitment rules are not static codes to be applied mechanically, but frameworks that must be interpreted in a manner that respects human dignity, reproductive autonomy, and the right to equal opportunity. For employers, commissions, and tribunals across the country, the decision in Komal Jaiswal serves as a precedent: when a candidate seeks only a brief postponement due a medical condition arising from maternity, the recruitment process should accommodate her without prejudice to others , not doing so would amount to exclusion.
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