ARTICLE
26 June 2026

Section 301’ing The World (Or 99.4% Of It)

SM
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP

Contributor

Businesses turn to Sheppard to deliver sophisticated counsel to help clients move ahead. With more than 1,200 lawyers located in 16 offices worldwide, our client-centered approach is grounded in nearly a century of building enduring relationships on trust and collaboration. Our broad and diversified practices serve global clients—from startups to Fortune 500 companies—at every stage of the business cycle, including high-stakes litigation, complex transactions, sophisticated financings and regulatory issues. With leading edge technologies and innovation behind our team, we pride ourselves on being a strategic partner to our clients.
The Trump Administration has deployed Section 301 tariff actions at unprecedented scale, with USTR issuing affirmative determinations against all 60 major U.S. trading partners for failing to adequately prohibit or enforce bans on forced labor imports.
Worldwide International Law
Sheppard, Mullin, Richter & Hampton LLP are most popular:
  • within Cannabis & Hemp topic(s)

As our readers may recall, we predicted in July 2025 that the Trump Administration would react to the invalidation of IEEPA tariffs by “Section 301’ing the world.” That prediction has now effectively come to pass, with Section 301 tariff actions being deployed at an unprecedented scale.

On June 2, 2026, the Office of the United States Trade Representative (“USTR”) issued a press release announcing affirmative determinations in all 60 of its Section 301 forced labor investigations, concluding that every major U.S. trading partner has failed to adequately prohibit or enforce bans on imports of goods produced with forced labor.1 The 60 economies collectively account for 99.4% of all goods imported into the United States.2 The USTR has proposed additional tariffs ranging from 10% to 12.5% on imports.3

Background: How We Got Here

A heavy use of Section 301 tariffs has been on the horizon since the Supreme Court’s decision striking down President Trump’s use of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (“IEEPA”) tariffs. In the immediate aftermath of that ruling, the Trump Administration issued temporary tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974. Those tariffs were imposed with a 150-day deadline that expires on July 24, 2026, unless extended by Congress.

In order to partially replace the short-lived Section 122 tariffs, on March 12, 2026, USTR self-initiated Section 301 investigations into 60 of the largest U.S. trading partners. In those investigations, USTR opened a public comment docket that received over 450 written submissions, held two days of public hearings, and conducted confidential government-to-government consultations with 46 of the 60 economies under investigation.4

The Legal Framework

Section 301(b) of the Trade Act of 1974 authorizes USTR to take action against foreign acts, policies, or practices that are “unreasonable or discriminatory” and burden or restrict U.S. commerce – even where no violation of international law exists.5 Critically, Section 301 explicitly identifies “a persistent pattern of conduct that . . . permits any form of forced or compulsory labor” as an example of unreasonable conduct.6 The statute also provides a limited defense: USTR shall not treat such conduct as unreasonable if the foreign country has taken actions demonstrating “significant and tangible overall advancement” in addressing the relevant labor practices, or if those practices are consistent with the country’s level of economic development.7

What USTR Found

Unsurprisingly, USTR found no applicable defenses across any of the 60 economies.

Because Section 301 covers both affirmative conduct and failures to act, USTR also focused on these economies’ inadequate enforcement against forced-labor imports.

And while USTR distinguished legally between failing to adopt a prohibition and failing to enforce one, the practical result was the same: each of the 60 economies failed on adoption, enforcement, or both.8

The Proposed Remedy: Two Tiers and a Textile Mechanism

As a result of these investigations, USTR proposed two tariff rates, as follows:

  • 10%: Economies that (i) have made forced-labor import-prohibition commitments under the Agreement on Reciprocal Trade (“ART”) or (ii) have a forced-labor import prohibition in place but do not enforce it effectively.
  • 12.5%: All other economies.

USTR also proposed a textile mechanism that would allow a certain volume of apparel and textile imports to enter at a reduced Section 301 rate.9 The mechanism is calibrated so that countries that purchase American textile inputs receive tariff relief on their finished goods for export.

A table of the proposed tariff rates follows:

#

Economies

Proposed additional duty rate

USTR Justification

1

Algeria

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

2

Angola

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

3

Argentina

10%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition, but has undertaken commitments in Agreement on Reciprocal Trade regarding forced labor import prohibitions

4

Australia

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

5

The Bahamas

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

6

Bahrain

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

7

Bangladesh

10%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition, but has undertaken commitments in Agreement on Reciprocal Trade regarding forced labor import prohibitions

8

Brazil

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

9

Cambodia

10%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition, but has undertaken commitments in Agreement on Reciprocal Trade regarding forced labor import prohibitions

10

Canada

10%

Imposes a forced labor import prohibition, but does not effectively enforce it

11

Chile

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

12

China, People’s Republic of

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

13

Colombia

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

14

Costa Rica

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

15

Dominican Republic

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

16

Ecuador

10%

Imposes a forced labor import prohibition, but does not effectively enforce it; has undertaken commitments in Agreement on Reciprocal Trade regarding forced labor import prohibitions

17

Egypt

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

18

El Salvador

10%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition, but has undertaken commitments in Agreement on Reciprocal Trade regarding forced labor import prohibitions

19

European Union

10%

Imposes a forced labor import prohibition, but does not effectively enforce it

20

Guatemala

10%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition, but has undertaken commitments in Agreement on Reciprocal Trade regarding forced labor import prohibitions

21

Guyana

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

22

Honduras

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

23

Hong Kong, China

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

24

India

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

25

Indonesia

10%

Imposes a forced labor import prohibition, but does not effectively enforce it; has undertaken commitments in Agreement on Reciprocal Trade regarding forced labor import prohibitions

26

Iraq

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

27

Israel

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

28

Japan

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

29

Jordan

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

30

Kazakhstan

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

31

Kuwait

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

32

Libya

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

33

Malaysia

10%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition, but has undertaken commitments in Agreement on Reciprocal Trade regarding forced labor import prohibitions

34

Mexico

10%

Imposes a forced labor import prohibition, but does not effectively enforce it

35

Morocco

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

36

New Zealand

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

37

Nicaragua

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

38

Nigeria

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

39

Norway

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

40

Oman

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

41

Pakistan

10%

Imposes a forced labor import prohibition, but does not effectively enforce it

42

Peru

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

43

Philippines

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

44

Qatar

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

45

Russia

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

46

Saudi Arabia

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

47

Singapore

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

48

South Africa

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

49

South Korea

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

50

Sri Lanka

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

51

Switzerland

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

52

Taiwan

10%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition, but has undertaken commitments in Agreements on Reciprocal Trade regarding forced labor import prohibitions

53

Thailand

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

54

Trinidad and Tobago

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

55

Türkiye

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

56

United Arab Emirates

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

57

United Kingdom

10%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition, but has imposed a partial regime with the effect of preventing the importation of certain forced labor goods

58

Uruguay

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

59

Venezuela

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

60

Vietnam

12.5%

Failure to impose and effectively enforce a forced labor import prohibition

Exclusions: What’s Not Covered

Despite the breadth of economies implicated, USTR’s proposed remedy includes meaningful categorical exclusions:

  • Goods identified under Annex A;
  • All articles currently subject to Section 232 tariffs;
  • Goods of Canada or Mexico that are compliant with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (“USMCA”);
  • Textiles and apparel that enter duty-free under the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement (“CAFTA-DR”) from Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, or Nicaragua10; and
  • Informational materials, donations, accompanied baggage.11

Next Steps

The proposed tariff actions are not final. The President retains final decision-making authority on tariff rates and country coverage, and President Trump may depart from USTR’s proposed approach. USTR is actively soliciting public comment on which products should be added to or removed from the tariff scope, whether the Annex A exclusions are appropriately drawn, the rate structure, features of the textile mechanism, and whether ART-commitment countries should be treated differently from countries that have already enacted prohibitions.12

Written comments on the proposed action are due July 6, 2026. Requests to appear at the July 7 public hearing at the USITC must be submitted by June 22, 2026.13

For importers, we recommend the following:

  • Audit Annex A. If a product should be excluded and is not currently on the list, the comment period is the window to make that argument. Companies with significant import exposure should be mapping their HTS classifications against Annex A to assess potential tariff exposure.
  • Reassess supply chain risk. Companies sourcing goods that may incorporate forced-labor inputs should review their compliance frameworks in light of USTR’s explicit emphasis on circumvention through third-country processing.14
  • Account for stacking. These tariffs, if finalized, apply on top of any other applicable duties. Companies already managing Section 232 or existing Section 301 China tariffs should review the potential cumulative effect.
  • Watch the parallel investigation. USTR’s concurrent Section 301 investigation into structural excess industrial capacity covers 16 economies and could result in additional tariff exposure across a broader range of products.15

*McKenna Lee is a summer associate in the firm's Washington, D.C. office. 

Footnotes

1. Notice of Determinations and Request for Comments Concerning Actions in Section 301 Investigations of Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor, 91 Fed. Reg. 34,272, 34,272 (June 5, 2026).

2. Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, Acts, Policies, and Practices of Various Economies Related to the Failure to Impose and Effectively Enforce a Prohibition on the Importation of Goods Produced with Forced Labor 1 (June 2, 2026), https://ustr.gov/sites/default/files/files/Press/Releases/2026/USTR%20Report%20Sec%20301%20FL%20301%206-2-26%20FINAL%20for%20upload.pdf.

3. Notice of Determinations, 91 Fed. Reg. at 34,272.

4. Id.

5. Id.; 19 U.S.C. § 2411(b)(1) (2018).

6. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(B)(iii)(III) (2018).

7. 19 U.S.C. § 2411(d)(3)(C)(i) (2018).

8. Id.

9. Id.

10. Id.

11. Id.

12. Notice of Determinations, 91 Fed. Reg. at 34,275–76.

13. Id.

14. Report, supra note 2, at 54.

15. Initiation of Section 301 Investigations: Acts, Policies, and Practices of Certain Economies Relating to Structural Excess Capacity and Production in Manufacturing Sectors, 91 Fed. Reg. 12,886 (Mar. 17, 2026).

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

[View Source]
See More Popular Content From

Mondaq uses cookies on this website. By using our website you agree to our use of cookies as set out in our Privacy Policy.

Learn More