Motive Matters Most: The Second Circuit Confirms A New Standard For Title VII Religious Accommodation Claims

In a recent decision in the case Bergin v. New York State Unified Court System, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals explicitly confirmed a new three-part test for determining whether a plaintiff has stated a prima facie case for failure to accommodate a religious belief or practice under Title VII. The new test zeroes in on whether the employer acted out of a desire to avoid providing a religious accommodation, rather than simply whether the employer had knowledge of the employee’s religious belief.

The Old Test’s Focus on Employer Knowledge

For decades, the Second Circuit has used the three-part test from cases such as Knight v. Conn. Dep’t of Pub. Health to determine whether a plaintiff has stated a claim for failure to accommodate. This old test focused on whether the employer had knowledge of the employee’s sincerely held religious belief. Specifically, courts would consider whether: (1) the plaintiff had a bona fide religious belief conflicting with a work requirement; (2) the plaintiff informed the employer of that belief; and (3) the plaintiff suffered discipline for noncompliance.

The New Test’s Focus on Employer Motive

In Bergin, however, the Second Circuit considered the Supreme Court’s decision in EEOC v. Abercrombie & Fitch Stores, Inc. and confirmed that the Abercrombie decision abrogates decades of precedent by refocusing the analysis of whether the desire to avoid providing a religious accommodation motivated the employer’s decision making. The new three-part test requires showing that: (1) the plaintiff actually required accommodation of their religious practice; (2) the employer’s desire to avoid the “actually required” accommodation was a motivating factor; and (3) this desire not to accommodate led to an adverse employment action.

The employer in Bergin had implemented a COVID-19 vaccination requirement that allowed employees to seek either medical or religious exemptions. Religious requests were reviewed by a vaccine exemption committee. Because the committee received approximately 1,200 exemption requests, it used strict deadlines and supplemental forms to gather additional information from applicants who had raised certain common objections, including concerns tied to fetal stem cells or bodily integrity.

The plaintiff, Jessica Bergin, submitted an initial request with a personal statement, scriptural references, and a letter from her pastor. The employer requested additional information through a supplemental form. Bergin returned the form without answering most of the questions, instead asserting privacy concerns. The employer denied the exemption request. She later submitted a more complete supplemental form, but by then, the employer considered the decision “final” and declined to revisit it. Bergin remained unvaccinated, was placed on leave, and was later terminated.

The district court granted partial summary judgment in Bergin’s favor, relying heavily on the employer’s statements made in interrogatory responses and depositions that suggested knowledge of her religious belief and need for a religious accommodation. Specifically, the employer had purportedly admitted that Bergin’s original submission was “perfectly adequate” and “explained a religious belief.” The Second Circuit rejected this analysis on two grounds:

First, the Court found that knowledge of a religious belief and the need for an accommodation may show motive not to provide the accommodation but is not dispositive of the issue. Rather, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the employer acted with the intent not to provide the accommodation.

Second, the Court cautioned that the employer’s statement made during discovery regarding the sufficiency of Bergin’s application for an accommodation were not judicial admissions that demonstrated an intentional, clear, and unambiguous position. Specifically, the Court found that the employer had not conceded that Bergin’s request satisfied all relevant requirements. Rather, the employer had said that her submission described a religious belief but that the employer still needed more information to assess sincerity and decide whether to grant the request, an important distinction

Employer Takeaways

• Employers should not assume that a technical or other defect in a religious accommodation request will be enough to avoid liability if the employee challenges the employer’s rejection of the accommodation. Relatedly, policies that effectively suggest that the company has no duty unless an employee uses a specific procedure or language do not reflect the governing analysis. Even if an employer does not know about a sincerely held religious belief that requires accommodation, evidence of a motive to deny accommodation may be sufficient to state a claim.
• Because motive is central to the new test, plaintiffs will likely focus on emails, committee notes, and denial rationales when looking to state a claim. Employers should be careful to document well the reasons for denying an accommodation. 
• Employers that use standardized forms and centralized review committees can benefit from those systems — but only if the process reflects individualized consideration and is supported by careful documentation.

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