Axinn Associates At The Antitrust Spring Meeting: Perspectives On The DOJ Antitrust Division’s Whistleblower Rewards Program

The Spring Meeting is the largest gathering of competition, consumer protection, and data privacy profes­sionals globally, with lawyers, academics, economists, enforcers, journalists, and students from around the world. During the 2026 Spring Meeting, Axinn associates attended thought leadership panels to capture key insights. Their report of the takeaways from the panel, “Blowing the Whistle: Cartel Detection Risk,” appears below.

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The DOJ Antitrust Division’s recently launched Whistleblower Rewards Program (“Whistleblower Program”) has been the buzz in the antitrust bar, especially following the announcement of the first bounty in January. The Spring Meeting panel, “Blowing the Whistle: Cartel Detection Risk,” provided perspectives on the program from former DOJ officials (Richard Powers and Manish Kumar) and Brendan Donahue of the United States Postal Inspection Service (“USPIS”), as well as an international perspective from a former president of CADE, Alexandre Cordeiro Macedo, and insights from the private bar from Kamil Shields. The panel additionally discussed the program from the whistleblower’s perspective. 

The panel started with Donahue explaining the role of the U.S. Postal Service, its law enforcement arm (USPIS), and its longstanding (if not well known) relationship with the Antitrust Division and other agencies. Donahue also explained that the Postal Service remains an independent agency in the traditional sense, is self-funded, and has a unique statutorily granted ability to collect penalties and to issue rewards, making it an important partner for the Whistleblower Program. Donahue reiterated the broad scope of the program, reminding the audience that, for the postal nexus to be met, there is no need for the Postal Service to be financially affected. 

Panelists then highlighted some of the particulars of the Whistleblower Program, as described in the Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Antitrust Division and the Postal Service. For instance, the MOU contemplates multiple whistleblowers for a single antitrust violation, specifying that the total shared amount among multiple eligible whistleblowers for a single award may not exceed 30% of the recovered criminal fine. It also allows the whistleblower rewards to exist alongside Type A leniency (available to a company that first alerts the Antitrust Division to a violation in which the company was involved). A whistleblower may receive a reward even if the company is the first to alert the Antitrust Division of the violation, so long as the whistleblower reports their information to the DOJ within 120 days of the reporting the same information through an internal company channel, and the whistleblower’s information triggered the internal investigation that led to the company’s report to the DOJ. 

Panelists also discussed how the program’s increased monetary incentives for whistleblowing may alter a potential whistleblower’s risk calculus for reporting, with the monetary reward potentially outweighing the whistleblower’s concerns about criminal liability or retaliation. Donahue explained that, when the Postal Service consults with the Antitrust Division about the award that the whistleblower should receive, the USPIS takes into account the whistleblower’s risk exposure when deciding what amount to recommend—higher risk undertaken by the whistleblower (for example, through additional cooperation such as consensual recording) may lead to a higher reward. 

Former DOJ Antitrust Division Deputy Assistant Attorney General for Criminal Enforcement Manish Kumar observed that, due to the program’s incentive structure, both the whistleblower and the company may benefit from the whistleblower reporting a potential violation internally first instead of going straight to the government. Under the MOU, the whistleblower may receive an award for providing original information about eligible crime violations only if the information leads “to a resolution including a criminal fine of at least $1 million, or an equivalent recovery from a deferred prosecution or non-prosecution agreement.” From the whistleblower’s perspective, reporting internally first may make a fine (and therefore a reward to the whistleblower) more likely. Such internal reporting could enable the company to secure leniency for wrongdoing, which in turn would require the company to cooperate with the government, potentially increasing the likelihood that the government would recover a fine from co-conspirators. For the company, an early internal report provides the best opportunity for Type A leniency or, if leniency is unavailable, a negotiated resolution allowing it to mitigate the repercussions of any wrongdoing. This potentially symbiotic relationship is a reminder to bolster internal reporting channels, create a culture of open lines of communication, and ensure that proper resources are available to conduct swift internal investigations. 

As the Whistleblower Program takes shape, we will continue monitoring its development. 

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