Court Of Appeal Provides Judicial Steer On The Scope Of Tipping Off In Convicted Solicitor's Case

The Court of Appeal considered, in the first appeal of its kind, the tipping off offence under the Proceeds of Crime Act ("POCA"), confirming that a transaction-specific enquiry may trigger liability even in the context of an investigation which is in the public domain, and actual prejudice need not be proved.

In R v Osmond [2026] EWCA Crim 979, the Court of Appeal dismissed an appeal by a former solicitor convicted of tipping off, in the first appellate case to consider the offence. Tipping off is a criminal offence under s.333A POCA, whereby a person who receives information in the course of business "in the regulated sector" discloses to another person (who may be a client or third party) that a suspicious activity report has been filed or that a money laundering investigation is contemplated or underway. There is also a similar offence of prejudicing a money laundering investigation under section 342 POCA for those outside the AML-regulated sector.

The judgment, which has significant implications for AML-regulated firms and professionals, clarifies the scope of the tipping off offence, in particular, what constitutes information in the course of a business in the AML regulated sector and the threshold for establishing prejudice to an investigation. 

Background

Mr Osmond, a former senior solicitor who acted for a long-standing client, James Redding Ramsay, was contacted by the SFO in June 2018 in respect of the purchase of a Mayfair property. The property purchase had been part funded by Mr Ramsay's company and handled by Mr Osmond's firm. Legal work of this type falls within the AML “regulated sector”. 

The transaction had come to the SFO's attention during its high-profile investigation into ENRC, and was suspected to be linked to money laundering. At the time of the SFO’s conversation with Mr Osmond, the fact that the SFO was investigating ENRC was in the public domain, but the specific investigation into the property purchase was not.

A formal section 2 notice was served on Mr Osmond on 15 June 2018 for information regarding the property purchase. The notice expressly referred to confidentiality and the tipping off offence.

Mr Osmond telephoned Mr Ramsay the day after the SFO's contact (but before the formal section 2 notice was served), and travelled to Malta to meet his client and coordinate responses to the SFO over the following weeks. The Court noted that the information later provided by Mr Osmond during his section 2 interview to the SFO was not an independent account, but the product of discussions with, and instructions from Mr Ramsay. 

Mr Osmond was later convicted of tipping off, and sentenced to nine months’ imprisonment suspended for 18 months. He appealed his conviction on the grounds that: (1) the information did not come to him in the course of a business in a regulated sector but from the SFO; and (2) the broader investigation into ENRC was well-known and the enquiry into the financing of the property was merely a part of that investigation. The Court dismissed the appeal and upheld his conviction.

Mr Osmond was also convicted of forgery after admitting that a letter of engagement with Mr Ramsay had been created for the purposes of the SFO investigation and backdated. The defence submitted that the investigator was not performing any duty when he received the false letter (which was a relevant element of the forgery offence¹). The Court upheld his forgery conviction, confirming that deceiving an SFO investigator conducting a criminal inquiry would satisfy the duty requirement.

Judgment

The defence argued that the information did not come to Mr Osmond in the course of a regulated business but, rather, he received information about a well-known investigation from a prosecuting authority, exercising its investigative powers, and that there was no evidence that the SFO investigation was actually harmed.

Thus Court was required to consider, in relation to the tipping off conviction, whether (i) the SFO's investigation was already known to the recipient of the information (i.e. Mr Ramsay), (ii) the information was received by Mr Osmond in a regulated-sector capacity, and (iii) the disclosure was likely to prejudice the SFO's investigation. 

In relation to each, the Court held as follows:

1. A specific non-public aspect of a public investigation can engage the tipping off offence

The Court held that the relevant disclosure was not the public ENRC investigation into alleged corruption, fraud and money laundering as a whole, but the specific investigation into suspected money laundering connected with the property transaction. It was accepted that Mr Ramsay was not aware the property transaction was itself under investigation.

The Court found that the disclosure of the specific investigation was capable of amounting to a disclosure for the purposes of section 333A(3) POCA. The fact that the inquiry formed part of a broader and well-publicised investigation did not prevent it from being treated as a separate investigation for these purposes.

2. The regulated-sector test turns on capacity, not source

Secondly, the Court rejected the argument that section 333A(3)(c) was not engaged because the information came from the SFO rather than from the firm’s own compliance or reporting processes. What mattered was the capacity in which Mr Osmond received the information, not the source, which will typically be the SFO or other investigating agency. 

The Court found that Mr Osmond had received the information as Mr Ramsay’s solicitor in relation to a transaction involving real property, client money and company-related structuring, all of which fall within Schedule 9 of POCA. 

The Court also confirmed that although the transaction was complete, information received by Mr Osmond in relation to it was still received in his ‘regulated sector’ capacity. 

3. Actual prejudice need not be proved

Thirdly, the Court found that the prosecution did not need to prove that the investigation was in fact prejudiced. The issue was whether, at the time of disclosure, the disclosure was likely to prejudice the investigation. It was therefore no defence to say, with hindsight, that the investigation had not actually been harmed. The Court also observed that disclosure of an investigation to its target is inherently likely to prejudice the investigation because evidence may be destroyed or compromised, or an offender may seek to evade justice.

Commentary

The judgment is the first leading authority on the tipping off offence (and, by analogy, the prejudicing an investigation offence). It raises a number of important considerations for legal and compliance professionals that are responsible for reporting suspected money laundering and that often face pressure to explain delay, silence or an unexpected change in the process to a client.

First, firms cannot assume there is no tipping off risk merely because a wider investigation is already public. A transaction-specific investigation can be distinct from a wider public inquiry. The question is whether the particular strand of enquiry is known to the recipient. In complex or long-running investigations, third parties may not be able to judge with confidence the precise scope of an authority’s enquiries or whether a particular transaction, asset or individual is an ongoing strand of investigation. That means firms should be cautious about assuming that publicity around a wider investigation eliminates the risk of tipping off and should take steps to mitigate against the risk arising from the disclosure of a specific line of enquiry to the client or counterparty, including by seeking advice before communicating where the position is uncertain.

Secondly, the judgment confirms that tipping off does not require evidence of actual prejudice to the investigation, merely that the investigation is likely to be prejudiced and the defendant knows or suspects this. The Court’s observation that disclosure of an investigation to its target is inherently likely to prejudice the investigation is also relevant in this regard.

Compliance professionals in particular may struggle to establish that they did not appreciate the risk that a disclosure would be likely to prejudice an investigation. On the facts, the Court found that, as the firm’s money laundering reporting officer, Mr Osmond would have been well aware of the risk of committing a tipping off offence. 

Thirdly, the capacity in which the information is received is key. Information can be received ‘in the course of business in the regulated sector’ simply because it relates to AML-regulated work². Indeed, the decision is a reminder that regulated sector obligations do not fall away merely because the underlying transaction is historical. The Court made clear that the historical nature of the underlying transaction did not take the case outside the AML-regulated sector and that a regulated professional who receives an approach from law enforcement about work done on an earlier transaction may still receive relevant information in their regulated sector capacity. Whilst this point was straightforward to apply in the Osmond case, it may be more complex where a firm has historically done both regulated and unregulated work for a client, and receives information about an investigation. That said, outside the regulated sector the s.342 POCA offence is likely to apply, so the practical steps to take for compliance purposes would be materially identical.

From a practical perspective, receiving information about money laundering investigations – particularly as a business in the AML-regulated sector – will necessarily carry some risk. Firms should ensure that compulsory notices, informal approaches and requests for information are escalated promptly through clear internal channels, and that those handling them understand the limits on what can be shared with clients or other persons. A key mitigant is to treat any notification that a specific client or transaction is under investigation as highly sensitive, control communications tightly, and obtain legal or compliance input before saying anything that might alert a third party to the investigation.

Footnotes

1 Pursuant to sections 1 and 10 of the Forgery and Counterfeiting Act 1981.

2 The same test applies in section 330(3) POCA – a SAR is required in respect of information received in the course of business in the regulated sector which meets the other requirements of that section. As such, this aspect of the judgment also has implications for firms considering their SAR-reporting obligations.