Personal Welfare Deputyships – The Court Of Appeal Confirms When Deputies Should Be Appointed

The Court of Appeal has recently made its first judgment on a personal welfare deputyship application in Re HB (Appointment of Personal Welfare Deputy) [2026] EWCA Civ 960, allowing the appeal from HHJ Beckley’s decision in Re HDEB [2026] EWCOP 12 (T2). The judgment clarifies when it may be appropriate to appoint a personal welfare deputy for an adult who lacks capacity to make welfare decisions.

Personal welfare deputies are appointed by the Court of Protection to make decisions for people aged 16 or over who lack capacity, known as ‘P’. Unlike property and affairs deputies, they are not routinely appointed as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 (‘MCA’) already provides a framework for a range of personal welfare decisions that can be made without express authority.

Background

HB was a 22-year-old man with autism, ADHD, oppositional defiant disorder and epilepsy. He had complex care needs, including one-to-one daytime support, waking-night supervision and additional support when his behaviour became challenging or when he was in the community.

His parents, JB and SB, had cared for him throughout his life and moved house twice to remain close to him following his move into residential care facilities.

They were already his property and affairs deputies and applied to be appointed jointly and severally as his personal welfare deputies, seeking authority over a wide range of care and welfare decisions.

The Legal Framework

The MCA requires decisions to be made in the least restrictive way, with P assumed to have capacity unless established otherwise. Where P lacks capacity, sections 4 and 5 allow best interests decisions to be made informally or collaboratively. Section 16 gives the Court of Protection power to make decisions or appoint a deputy, but provides that a Court decision is generally preferable to appointing a deputy and that any deputyship powers should be limited in scope and duration.

In Re Lawson, Mottram and Hopton (Appointment of Personal Welfare Deputies) [2019] 1 WLR 5164 , the Court confirmed that there is no presumption against appointing personal welfare deputies. Instead, the question is whether appointment is in P’s best interests, applying the MCA framework.

Why was the initial application refused?

HHJ Beckley accepted that HB would require future welfare decisions, but held that this did not justify appointing personal welfare deputies where collaborative decision-making was working in his best interests.

The parents sought authority over broad day-to-day matters, including diet, dress, leisure and social activities. The judge considered these decisions were better made by those supporting HB in residential care.

He also considered that any future serious dispute, for example about residence, should be brought back to the Court of Protection rather than addressed through a personal welfare deputyship.

HHJ Beckley concluded that appointing JB and SB would unnecessarily infringe HB’s autonomy as an adult. Permission to appeal was granted, partly because the approach differed from Parr v Cheshire East Council & Another [2026] EWCOP 1 (T3).

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeal unanimously allowed the appeal with Sir Stephen Cobb handing down the leading judgment. He concluded that JB and SB should be appointed jointly and severally as personal welfare deputies for a wide range of care and welfare issues, subject to the MCA’s conditions and restrictions.

The Court held that the existence of collaborative decision-making under sections 4 and 5 MCA is not, by itself, a reason to refuse deputyship. The Court must examine how effective those arrangements are in practice. Furthermore, the Court found that there was evidence that JB and SB had to challenge the local authority and other professionals on various issues including HB’s education, choice of school, physical, dental and occupational health. These challenges had been lengthy and showed a distinct lack of collaboration between the relevant professionals, which was not in HB’s best interests.

On the facts, the Court of Appeal found that appointing JB and SB as personal welfare deputies would enhance rather than diminish the effectiveness of decision-making for HB.

When might personal welfare deputyship be appropriate?

The judgment identifies factors which may support appointment, including:

1. When the proposed deputy has a special relationship with P, particularly where they can understand, communicate with and advocate for P.
2. Where the proposed deputy will be able to better reflect and enhance P’s wishes and feelings, beliefs and values.
3. Where a “stream of decisions” is anticipated, rather than a single issue suitable for determination by the Court of Protection.
4. Where P is transitioning from childhood to adulthood services and continuity of decision-making would be in P’s best interests.
5. Where there have been difficulties with public bodies’ decision-making, including failure to consult properly or apply the MCA framework.
6. Where there is a particular need for prompt and agile decision-making as P’s circumstances evolve.

What does the decision mean in practice?

The judgment does not mean personal welfare deputies should be routinely appointed whenever an adult lacks capacity. The Court of Protection must focus on P’s real-world circumstances and the practical effectiveness of existing arrangements.

Applicants should provide evidence of the practical benefits deputyship would bring, such as previous disputes, delays, difficulties with professionals or public bodies, or circumstances where P’s wishes and feelings have not been properly understood or represented.

The proposed powers should also be carefully limited. Authority over every aspect of P’s daily life is unlikely to be appropriate where decisions can be made informally or collaboratively with the relevant professionals.

Conclusion

Re HDEB highlighted the tension between autonomy and the perceived benefits of a personal welfare deputyship. Re HB now confirms that collaborative decision-making does not prevent appointment where the evidence shows that deputyship would provide more effective, consistent and responsive decision-making for P.

The decision is likely to lead to more applications being considered on their individual merits. For practitioners, the key issue is not simply whether decisions can be made without a deputy, but whether appointment would enhance decision-making and better promote P’s best interests.