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The Dispute: A Leave Benefit That Came with a Built-In Exclusion
In Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, the Supreme Court examined whether adoptive mothers could be denied maternity benefit merely because the adopted child was older than three months. The challenge was first mounted against the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961 (“the Act”), but after the Code on Social Security, 2020 (“the Code”) came into force on November 21, 2025, the Court treated the Code as the operative provision.1
The Code originally provided that a woman who legally adopted a child below the age of 3 (three) months would be entitled to maternity benefit for 12 (twelve) weeks from the date the child was handed over to her. The petition challenged only the adoptive-mother limb of that provision.2
That framing matters for corporates. The case was not about whether adoption should be recognised in theory. The law already did that. The real question was whether the State could recognise adoptive motherhood with one hand and then quietly take it away with the other by attaching a cut-off that often made the benefit practically unreachable.3
The Court’s Core Idea: Maternity Benefit Protects Motherhood, Not Just Childbirth
The judgment’s central holding is straightforward and important. The object of maternity benefit is not confined to the biological process of childbirth; it extends to the larger process of motherhood.4
The Court broke maternity leave into three broad components: (i) physical recovery after childbirth, (ii) emotional bonding between mother and child, and (iii) the care needed to help the child physically and emotionally integrate into the family. It accepted that in adoption cases the first element may be absent, but the second and third remain real and significant.5
That move is doctrinally powerful because it rejects a narrow biological understanding of parenthood. The Court expressly said that an adoptive mother has the same rights and obligations towards the child as a natural mother, even though the categories are not identical in every respect.6
Why the Three-Month Cut-Off Failed
The Court held that the distinction between women adopting a child below 3 (three) months and women adopting a child aged 3 (three) months or above lacked a rational nexus with the object of the law.7
Its reasoning was practical as much as constitutional. The need for bonding, caregiving, adjustment, and family integration does not disappear the moment the child crosses the 3 (three) month mark. Nor is there anything inherently rational about assuming that a 4 (four) month-old, adopted child needs materially less parental presence than a 2 (two) month-old, adopted child for purposes of emotional integration into a new home.8
In effect, the Court treated the statutory line as a bright-line rule drawn for administrative neatness rather than constitutional legitimacy. That distinction is important. The State is free to classify, but not lazily. Where 2 (two) groups are similarly situated for the purpose of the benefit, a line that excludes one group without a real justification collapses under Article 14.9
Article 21 and the Recognition of Adoptive Parenthood
The judgment also rests on Article 21. The Court held that reproductive autonomy is not confined to the biological act of giving birth, and that adoption is equally an exercise of reproductive and decisional autonomy.10
It linked this directly to the “best interests of the child” principle. In the Court’s view, the child’s welfare does not end once legal formalities are complete or custody is handed over. Welfare continues through the child’s process of adjustment, bonding, and integration into the adoptive family.11
This part of the judgment is especially relevant for employers. It means maternity benefit in adoption cases is not just an employee-side entitlement. It is also a legal recognition that early post-adoption care has constitutional value.12
Bridging the Gap Between Legal Framework and Practical Implementation
One of the strongest parts of the ruling is the Court’s workability analysis. It noted that under the adoption framework, a child has first to be declared legally free for adoption, and the broader statutory and regulatory process itself consumes time.13
The result is obvious. By the time the process is completed in many cases, the child is unlikely to still be below 3 (three) months old. The Court therefore concluded that the age cap rendered the provision illusory and practically unworkable.14
That is where the judgment quietly takes aim at a familiar regulatory vice: compliance by fiction. A rule that looks neat on paper but fails in actual operation is not disciplined lawmaking. It is bureaucracy mistaking form for function.
The Reading Down and What Employers Must Now Do
The Supreme Court held that the Code, insofar as it imposed the 3 (three) month age limit on the adoptive child, was violative of Articles 14 and 21. It then read the provision to mean that a woman who legally adopts a child, without the three-month limitation, is entitled to maternity benefit for 12 (twelve) weeks from the date the child is handed over to her.15
- Immediate Policy Overhaul: The three-month age cap on the adopted child has been struck down as unconstitutional. Every HR policy, leave manual, employee handbook, and internal circular that conditions adoption leave on the child being below three months must be revised without delay. Continuing to apply the old threshold exposes the employer to grievance claims, litigation, and regulatory scrutiny. The operative provision is now Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020, as read down adoption leave of 12 weeks is available from the date of handover, irrespective of the child's age.
- Audit Manager-Level Decision-Making Immediately: The greatest compliance risk is not policy text — it is managerial discretion. Document a clear escalation chain: adoption leave requests must be routed to HR.
- Watch Out: Crèche Facilities Are Not a Substitute: The Court expressly rejected the government's argument that crèche facilities under Section 67 of the 2020 Code serve as an adequate alternative for adoptive mothers whose child is above three months. Employers cannot rely on crèche provision, available only where there are 50 or more employees, as a reason to deny or dilute adoption leave. This is a direct risk point for mid-size employers who may currently operate on that assumption.
- Document the Handover Date Carefully — It Is the Legal Trigger: The 12-week maternity benefit period runs from the date the child is handed over to the adoptive mother, not from any other date in the adoption process. HR must establish a clear documentary protocol: obtain and retain the handover certificate or official placement order as the formal trigger for leave commencement. Ambiguity on this date creates liability.
- Disciplinary and Dismissal Protections Now Apply Fully: The employment protection provisions of the Code on Social Security- including protection against dismissal on grounds related to maternity now apply with equal force to adoptive mothers irrespective of the child's age. Any adverse action taken against an employee during or proximate to adoption leave will now be closely scrutinised and should be treated with the same caution as action taken during biological maternity leave.
- Update Contractual Templates and Offer Letter Language: Standard employment contracts, offer letters, and fixed-term agreements that reference maternity benefits by cross-referring to the 2020 Code without clarification may now create interpretive disputes. Update templates to explicitly reflect the read-down position: adoption leave of 12 weeks from date of handover, with no age condition on the child. This reduces the scope for disputes and demonstrates proactive compliance.
For corporate India, the compliance takeaway is immediate. Adoption leaves and maternity benefit policies should be revised to remove the “below three months” condition. Employee handbooks, HR manuals, template communications, and manager guidance notes should be updated accordingly.16
Footnotes
1 Section 5(4) of the Maternity Benefit Act, 1961; Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
2 Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
3 Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020; Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
4 Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020; Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246; B Shah v Presiding Officer, Labour Court (1977) 4 SCC 384; Deepika Singh v PGIMER, Chandigarh (2023) 13 SCC 681.
5 Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
6 Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
7 Article 14 of the Constitution of India; Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
8 Article 14 of the Constitution of India; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
9 Article 14 of the Constitution of India; State of W.B. v Anwar Ali Sarkar (1952) 1 SCC 1; State of Gujarat v Shri Ambica Mills Ltd. (1974) 4 SCC 656; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
10 Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
11 Section 3 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
12 Article 21 of the Constitution of India; Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
13 Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015; Adoption Regulations, 2022; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
14 Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
15 Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020; Article 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India; Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
16 Section 60(4) of the Code on Social Security, 2020 as read down in Hamsaanandini Nanduri v Union of India, 2026 INSC 246.
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