State Farm Fire And Casualty Company v. Curtis Diblin

(December 2025) - In State Farm Fire and Cas. Co. v. Diblin, 114 Cal.App.5th 1245 ( October 7, 2025), the Fourth District Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's entry of judgment finding that indemnity coverage was not afforded under the State Farm Fire and Casualty Company ("State Farm") policy issued to insured, Curtis Diblin ("Diblin") for a judgment rendered in an underlying lawsuit based on Diblin striking plaintiff Monee Gagliardo ("Gagliardo") with a rubber mallet three times from behind. State Farm defended Diblin against the underlying Gagliardo lawsuit, but secured a judgment in a declaratory relief action arguing that Diblin acted intentionally rather than by accident, such that coverage was not afforded by the policy for the $2.5 million judgment entered against Diblin. State Farm relied on the following evidence in arguing that Diblin's conduct did not constitute an "occurrence" as defined in the State Farm policy:

• Underlying Gagliardo First Amended complaint alleging causes of action for sexual assault, sexual battery, gender violence (Civ. Code. Section 52.4), violation of civil rights, sexual harassment and negligence;
• The Jury Instructions given to the jury in the Gagliardo trial;
• Special Verdict form used by the jury in the Gagliardo trial; and
• The State Farm policy.

Each of the causes of action in the Gagliardo trial were based on Diblin's attack on Gagliardo. The jury found in favor of Gagliardo based on the causes of action for gender violence and negligence.

State Farm relied on the following policy language in connection with its contention that indemnity coverage was not afforded under its policy for the underlying Gagliardo judgment:

"SECTION II—LIABILITY COVERAGES

"COVERAGE L—PERSONAL LIABILITY

"If a claim is made or a suit is brought against an insured for damages because of bodily injury or property damage to which this coverage applies, caused by an occurrence, we will:

"1. pay up to our limit of liability for the damages for which the insured is legally liable; and

"2. provide a defense at our expense by counsel of our choice. We may make any investigation and settle any claim or suit that we decide is appropriate. Our obligation to defend any claim or suit ends when the amount we pay for damages, to effect settlement or satisfy a judgment resulting from the occurrence, equals our limit of liability."

The Policy defined an "occurrence" as follows:

"FE-3419

"DEFINITIONS

"Definitions 6. and 7. are replaced by the following: [¶] ... [¶]

"7. 'occurrence', when used in Section II of this policy, means an accident, including exposure to conditions, which first results in:

"a. bodily injury; or

"b. property damage;

"during the policy period. All bodily injury and property damage resulting from one accident, series of related accidents or from continuous and repeated exposure to the same general conditions is considered to be one occurrence." (Italics added.)

The Court of Appeal interpreted the State Farm policy language as follows:

"An insurance policy is written in two parts: the insuring agreement defines the type of risks which are covered, while the exclusions remove coverage for certain risks which are initially within the insuring clause." (Collin v. American Empire Ins. Co. (1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 787, 802–803 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 391] (Collin).) "The insured has the burden of establishing that a claim, unless specifically excluded, is within basic coverage, while the insurer has the burden of establishing that a specific exclusion applies." (Minkler v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America (2010) 49 Cal.4th 315, 322 [110 Cal.Rptr.3d 612, 232 P.3d 612].)

In considering whether there is coverage for a particular risk or whether an exclusion applies to exclude a risk that would otherwise be covered, we must interpret and apply the language of the policy at issue. "Insurance policies are contracts and therefore subject to the rules of construction governing contracts. [Citation.] The goal of contractual interpretation is to determine and give effect to the mutual intention of the parties." (Safeco Ins. Co. v. Robert S. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 758, 762–763 [110 Cal.Rptr.2d 844, 28 P.3d 889].)

Here, the Policy covers claims for damages made "because of bodily injury" that are "caused by an occurrence." The Policy defines an "occurrence" as an "accident." "[T]he meaning of the term 'accident' in a liability insurance policy is settled in California. '[A]n accident is "'an unexpected, unforeseen, or undesigned happening or consequence from either a known or an unknown cause.'" [Citations.] "This common law construction of the term 'accident' becomes part of the policy and precludes any assertion that the term is ambiguous."'" (Liberty Surplus Ins. Corp. v. Ledesma & Meyer Construction Co., Inc. (2018) 5 Cal.5th 216, 221 [233 Cal.Rptr.3d 487, 418 P.3d 400] (Liberty Surplus), quoting Delgado v. Interinsurance Exchange of Automobile Club of Southern California (2009) 47 Cal.4th 302, 308 [97 Cal.Rptr.3d 298, 211 P.3d 1083] (Delgado).)

"'[T]he word "accident" in the coverage clause of a liability policy refers to the conduct of the insured for which liability is sought to be imposed.'" (Liberty Surplus, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 221.) "When an insured intends the acts resulting in the injury or damage, it is not an accident 'merely because the insured did not intend to cause injury. ... The insured's subjective intent is irrelevant.'" (Albert v. Mid-Century Ins. Co. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1291 [187 Cal.Rptr.3d 211].) "Because the term 'accident' refers to the insured's intent to commit the act giving rise to liability, as opposed to his or her intent to cause the consequences of that act, the courts have recognized—virtually without exception—that deliberate conduct is not an 'accident' or 'occurrence' irrespective of the insured's state of mind." (Collin, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 810.)

. . .

Because the Policy at issue in this case covers only injuries that result from "accidents," the relevant question for determining whether Gagliardo's injuries are covered under the Policy is whether those injuries were the result of intentional conduct or whether they instead resulted from an "accident."

The Court of Appeal rejected Diblin's argument that the determination of negligence, along with the finding of gender violence, required coverage of the judgment. The Court of Appeal stated as follows:

The jury's finding that Diblin committed gender violence is a finding that he committed an intentional tort. (See 5 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (11th ed. 2025) Torts, § 548 [discussing claims for gender violence as a species of "Intentional Invasions of Interests in Personality"].) But even aside from the fact that a claim for gender violence sets out a claim for an intentional tort, one of the specific elements the jury found true was that Diblin engaged in the conduct "at least in part, based on [Gagliardo's] gender." In order to engage in conduct that is "based on" another person's gender, the defendant necessarily intended the conduct, negating the possibility that injuries resulting from gender violence were attributable to an "accident."

Moreover, even if the jury's finding on the gender violence claim was not enough itself to make clear that Diblin's liability for Gagliardo's injuries does not come within the Policy's coverage provision, the jury also found that Diblin acted with both malice and oppression in injuring Gagliardo. The finding by the jury that Gagliardo had proven the elements necessary to entitle her to a punitive damage award also meant the jury necessarily concluded Diblin's conduct was deliberate and intentional, as "accidentally harmful conduct cannot provide the basis for punitive damages under [California] law." (Simon v. San Paolo U.S. Holding Co., Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1159, 1181 [29 Cal.Rptr.3d 379, 113 P.3d 63], italics added.)

. . .

Appellants further contend that because the jury also made a finding Diblin was negligent, the jury must have necessarily concluded Gagliardo's injuries were caused unintentionally. They argue that only the negligence finding—and not the gender violence finding—should be given preclusive effect. Appellants rely on the fact the verdict form expressly asked the jury to make a finding as to causation only with respect to the question of Diblin's negligence, but not with respect to the gender violence cause of action. This suggestion ignores the jury instructions and the entirety of the verdict form. For example, the jury was told, "You will be asked to decide whether Curtis Diblin is liable to Monee Gagliardo under the following legal theories" (italics added), and the instructions listed both "Gender Violence" and "Negligence" as two of the six possible legal theories for his liability. The jury was also instructed that it was only to decide whether Diblin's conduct "justified an award of punitive damages" if it "decide[d] that Curtis Diblin's conduct caused Monee Gagliardo harm." (Italics added.) Thus, in order to reach the questions about whether Diblin's conduct was done with malice, oppression or fraud, the jury had to first decide that this same conduct caused Gagliardo harm. Because the jury reached those punitive damages questions, it had decided that Diblin's violent conduct caused Gagliardo's injuries.

Nor do we agree with appellants' suggestion that the jury's determination as to negligence is inconsistent with its finding on the gender violence cause of action. When the verdict form is considered as a whole and understood through the framing of the operative pleading (see Collin, supra, 21 Cal.App.4th at p. 805 [to determine the nature of the conduct upon which a judgment is based, one must look to the pleading allegations]), it can be understood to reflect the jury's conclusion that Diblin engaged in intentional conduct when he attacked Gagliardo, and that this same conduct also met the standard for negligence set out in the jury instructions. The only conduct alleged to have caused Gagliardo's injuries in the first amended complaint was Diblin's assaultive conduct. Thus, every cause of action asserted by Gagliardo, including the cause of action for negligence, was based on Diblin's physical attack—not other conduct. And when the jury was asked to make findings on these causes of action, it was not told that if it found there was liability for the attack under an intentional tort theory, the same conduct could not then also support a finding of liability based on negligence. Nor was the jury instructed that it could find Diblin negligent only if it determined the injury-producing conduct was unintended. Instead, the jury was told that negligence "is the failure to use reasonable care to prevent harm to oneself or to others," and that "[a] person is negligent if he or she does something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation or fails to do something that a reasonably careful person would do in the same situation." This expressed "failure to use reasonable care" standard is broad enough to include intentionally harmful conduct. In other words, under these instructions, a jury could conclude that a person who intentionally injures another person has also failed to use reasonable care to prevent injury to another. Thus, in the absence of any instruction telling the jury that a finding of liability for an intentional tort precludes a finding of negligence based on the same conduct, a determination that the defendant committed gender violence could also support a negligence finding, i.e., that the defendant did "something that a reasonably careful person would not do in the same situation."

There is thus no inconsistency in the jury's findings that Diblin was liable for Gagliardo's injuries under both an intentional tort theory and a negligence theory. And we have no reason to conclude the jury's answers to the special verdict questions regarding negligence should be understood to reflect a finding that Gagliardo's injuries were the result of accidental conduct. Rather, the verdict form and the jury instructions confirm that the jury believed Diblin's injury-producing conduct was deliberate and intentional and that this deliberate conduct constituted a breach of the duty of care Diblin owed to Gagliardo. We therefore reject appellants' contention that the jury's negligence determination in the underlying case mandated a finding of coverage in this case.

Lastly, the Court of Appeal rejected Diblin's argument that under a concurrent cause approach, indemnity coverage was triggered under the State Farm policy. The Court of Appeal stated:

Relying on State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Partridge (1973) 10 Cal.3d 94, 97 [109 Cal.Rptr. 811, 514 P.2d 123] (Partridge), appellants next argue that a finding of coverage is compelled pursuant to the concurrent independent causes doctrine. Under this doctrine, an insurer has a duty to indemnify an insured if a covered risk is a proximate cause of the injury, even if a noncovered risk also jointly caused the injury in question.

According to appellants, there is no way to discern "that the conduct of Diblin the jury deemed to have been negligent is the same as whatever it deemed to have been malicious, so it is not at all clear the jury perceived there to be a single proximate cause" of Gagliardo's injuries. Thus, appellants suggest, the jury could have concluded that Diblin's negligent conduct was different from the conduct that the jury found to be malicious. And, their argument goes, even if the special verdict is interpreted as expressing that the jury found Diblin liable for an intentional tort (the gender violence cause of action), which is a noncovered cause of the injuries, the jury must have also found Diblin liable for different conduct amounting to negligence, which is a covered cause of the injuries.

In appellants' view, the evidence presented in the underlying trial not only supported a theory of liability based on gender violence, but also supported theories of liability related to Diblin's "negligent management of his own medical condition" or his negligent failure to warn Gagliardo that he was feeling out of sorts and aggressive that morning. They argue that negligence based on Diblin's failure to manage the effects of his testosterone medication or his failure to warn Gagliardo about those effects would be a covered risk under the Policy. According to appellants, the jury may have found him liable for these other types of conduct when the jury determined his negligence caused Gagliardo's injuries. However, Partridge and the law of concurrent independent causation does not assist appellants.

. . .

Applying Partridge and subsequent cases considering its rule, we must reject appellants' contention regarding the applicability of the concurrent independent causes doctrine. As a preliminary matter, as we have already explained, we are unconvinced the jury's verdict reflects that it was holding Diblin liable for two separate types of conduct when it found that Diblin committed gender violence and that he acted negligently. Again, the jury was not told that finding specific damage-producing conduct was intentional would preclude them from also finding that the same conduct was negligent. Absent an instruction that a finding of liability on any of the intentional tort theories would prevent a finding of negligence based on the same asserted conduct, one cannot presume that the jury relied on two different sets of conduct in finding that Diblin was liable for an intentional tort and for his negligence.

But even if we were to assume for the sake of argument that appellants were correct that the jury's verdict could be interpreted as reflecting that the jury found Diblin liable to Gagliardo based on two separate acts or omissions (one being his intentionally violent conduct and the other being his mismanagement of his medication and/or his failure to warn Gagliardo about the side effects he was experiencing), the concurrent independent causes rule does not apply because the purported noncovered and covered causes of the injury are not independent of each other. Appellants' argument is that the jury could have found Diblin liable on the gender violence cause of action based on his conduct of deliberately striking Gagliardo with a mallet, and that it also could have found him liable for negligence based on his failure to warn Gagliardo or his failure to seek additional medical care to reduce the side effects of the testosterone. But unlike in Partridge, where the negligent filing of the gun's trigger mechanism and the negligent driving each could have separately resulted in injury (see Partridge, supra, 10 Cal.3d at p. 103), the failure to address the side effects of the testosterone or to warn Gagliardo about his experience of the violent side effects were not risks that themselves could have caused Gagliardo harm. It is only when these omissions are coupled with Diblin's violent conduct that any injury could have possibly resulted. In fact, Diblin's theory of the role of his purported negligence regarding the side effects of the testosterone demonstrates the interdependency of these two purported concurrent causes. Under Diblin's theory of what occurred, his aggression was a side effect of the testosterone treatment, and it was this medication-induced aggression that led to his violent conduct—conduct the underlying jury found constituted the intentional tort of gender violence. Thus, possible testosterone-related negligence was "integrally connected to" (Prince v. United National Ins. Co. (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 233, 245 [47 Cal.Rptr.3d 727]) Diblin's intentional violent conduct, not independent of it. Consequently, the concurrent independent causes rule set out in Partridge does not apply to mandate coverage, even assuming the jury in the underlying case found that Diblin was liable for Gagliardo's injuries based on the separate types of purportedly negligent conduct appellants' identify on appeal.

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