ARTICLE
30 June 2026

Mobile Spectrum Renewals – The Case For Regulatory Pre-Commitment

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Mobile spectrum licence renewal presents regulators with a critical policy choice: should renewal fees reflect full market value, or can below-market pricing serve as an investment instrument? This white paper models how pre-committed renewal fee structures affect operator investment decisions and social welfare, revealing that optimal fees may strategically deviate from market rates when private returns fall short of social benefits. The analysis further explores how success-dependent fee extraction create
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Mobile spectrum licence renewal is often framed as a choice between incumbent continuity and testing the allocative efficiency of the current assignment. In this white paper, Managing Director Hans-Martin Ihle and Associate Analyst Gaurav Khatri treat renewal as an investment instrument. The authors model a regulator that chooses a renewal fee intensity parameter before operators invest. Operator investments create positive externalities that are not captured by private returns. A renewal fee below full market value can increase ex ante investment and raise welfare. The optimal pre-committed fee intensity is below one (i.e., below full market value) when private returns are below social returns to investment.

The authors then examine a no-commitment setting in which the realised fee or auction price is higher when investment succeeds. This creates a hold-up problem. Even where expected fee intensity equals full market value, success-dependent extraction lowers investment relative to a pre-committed full-market-value rule.

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