CVA/HTA Practice Newsletter - July 2026

Welcome to the fifth edition of our Child Victims Act/Human Trafficking & Assault (CVA/HTA) Practice's newsletter.

Greetings from the CVA/HTA sub-practice group! We've had another busy quarter and are pleased to share several important legal developments and practical resources. First, we're excited to introduce our new 50-state surveys, "Civil Restitution for Human Sex Trafficking" and "Statute of Limitations for Child Sexual Abuse and Charitable Immunity Defenses," which provide a comprehensive, state-by-state reference on key issues affecting human trafficking and child sexual abuse litigation. We'd also like to thank New York Partner Dean Pillarella and Partners Corey Shulman for their contributions covering significant appellate decisions and recent CVA trial results, including notable rulings addressing notice standards, the Adult Survivors Act, and a defense verdict in T.F. v. Clarkstown Central School District.

Read on for more details on these developments.

50-State Surveys

We are pleased to share the attached 50-state surveys prepared by Lewis Brisbois’ Child Victims Act/Human Trafficking & Assault Practice. The surveys, “Civil Restitution for Human Sex Trafficking” and “Statute of Limitations for Child Sexual Abuse and Charitable Immunity Defenses,” provide a comprehensive overview of state laws addressing civil remedies for human sex trafficking under state codifications of the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, as well as statutes of limitations and charitable immunity defenses applicable to child sexual abuse claims.

These resources were developed to serve as practical, 2026 reference tools that can assist you in evaluating legal issues and managing risk.

Second Department Holds Complaint Alleging “Nonconsensual Insemination” During Consensual Unprotected Intercourse Fails to State a Cause of Action

In M.P. v. Wilson, 2026 NY Slip Op 01954 (2d Dep’t 2026), the Appellate Division, Second Department, held that the defendant’s alleged “nonconsensual insemination” of the plaintiff during consensual unprotected intercourse failed to state a cause of action for battery or negligence.

The complaint alleged the parties “engaged in consensual unprotected sexual intercourse, during which the defendant allegedly ‘inseminated’ the plaintiff without her consent, resulting in the plaintiff’s ectopic pregnancy, internal bleeding, miscarriage, and salpingectomy.”

The Supreme Court, Nassau County, dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action, and the Second Department affirmed. In a short opinion, the panel reasoned that “[t]he allegations contained in the complaint demonstrate that the plaintiff consented to the bodily contact at issue” and therefore failed to state a cause of action for battery. Regarding negligence, the panel reasoned, “Under the circumstances of this case in which the plaintiff consented to unprotected sexual intercourse with the defendant and did not allege that she withdrew her consent, the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care.”

M.P.’s complaint is more notable for what it did not allege. The complaint did not allege, for example, that the plaintiff expressly premised her consent upon the defendant’s agreement not to ejaculate inside of her or inseminate her. Instead, it alleged, in effect, that the plaintiff did not also consent to insemination, despite consenting to unprotected intercourse. On these facts, the relevant “bodily contact” for purposes of battery is the unprotected intercourse—to which the plaintiff consented. Likewise, absent an express limitation or subsequent withdrawal of consent, the defendant owed no duty to the plaintiff to avoid ejaculation or insemination.

Second Department Deems Submission of Alleged Perpetrator’s Employment File Sufficient to Establish Prima Facie Lack of Notice

After several years of denying summary judgment to defendants for a failure to establish prima facie lack of notice, the Appellate Division, Second Department appears to have changed course in Reichenbach v. Garden City Public Schools, 248 A.D.3d 1148 (2d Dep’t 2026). In Reichenbach, the plaintiff alleged his sixth-grade teacher, an employee of defendant’s school district, sexually abused him once in 1998, and asserted causes of action for negligence and negligent training, supervision, and retention. At the close of discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that based on the lack of prior allegations of sexual abuse or misconduct in the teacher’s personnel file, the defendant had no notice of the teacher’s alleged propensity to sexually abuse students. The Supreme Court, Nassau County granted the summary judgment motion, and the Second Department affirmed. Specifically, the Court held the personnel file, which had no evidence of prior misconduct, was sufficient to demonstrate the defendant had no actual knowledge of a propensity for sexual abuse. Although the teacher was one accused of sexually inappropriate behavior with a fellow teacher, a subsequent investigation deemed the accusation unfounded, and did not raise a triable issue of fact.

The Riechenbach decision appears to be a departure from the Court’s previous holding in Stanton v. Longwood Central School District, 233 A.D.3d 1010 (2d Dep’t 2024), where the Court held that the defendant school district failed to establish its prima facie burden that it lacked notice of the teacher’s alleged propensity for sexual abuse, despite defendant’s submission of the teacher’s unremarkable personnel file and testimony from former teachers and a principal that they were unaware of any misconduct during the teacher’s employment. The Reichenbach decision is also unique in that it does not expressly address a lack of constructive notice. While the Second Department has often found triable issues of fact when the alleged abuse occurred with some frequency (see Staton, 233 A.D.3d at 1014-15), it will be interesting to see how courts within the Second Department (and the Second Department itself) reconcile an employee’s file that shows no evidence of prior sexual misconduct with allegations of abuse occurring more than once. Whether the courts deem such conflicting evidence to raise a triable issue of fact, the Reichenbach decision provides a path for defendants to establish its prima facie entitlement to summary judgment, shifting the burden to plaintiffs to establish evidence of notice.

First Department Holds Past Violations Do Not Inform the Definition of “Intimate Part” for Purposes of Penal Law Article 130

In Watson v. Roanoke Is. Historical Assn., 2026 NY Slip Op 02949 (1st Dep’t 2026), a split court (4-1) at the Appellate Division, First Department, recently dismissed the plaintiff’s Adult Survivors Act (“ASA”) suit against his alleged assailant, holding “past violations do not inform the definition of ‘intimate part’ for the purposes of Penal Law article 130.”

The plaintiff alleged the defendant sexually abused him from 2000 through 2003, while the two worked together. The plaintiff further alleged that, in 2008, after not having contact with the defendant for years, he briefly encountered the defendant in a store, where the defendant allegedly “grabbed [plaintiff] by both of his shoulders, put his face inches from [the plaintiff’s] face and touched [the plaintiff’s] cheeks with the intimacy of a grandmother greeting her grown grandchild, saying words to the effect of ‘My! Don’t you look great. You’ve finally gone through puberty!’ and “then winked at [plaintiff] and walked away.”

Based upon this encounter, the plaintiff sued the defendant in 2023 for intentional infliction of emotional distress under the ASA. The defendant moved to dismiss pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(7), arguing that the complaint failed to plead a predicate sexual offense under Article 130 of the Penal Law, as required to trigger the ASA’s revival provision (CPLR 214-j). In opposition, the plaintiff argued that, under the circumstances, the touching of his cheeks and shoulders constituted forcible touching (Penal Law § 130.52), rendering CPLR 214-j applicable.

The Supreme Court, New York County, agreed with the plaintiff, reasoning that, given the defendant’s alleged prior abuse, it could not “be said as a matter of law ... that [defendant’s] grabbing of [plaintiff’s] shoulders and reliving the past events is not a forcible touch.” On appeal, the First Department reversed.

In reversing, the majority reasoned that the defendant’s “acts of grabbing plaintiff’s shoulders and touching his cheeks were not, under the circumstances, sexual or intimate in nature, as necessary to state a claim for forcible touching.” The panel rejected the notion that “in determining whether there has been a forcible touching ... one should look to any prior relationship between the parties, including any allegation of a history of prior sexual abuse, sexual misconduct or sexual degradation.” On the contrary, “no reading of the statute would support this position,” and “such a reading runs afoul of the plain language and intent of the statute.” The majority further distinguished the Second Department’s decision in Aguilar v. Wishner, 249 N.Y.S.3d 476 (2d Dep’t 2026), discussed in the March 2026 CVA/HTA Practice Group Newsletter, and related cases as concerning “contemporaneous sexualized circumstances that are not present here.”

The dissent characterized the majority as “suggest[ing] that ‘societal norms require victims of sexual assault and harassment to simply put aside the distress and anxiety that their abuser’s current conduct triggers.’” Responding directly, the majority wrote, “[W]e conclude [merely] that past violations do not inform the definition of ‘intimate part’ for purposes of Penal Law article 130.” And “[w]ithout a predicate sex offense for ASA purposes, plaintiff’s cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress was not revived.”

Watson illustrates that, in assessing whether the touching of an “other intimate part” has occurred within the meaning of Article 130 of the Penal Law (see §§ 130.00(3), 130.52, 130.55), prior alleged sexual abuse is irrelevant; while the broader facts and circumstances are relevant, absent contemporaneous sexualized circumstances, the touching of an otherwise non-erogenous body part is not transformed into the touching of an intimate part.

Recent CVA Trial Results: Big Wins for Plaintiffs and Defendants

Given the rarity of the Child Victims Act cases being tried, it is important to take note of the few that see their way to a jury verdict. Readers can compare two recent cases: T.F. v. Clarkstown Central School District, 032990/2021 (Sup. Ct., Rockland Co. 2021), in which the jury returned a defense verdict, and A.P. v. City of New York, 512233/2021 (Sup. Ct., Kings Co. 2020), purportedly the first CVA jury verdict in New York City, in which the jury returned an $18 million verdict for the plaintiff.

T.F. v. Clarkstown Central School District

In T.F. v. Clarkstown Central School District, the plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by his seventh-grade Spanish teacher during the 1984–1985 school year. According to the allegations, the abuse occurred approximately three times per week. The plaintiff claimed that the teacher regularly seated him in the back row of the classroom and, during examinations or independent assignments, would stand behind him, massage his back and shoulders, and engage in inappropriate sexual touching both over and underneath his clothing.

To establish liability, the plaintiff contended that the Clarkstown Central School District had actual or constructive notice of the teacher’s alleged propensity for sexual misconduct. In support of this claim, the plaintiff presented evidence concerning the frequency and nature of the alleged conduct, testimony regarding student rumors and nicknames referring to the teacher as “Feely Fitz” and “Feel Good Fitz,” and allegations that the teacher routinely permitted students to sit on his lap during classroom instruction.

The District denied liability and challenged both the occurrence of the alleged abuse and the sufficiency of the evidence supporting notice. The District argued that the allegations were not credible in light of the absence of corroborating testimony from former classmates. The District further maintained that it lacked notice of any alleged misconduct, noting that no witness testified that District personnel had observed students sitting on the teacher’s lap or otherwise witnessed inappropriate conduct. It also contended that the purported evidence of notice consisted primarily of rumors, speculation, and unsubstantiated hearsay.

Following nearly two weeks of testimony, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the District, finding that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he was sexually abused. The plaintiff was represented by Herman Law. The defendants were represented by Kenneth Ross and John Della Jacono of Della Jacono & Ross, together with Lewis Brisbois partners Corey Shulman and Karen L. Campbell.

A.P. v. City of New York

In A.P. v. City of New York, the plaintiff alleged that he was sexually abused by his music teacher between 1968 and 1971, when he was between eight and eleven years old. The plaintiff alleged that the teacher repeatedly placed him on his lap, engaged in inappropriate sexual touching, digitally penetrated him on at least two occasions in a darkened room, and covered his mouth to prevent him from crying out.

To establish notice, the plaintiff relied on documentary and testimonial evidence concerning complaints made against the teacher during the relevant period. This evidence included records from a 1970 special open meeting of the school board reflecting parental complaints regarding the teacher’s conduct. The plaintiff also introduced evidence that, although the school principal reassigned the teacher within the school, the teacher’s employment was not terminated. In addition, the plaintiff presented testimony from a parent who reported misconduct to school officials in 1971. The plaintiff further relied on contemporaneous newspaper articles reporting that parents protested the District’s decision not to terminate the teacher by boycotting the school and refusing to send their children to classes.

The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages in the amount of $18 million. The plaintiff was represented by Herman Law. The defendants were represented by the New York City Corporation Counsel.

Resumes are available at LewisBrisbois.com. The information contained in this alert is for informational purposes only and not for the purpose of offering legal advice or a legal opinion on any matter. The information contained is confidential and is intended only for the individual named. Published by Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.