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The English High Court refused to stay LCIA arbitrations pending challenges to procedural orders and the arbitrator, reaffirming the high threshold for curial intervention and resistance to "stop-the-clock" tactics
In Party A v Party B and Another [2026] EWHC 327 (Comm), the English High Court refused to stay two London-seated LCIA arbitrations pending the Court's determination of a serious irregularity challenge and an application to remove the sole arbitrator.This demonstrates the high bar for the English courts to intervene in arbitration proceedings and serves as a warning against "stop‑the‑clock" tactics to disrupt arbitration proceedings.
Background
A (Applicant) and B (Respondent) executed multiple contracts for the supply of artillery rounds and rockets to Ukraine. These contained identical arbitration clauses, pursuant to which two arbitrations were commenced before the same sole arbitrator.
In December 2025, the arbitrator issued two procedural orders – one in each arbitration – refusing to (i) consolidate the arbitrations; and (ii) order an evidentiary hearing at which oral examination of witnesses and experts could take place. The arbitrator explained that consolidation "would require redrafting parts of the draft awards". The Applicant viewed this as indicating that the arbitrator had already substantially drafted the final awards before the arbitral proceedings concluded.
This prompted the Applicant to file a series of applications in the English High Court, namely:
- a challenge against the arbitrator's procedural orders under s68 of the Arbitration Act 1996 (the Act), contending that the arbitrator was biased and had prejudged the merits; and
- an application under s24 of the Act to remove the sole arbitrator from both arbitrations, asserting that the arbitrator failed to conduct the arbitrations fairly and impartially.
Concurrently, the Applicant requested the Court to stay the arbitrations pursuant to its general case management powers under Rule 3.1(2)(g) of the Civil Procedure Rules (CPR). The Applicant contended that continuing the arbitrations would be unjust and inappropriate given the possibility of the Court allowing the Applicant's challenges. This decision only relates to this application.
Decision
The Court refused to stay the arbitrations and provided the following noteworthy observations.
First, the English courts' general case management powers under Rule 3.1 of the CPR cannot be used to stay arbitral proceedings. Such powers only concern the management of English court proceedings.
Second, the English court will apply a minimal curial intervention policy when asked to intervene in arbitrations and will not do so "except as provided by this Part" (s1 of the Act). The Court noted that the Applicant's stay application was, in substance, an injunction to restrain the arbitrations pending the Court's determination of the Applicant's serious irregularity and arbitrator challenges.
- As regards the arbitrator challenge, nothing in s24 (or anywhere else in the Act) permitted the Court to interfere with an arbitration while an application to remove an arbitrator is pending. Rather, s24(3) explicitly allows arbitral proceedings to continue pending the outcome of such challenges.
- Similarly, s68 of the Act does not expressly allow the English courts to stay an arbitration until the determination of a serious irregularity challenge.
The Court found that these facts reflect a deliberate policy choice to ensure that arbitrations are not delayed by tactical challenges and to guard against procedural abuse. Therefore, absent an express statutory power, the Court could not intervene in the arbitration.
Third, the relevant procedural orders were not capable of being the subject of a serious irregularity challenge under s68 of the Act, which only relates to arbitral awards. Since procedural orders do not settle substantive rights between the parties to the arbitrations, they are not awards falling within the scope of s68. In any event, English courts ordinarily lack jurisdiction to interfere with the procedural conduct of an arbitration prior to the making of an award (Elektrim SA v Vivendi Universal SA [2007] EWHC 571 (Comm)).
Fourth, even if the Court had power to intervene, it would only do so in exceptional circumstances, namely where continuing the arbitration would be vexatious, oppressive, or unconscionable. The Applicant contended that continuing the arbitrations would lead to (i) a potential waste of time and costs and (ii) the possibility that witnesses might "rehearse" their answers through written questions if the Court were to order an oral hearing be conducted. However, the Court found that neither outcome was sufficiently exceptional to warrant restraining the arbitrations.
Comment
This decision provides useful lessons for arbitral parties and practitioners.
It gives welcome reassurance and reinforces procedural certainty for parties who choose an English arbitral seat. It is also consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions, including UNCITRAL Model Law jurisdictions such as Singapore (DMZ v DNA [2025] SGCA 52) and Malaysia (Danieli & C Officine Mecchaniche SPA v Southern HRC Sdn Bhd (WA-24NCC-471-10/2020)). Although England has not adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law, this decision demonstrates that the English courts have developed a similar non‑interventionist approach, aligning English law with international best practice in arbitration.
Parties who encounter potential procedural irregularities or apparent bias must first address those concerns with the arbitral tribunal, and not the courts. They should do so promptly, keep a clear record of the tribunal’s response, and preserve the right to challenge the award once the arbitration has concluded.
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