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After considerable delay, the CMA has finally started to exercise its new digital markets regulatory powers. The measures announced are a procedural mixed bag, comprising both the expected proposed Conduct Requirements and, perhaps more significantly, unexpected voluntary commitments from both Apple and Google.
In October 2025, the CMA designated both Apple and Google as having "strategic market status" (SMS) in respect of certain "digital activities" under the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act 2024 (the DMCCA). Google was the first to be designated, in respect of its general search and search advertising services (General Search), followed shortly thereafter by designations for Apple and Google in respect of their Mobile Platforms (comprised of their respective mobile operating systems, browsers, and app stores).
These SMS designations arrived on schedule, but the process of setting Conduct Requirements (CRs) - binding rules that will determine how the designated services are provided - has taken longer than anticipated. The CMA's initial aim was to impose CRs around the same time as the designation decisions, but it is now months behind the timelines it set itself (including in the "Roadmaps" published last summer, which outlined the types of interventions the CMA intended to put forward in respect of Apple and Google, and its proposed order of priority).
With the recent launch of consultations1 in respect of its proposed next steps in relation to both General Search and Mobile Platforms, the CMA is looking to get matters back on track. In this article, we examine the measures proposed, the extent to which they align with – or depart from – initial expectations, and what this might mean for the UK's digital markets regime more generally.
Google General Search
The CMA's consultation on draft CRs in respect of General Search invited comments on the following four sets of measures, each of which was identified as an early priority in the Google General Search Roadmap.
Fair ranking on Google's search engine results page (SERP)
The CMA has identified that the order in which results are listed on the SERP (or, in some cases, being excluded entirely from the SERP) can have a significant impact on web publishers and other businesses that depend on Google Search for traffic. The CMA also considered that Google's existing "honest results policy" provides insufficient comfort regarding the fairness of its ranking practices, and so proposed that Google be required to:
- apply non-discriminatory and objective criteria when ranking and presenting organic (i.e. as opposed to paid for) search results, including via AI Overview and AI Mode;
- publish how it goes about accomplishing the above, and give sufficient notice of any changes to ranking criteria and policies; and
- provide a clear and accessible complaints process and dispute resolution procedure for publishers adversely affected by ranking policies, and provide information to the CMA on their functioning.
Publisher controls for use of content in AI functionality
The use of website publishers' content in AI-generated responses, and its implications for web publishers' business models, are a hot topic in competition policy – recently prompting a European Commission abuse of dominance investigation and a formal complaint from the European Publishers Council. The CMA's proposed CRs seek to address these concerns by requiring Google to:
- provide effective controls allowing publishers to opt out from their content being used to ground Google's generative AI search features (i.e. AI Mode and AI Overview) and/or train its generative AI services, without being downranked or presented differently in search results;
- take reasonable steps to attribute publisher content used in generative AI-powered features; and
- publish clear and detailed information on how publisher content is used by Google's generative AI features, and provide publishers with metrics on how users engage with their content via such services.
Search engine choice screens
The CMA has identified that Google's control of key access points, particularly its Android operating system and Chrome browser, gives it significant influence over user choices in search, with Google normally set as the default search service and very few users choosing to change this. The CMA is therefore proposing that:
- Google must present Chrome and Android users with a default search engine choice screen on first use of Chrome or setup of the Android device, and at least yearly thereafter; and
- the choice screen must provide a reasonable number of alternatives (with a fair and transparent process to determine which search engine providers will be listed as an alternative) and set out balanced information on each of them, together with fair and balanced choice prompts.
Tools to facilitate search engine data portability
Under Article 6(9) of the EU Digital Markets Act (DMA), Google must allow EU end users to export data relating to their use of designated Google services. Google introduced a data portability API to comply with this requirement, and voluntarily made it available in the UK.
Nevertheless, the CMA is proposing to introduce a formal data portability requirement regarding data derived from use of Google's General Search services by UK users. This would be equivalent to that under the DMA, and it is expressly recognised that the requirement may be satisfied by continuing to make the DMA data portability API available in the UK, such that UK end users can port their data to third parties. In doing so, the CMA hopes that increased confidence around reliable access to this data will incentivise third-party businesses to improve existing products or services and/or invest in new ones.
A narrowing of the CMA's horizons?
The proposed CRs reflect the areas of focus in the CMA's General Search Roadmap, and contain few surprises. However, their scope, and the CMA's accompanying statements, arguably point to a reduction in ambition on the CMA's part.
For example, the CMA opted expressly to exclude specialised search services (e.g. for flights) from its proposed fair ranking requirements, despite the treatment of such services by Google having long been the subject of antitrust scrutiny2. Further, whilst the Roadmap stated that the CMA intended to consult more broadly on CRs ensuring the fair treatment of specialised search competitors in H1 2026, it now plans only to monitor relevant developments in the EU (where the Commission is investigating alleged self-preferencing by Google under the DMA) and assess what they might mean for the UK.
Similarly, rather than pressing ahead with planned work on ensuring Google's terms (both payment and non-payment) for use of publisher content are fair and reasonable, the CMA will instead wait a full year from the implementation of the new publisher controls, to assess their impact before taking further action.
Overall, the initial round of CRs incorporates a mix of measures that aim to facilitate competition in general search and the fair treatment of businesses that rely on Google's search services. However, stakeholders that were pinning their hopes on interventions further down the CMA's stated priority list in the General Search Roadmap may end up disappointed.
Apple's and Google's Mobile Platforms
Shortly after the CMA published its consultation on draft CRs in respect of Google General Search, it announced that it was consulting on proposed behavioural commitments (rather than CRs) from Apple and Google in relation to their respective Mobile Platforms. These largely reflect and/or build upon existing internal policies within Apple and Google, and fall within the following three broad categories.
App review and rankings
To address developer concerns around Apple's and Google's app review and ranking processes being arbitrary and inconsistent, both offered to commit to reviewing and ranking apps in their app stores in a "fair, objective, and transparent manner". This includes:
- providing clear expectations for app review turnaround times and explanations for any rejections, allowing appeals of such decisions, and providing channels for complaints;
- not preferencing their own apps in rankings, nor discriminating against third-party apps in the review process; and
- providing notice of changes to their app review and ranking policies and guidelines.
Use of app developers' data
Apple and Google denied allegations of using third-party app developers' data, gathered through the app review process or the operation of their app stores, in the development of their own apps, but nevertheless offered to commit to:
- protect third-party app developers' data, and not use it in connection with their own products;
- provide greater transparency over the access controls for such data and the mechanisms by which it is separated from Apple's/Google's own data; and
- provide channels for developers to submit complaints or questions concerning use of data.
Interoperability requests
Whilst the CMA's investigation found that Apple currently allows developers to make requests for new forms of third-party interoperability with iOS/iPadOS, the CMA is of the view that Apple's decision-making process, timelines, and reasoning are not always clear to developers. Apple therefore proposed to commit to ensure that its decisions in respect of such requests are "fair, objective, and transparent", including by:
- publishing criteria for assessing interoperability requests (which must relate to access to functionalities used by Apple's own products), and ensuring that there is a fair, objective, and timely feedback channel for such requests; and
- providing greater transparency in respect of the progress of interoperability request reviews (via status updates) and upcoming changes to iOS/iPadOS.
Commitments rather than CRs: a procedural innovation, or an unnecessary compromise?
The CMA's proposal to accept behavioural commitments from the parties, rather than imposing CRs, is an unexpected procedural development. Although commitments processes are envisaged as part of the digital markets regime under the DMCCA, their use is limited to resolving:
- investigations for breaches of CRs; and
- so-called "pro-competition intervention" (PCI) investigations into deep-rooted issues.
The "commitments" proposed in these Mobile Platforms investigations therefore have no basis in statute, and the CMA accordingly lacks a formal enforcement mechanism for them. While the CMA is able to impose penalties for breaches of CRs (or breaches of commitments accepted following CR breach investigations or PCI investigations), it will not be able to do so for breaches of the proposed Mobile Platforms commitments. Instead, the CMA states that Apple's and Google's compliance will be closely monitored, including through the publication of compliance statements/metrics, and regular confidential reporting by Apple and Google to the CMA (including in relation to complaints raised by developers). Should the commitments not prove effective, the CMA retains the ability to commence the CR imposition process, although clearly that would take some time.
The CMA's call for evidence appears implicitly to acknowledge the unexpected nature of this procedural development. However, the CMA believes that these informal commitments are appropriate - given they build on Apple's and Google's existing fair treatment policies and procedures - and that they will deliver meaningful outcomes for UK businesses and consumers by giving developers more confidence when engaging with the two Mobile Platforms. Although the CMA notes that commitments of this sort will not be appropriate in all circumstances, it is also leaving the door open to taking a similar approach in future cases.
Looking ahead
Alongside the proposed commitments, the CMA has provided a brief update on other planned workstreams from its Mobile Platforms Roadmaps.3
- On digital wallets – specifically, third-party access to the Near Field Communication chip that underpins Apple Wallet – the CMA is "engaging" with Apple, Google and third parties and will provide an update in H1 2026.
- On steering restrictions (which prevent developers from "steering" customers off platform to promote offers and conclude transactions), the CMA is again "continuing" to engage with Apple, Google and other stakeholders in this regard, and will monitor legal developments in the US and EU, before providing an update in H1 2026.
- The CMA "expects to progress" work regarding the removal of Apple's prohibition on third party browser engines, and will "closely monitor" developments regarding the emergence and adoption of AI.
These updates are non-committal and again indicate that the CMA is moving at a slower pace on certain issues than was anticipated. For example, the removal of Apple's steering restrictions was classed in the Apple Mobile Platform Roadmap as a Category 1 (i.e. highest priority) measure, on which the CMA initially proposed to consult from Autumn 2025. Certain other measures considered in the Roadmaps are notable by their absence, with the CMA staying silent on measures such as app downloads from alternative app stores and improved APIs to facilitate switching between iOS and Android. Whilst the CMA has said that such other potential interventions remain "under consideration", it will be interesting to see whether the CMA's focus has narrowed when updated Roadmaps are published later this year.
Conclusion
Compared to the formal CRs process in General Search (involving four parallel consultations and the publishing of almost 250 pages of consultation documents), the Mobile Platforms commitments promise a swifter outcome (the CMA intends for them to enter into force on 1 April 2026, subject to comments received) and a more administratively efficient procedure.
From the CMA's perspective, this nimbler approach aligns with its "4Ps" objectives of proportionality and process, as well as its declared intention for constructive engagement with SMS firms to be a central feature of the digital markets regime. But some stakeholders might question why it has taken this long for the CMA to arrive at a set of voluntary commitments that – transparency and reporting requirements aside – involve few actual changes to the SMS firms' conduct, and leave the CMA with a "quick win" that it ultimately cannot directly enforce without going back to the CR process.
Only time will tell whether the new regime is proving effective in meeting the needs identified in the CMA market studies4 that called for its introduction. For now, whether the CMA can ultimately deliver the "best in class" regime that was promised remains an open question.
Footnotes
1. See the General Search consultation and Mobile Platforms call for evidence.
2. ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_10_1624
3. See Google Mobile Platform Roadmap and Apple Mobile Platform Roadmap.
4. Specifically, the Online Platforms and Digital Advertising Market Study and the Mobile Ecosystems Market Study.
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