Enforcement Of Russian Court Decisions And Arbitral Awards In Türkiye: A New Era

A.      Introduction

The geopolitical shifts in recent years drastically changed the landscape of international dispute resolution. Today, finding legal representation and navigating the dispute itself are only the initial hurdles; winning a case on the merits is no longer the finish line. The real challenge—and the ultimate battleground—is successfully enforcing those judgments and arbitral awards abroad.

This shift was triggered by the Russia-Ukraine conflict. We all know the story: First, Russian entities invoked the Lugovoy Law¹, bypassing arbitration clauses to secure favourable judgments before Russian state courts. Then, Europe fired back by blocking the enforcement of these decisions.

However, the issue did not stop at Russian state court litigation. The expanding sanctions regime now directly impacts the enforcement of arbitral awards in favour of Russian entities as well. So much so that, in recent years, we have seen more and more European courts denying enforcement of awards on the grounds that it would impede the sanctions regime.

With European courts systematically denying enforcement to Russian parties, a natural question arises: What is the situation in Türkiye? The short answer is that Turkish courts are entirely unconcerned with the Lugovoy Law, international sanctions, or geopolitical pressure. Instead, they strictly adhere to standard procedural frameworks: the New York Convention for arbitral awards, and Turkish private international law for state court judgments.

While this might seem straightforward, it does not mean Russian parties get a free pass. Turkish courts still closely examine whether all the required legal criteria are met for each judgment or award. In fact, until very recently, Turkish courts systematically denied the enforcement of Russian state court judgments. However; a few months ago, Turkish Court of Cassation ultimately reversed its stance.

So, how did this sudden shift happen, and what is the current landscape? This article breaks down how the reciprocity hurdle was finally cleared for Russian court judgments and examines what Russian parties should expect when enforcing both their court judgments and arbitral awards in Türkiye today.

B.      The Enforcement of Russian Court Decisions

a.      Overview

The enforcement of foreign court judgments in Türkiye is governed by the Turkish Act on Private International Law and International Civil Procedure (MÖHUK). Under this framework, Turkish courts must verify four main conditions before granting enforcement:

• Lack of Exclusive Turkish Jurisdiction: The dispute must not fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Turkish courts. Disputes concerning real estate located in Türkiye, for example, are considered to fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of Turkish courts.²
• Due Process: The respondent must have been properly summoned and represented in the foreign proceedings, and their right to a fair defence must have been respected. For example, enforcement is ought to be denied if a Turkish company was never properly served with the Russian lawsuit in accordance with Russia’s notification rules.³
• Compliance with Public Policy: The foreign judgment must not clearly violate Turkish public policy. While public policy is a broad and somewhat vague concept, the courts’ scope of review is highly restricted regarding this matter. Enforcement will only be denied if the violation is manifest; courts are prohibited from reviewing whether the foreign court correctly applied the relevant substantive laws.⁴
• Reciprocity: The final condition is reciprocity, meaning that Turkish court judgments must also be enforceable in the respective foreign state. This can be established through a bilateral or international treaty, a provision in the foreign state’s local law, or de facto practice —meaning Turkish judgments are enforced in that state in practice, even without a formal agreement or legislation.

As outlined above, Turkish courts examine every single condition. However, a closer look at practice reveals that the reciprocity requirement is by far the most common and significant obstacle to enforcement.

b.   The History and the Present

For Russian parties, reciprocity requirement historically served as a major hurdle. Since there is no bilateral treaty between Türkiye and Russia nor they are jointly party to an international treaty regarding recognition of court judgements, applicants had to rely entirely on proving de facto reciprocity. However, for many years, the Turkish stance was firm: Turkish courts consistently found no evidence that Russian courts were enforcing Turkish decisions in practice. Consequently, until as recently as 2025, applications to enforce Russian court decisions in Türkiye were routinely rejected.⁵

This stance was largely the result of a lack of concrete data and a general unfamiliarity with Russian practice. Interestingly, while there were a few isolated rulings during those years that seemingly granted enforcement, these were not based on a true assessment of reciprocity. Rather, they stemmed from a fundamental—and somewhat ironic—misunderstanding. Turkish judges often confused Russian “Arbitrazh” (commercial state) courts with arbitral tribunals simply because of their name.⁶ As a result, they bypassed the reciprocity analysis due to both states being party to the New York Convention—which created even more complications for the parties, who then had to go to great lengths to explain that the two were entirely different institutions.

In practice, this meant that winning a case in Russia mattered very little if the losing party’s assets were in Türkiye, because there was simply no way to enforce the judgment.

However, the landscape changed in the latter half of 2025. In a September ruling, the Turkish Court of Cassation finally broke the deadlock. For the first time—setting aside those earlier “Arbitrazh” mishaps—the Court definitively acknowledged the existence of de facto reciprocity between the two nations, paving the way for the successful enforcement of a Russian court decision.⁷ The Court did not provide any detailed explanation as to why it changed its long-standing stance, nor did it clarify since when this de facto reciprocity has actually existed.

But the result was still there, and the impact was immediate. Lower courts adapted rapidly to this new jurisprudence. As recently as February 2026, first-instance courts have been explicitly citing this exact precedent to enforce Russian judgments.⁸

This means that, the historical reciprocity barrier has fallen. If the remaining statutory conditions are met—namely, the lack of exclusive Turkish jurisdiction, adherence to due process, and compliance with public policy—parties can now successfully enforce Russian state court decisions in Türkiye.

C.      The Enforcement of Arbitral Awards

Unlike state court judgments, Turkish courts have historically been much more willing to enforce arbitral awards­—primarily because Türkiye is a party to the 1958 New York Convention. This approach certainly applies to awards rendered in favour of Russian parties as well. In fact, unlike European courts, which are increasingly refusing to enforce arbitral awards in favour of Russian companies, Turkish courts remain completely unbothered by the sanctions regime or geopolitics. Instead, they simply continue to analyse cases based strictly on the standard criteria of the New York Convention.

Thus, for this section, it is worth exploring the broader landscape and to illustrate the contrast between the European and Turkish approaches.

a.   The European Trend

As mentioned, enforcing arbitral awards in European jurisdictions has become increasingly more problematic for Russian parties. Courts across the continent are frequently interpreting international sanctions regimes as part of their international public policy. Consequently, these sanctions are often applied as a strict bar to enforcement, regardless of the underlying arbitral institution.

Recent case law highlights exactly how this trend is getting more popular across Europe. In May 2025, the Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart reviewed an ICAC⁹ award ordering a German supplier to refund advance payments. What should have been a routine enforcement under normal circumstances took a completely different turn. The court concluded that complying with the award would violate EU sanctions, and by extension, German public policy—ultimately refusing the enforcement.¹⁰

The Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt took a similar stance shortly after.¹¹ In a case where a German company took an advance for sanctioned polymer alloys but refused to deliver, the Russian buyer won an ICAC award just to reclaim the payment.  The Frankfurt court, however refused the enforcement. It held that because the original transaction was caught by EU sanctions, enforcing even a basic repayment would violate those sanctions and thereby breach German public policy.

This trend certainly isn't limited to the EU. A March 2026 ruling by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court follows the exact same logic, but more strikingly, it highlights that even partial Russian ownership is enough to derail enforcement. In this case, an Angolan company, 41% of whose shares were held by a sanctioned Russian entity, tried to enforce an LCIA award against a Swiss party. Yet the court held that national sanctions act as overriding mandatory law, forbidding funds from reaching a sanctioned entity even indirectly. The Court also established that the existence of a valid arbitral award couldn't override this ban; the payment obligation is now completely suspended until sanctions are lifted.¹²

This issue has now escalated all the way to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the Reibel case.¹³ The CJEU's upcoming ruling will provide a guideline to European Courts on how to handle this issue. However, if the Advocate General's February 2026 opinion is any indication, the outcome is unlikely to favour Russian parties: they suggest that awards effectively bypassing EU sanctions remain unenforceable, confirming that Europe’s current restrictive stance on enforcement is here to stay.¹⁴

b.   Approach of the Turkish Courts

In contrast, Türkiye offers a more streamlined and politically insulated process. Because Türkiye is not a party to the international sanctions regime against Russia, Turkish courts do not view these sanctions as part of Turkish public policy. Consequently, the assessment of enforcement cases generally does not go beyond the standard, procedural criteria set out in the New York Convention.

This predictable approach is still apparent in the recent case law. In a notable recent decision by the Sakarya Regional Appellate Court, the judiciary demonstrated its commitment to separating legal procedure from geopolitical context. In the enforcement case, the Sakarya court focused entirely on the New York Convention criterion, specifically addressing the due process objections raised by the Turkish respondent. After confirming that the general requirements of the New York Convention were met, the court went on with the enforcement of the award.¹⁵

Evidently Turkish courts refrain from overarching inquiry into sanctions, overriding mandatory laws, or geopolitical public policy. Therefore, by strictly applying the principles set in New York Convention, Türkiye seems to have positioned itself in a more neutral position with regards to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards.

D.      Conclusion

The intersection of international arbitration, cross-border litigation, and global sanctions has created a highly fragmented legal environment. Enforcement, asset location, and counterparty risks have eclipsed the merits of the case as the primary concerns for legal practitioners.

In this shifting landscape, the divergence between the EU and Türkiye is sharp and undeniable. While European courts are adopting a highly restrictive, policy-driven approach that frequently blocks enforcement of Russian court decisions or awards granted in favour of Russian parties, Türkiye is moving in the opposite direction. By acknowledging de facto reciprocity for court judgments and strictly adhering to the New York Convention for arbitral awards, Türkiye continues to offer a practical, predictable, and neutral forum.

Footnotes

^{1  The term Lugovoy Law refers to the amendments made to the Russian Arbitrazh Procedural Code via Federal Law No. 171-FZ, dated June 19, 2020. This term is primarily used to describe Articles 248.1 and 248.2 of the code, which allow Russian parties to bypass arbitration agreements and bring their disputes before Russian state courts.}

^{2   Milletlerarası Özel Hukuk, Şanlı / Esen / Figanmeşe, 12. Bası, Beta Yayınları, s. 692.}

^{3   Milletlerarası Özel Hukuk, Şanlı / Esen / Figanmeşe, 12. Bası, Beta Yayınları, s. 721.}

^{4   Court of Cassation Grand General Assembly for the Unification of Judgments' judgement with the case number of E. 2010/1, K. 2012/1 dated 10.02.2012.}

^{5    Court of Cassation 6th Civil Chamber's judgement with the case number of E. 2023/4469, K. 2025/679 dated 24.2.2025. For similar decisions, see Ankara Regional Appellate Court 23rd Civil Chamber's judgement with the case number of E. 2022/1228, K. 2023/365 dated 1.3.2023.}

^{6      Court of Cassation 6th Civil Chamber's judgement with the case number of E. 2024/2447, K. 2024/3264 dated 8.10.2024. For similar decisions, see Istanbul 8th Commercial Court of First Instance's judgement with the case number of E. 2018/44, K. 2018/944 dated 11.10.2018; Istanbul 15th Commercial Court of First Instance's judgement with the case number of E. 2022/118, K. 2022/360 dated 21.4.2022.}

^{7   Court of Cassation 11th Civil Chamber's judgement with the case number of E. 2025/564, K. 2025/5247 dated 10.9.2025.}

^{8   Istanbul 1st Commercial Court of First Instance's judgement with the case number of E. 2025/381, K. 2026/102 dated 12.2.2026.}

^{9   An arbitration centre based in Moscow, fully titled the "International Commercial Arbitration Court at the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of the Russian Federation”.}

^{10    Higher Regional Court of Stuttgart, Case No. 1 Sch 3/24, 13 May 2025.}

^{11   Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt am Main, Case No. 26 Sch 12/24, 12 June 2025.}

^{12    Swiss Federal Supreme Court (Bundesgericht), Case No. 4A_305/2025, 13 March 2026.}

^{13  CJEU Case C-802/24.}

^{14 Opinion of Advocate General Biondi dated 26 February 2026.}

^{15 Sakarya Regional Appellate Court 7th Civil Chamber's judgement with the case number of E. 2025/495, K. 2025/1295 dated 8.7.2025.}

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