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On April 15, the board of Saudi Arabia's Public Investment Fund (PIF), chaired by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), approved the PIF's five-year investment strategy to cap off MBS' Vision 2030 plan for Saudi economic diversification. Financial media have interpreted the approximately $1 trillion fund's shift from "rapid growth and acceleration" to "sustained value creation" and "efficiency" as a signal that the days of multi-billion-dollar "giga-projects" and flashy sports investments are over. PIF Governor Yasir al-Rumayyan told Saudi media that the fund had been reassessing its priorities even before the outbreak of the Iran war in late February, which placed new strains on sovereign finances throughout the Gulf. MBS has relied on the PIF as a tool of international statecraft and domestic economic development, and the fund's strategic shifts indicate that it has made hard-nosed decisions in pursuit of economic and geopolitical returns on investment by 2030 and beyond.
The new strategy will create risks for firms that have relied on the PIF's historic spending habits as the kingdom tightens its belt amid disruptions caused by the Iran war. There could be uneven impacts for US and non-US private interests, as well as consequences for Saudi Arabia’s economic and diplomatic role in a shifting Middle East.
Background: A Vehicle for National Transformation and Giga-Projects
When al-Rumayyan and MBS took over the four-decade-old PIF in 2015, it was a modest Gulf sovereign wealth fund with $150 billion in assets, focused on passive domestic investments. A decade later, its holdings accounted for about 10% of Saudi Arabia’s non-oil GDP, with foreign investments rising to 30% of its portfolio. The PIF became known for its giga-projects, such as The Line, Trojena, and Red Sea resorts, while also founding or taking controlling stakes in dozens of firms across the Saudi economy since 2017, including in electricity, finance, mining, and telecoms. Between 2021 and 2025, it invested over $199 billion in the Saudi domestic market.
This growth relied on government asset transfers, debt, and dividends from its 16% stake in Saudi Aramco. Yet persistent low energy prices, aside from a brief 2022 spike, have drained billions, and the giga-projects are still years from profitability. The Saudi Finance Ministry has reported budget deficits in nearly every year of the past decade and expects additional lean years despite higher wartime oil prices.
Saudi policymakers assumed the kingdom’s wealth could fund its diversification, but the Iran war’s shocks exposed vulnerabilities. With a population of 37.8 million, far larger than its Gulf peers, Saudi Arabia faces deeper fiscal strain. The Hormuz shipping halt and damage to Saudi petrochemical infrastructure have forced difficult choices over where to commit shrinking revenues.
Recent statements by MBS and al-Rumayyan confirm a strategic shift. In September 2025, MBS told the Shura Council he would “cancel or radically change” Vision 2030 targets, while al-Rumayyan said the PIF will focus on “must-haves” and delay “good-to-haves,” leaving many dependent firms facing canceled contracts.
Cancelled and Postponed Projects
Cost overruns, logistical issues, and disputes with vendors reflected a change in Saudi priorities months before the release of its new five-year plan. In early 2025, the PIF imposed a one-year ban on new consulting contracts with Big Four firm PwC over hiring and contract disputes, leading to PwC cutting 60 partners and 1,500 staff from its Middle East business and anticipating years of major revenue shortfalls. The dispute with PwC is part of a wider trend within Saudi government contracts to move away from reliance on expensive foreign consultants, with annual growth in the Saudi consulting sector falling from 38% in 2022 to 13% in 2025.
Several of the Saudi giga-projects have also seen delays and cancellations. In January 2026, the Saudi government announced that the PIF's incomplete Trojena mountain resort, under construction as part of the NEOM giga-project, would not be able to host the 2029 Asian Winter Games. In March 2026, Italian and Malaysian construction firms confirmed that the PIF had cancelled billions of dollars in contracts for Trojena. Construction activity for The Line, once the largest active building site on Earth, has all but ceased.
The PIF is also shifting its focus away from its stable of high-profile sporting ventures. The PIF has reportedly pulled funding from the LIV Golf tour after spending billions on talent and marketing with limited international success. On April 16, the PIF sold its 70% stake in Saudi professional soccer team Al-Hilal to a Saudi royal family holding company. Al-Rumayyan and two dozen PIF officials are currently in the UK to review the fund’s controlling stake in English Premier League team Newcastle United, which it purchased in 2021. The PIF’s sports holdings have also proven to be a lightning rod for controversy, with allegations of “sportswashing” and legal battles with rival sports leagues perhaps contributing to the sales and strategic review.
In addition to the now-relocated 2029 Asian Winter Games, PIF projects are central to Saudi Arabia's commitments to host the 2027 AFC Asian Cup, Expo 2030, and the 2034 FIFA World Cup. Further delays and cancellations, inflamed by Iran war disruptions, will undermine Saudi Arabia's presentation as a new destination for international sports and tourism.
New Priorities: US Support and Infrastructure
The PIF has not completely abandoned its mega-investments. A new focus on US media assets and functional domestic infrastructure has started to emerge since the fund began its reassessments.
In September 2025, the PIF backed a $55 billion leveraged buyout of US video game developer Electronic Arts, the largest such transaction in history. The deal is significant in the context of the PIF's foreign investments, as the fund had previously only invested $85 billion in Europe and North America since 2016. The deal was arranged by President Donald Trump's son-in-law and personal envoy Jared Kushner and fits into the PIF's prior investments in Saudi esports venues and mobile game developers. Despite the outbreak of the Iran war, the transaction remains on track for completion later this year. $18 billion in debt issued for the buyout easily attracted buyers when put on the market in March 2026. The PIF has also financially supported Paramount Skydance’s media acquisition spree, which the Trump administration has backed rhetorically and through regulatory approvals. These investments risk politicizing the PIF’s activities and could invite Congressional scrutiny.
Saudi Arabia appears to be dedicating sovereign investments to support its political relationship with the US, but it faces competition from an increasingly assertive UAE. Saudi Arabia’s population requires it to dedicate a much larger proportion of its investment capacity towards domestic firms that can employ its citizens, putting it at a comparative disadvantage against the UAE, which faces no similar obligations and can focus its capital on securing foreign support for its goals. This dynamic proved complementary over the prior decades when Saudi Arabia and the UAE pursued broadly similar geopolitical goals, but the UAE has more frequently broken with Saudi Arabia on Yemen, Israel, OPEC, and other regional issues. It may also be an opportunity for Saudi Arabia to present itself internationally as a less disruptive force for regional politics when compared to the UAE, whose activities in Sudan, Somaliland, and Libya have drawn increasing criticism from Europe.
Saudi Arabia will also likely direct its investments back into the petrochemical sector to both rebuild assets damaged by Iranian attacks and create new infrastructure that will hedge against future disruptions in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia has a history of reacting to instability by building infrastructure insulated from regional risks, such as the East-West Pipeline during the 1980’s Iran-Iraq War and petrochemical storage capacity outside of the Middle East following the 12 Day War in 2025. Saudi Arabia will likely engage in similar development efforts to re-route oil exports to the Red Sea, as al-Rumayyan has already signaled that new export infrastructure is one of the PIF’s top priorities. While announcing the PIF’s new strategy this month, he identified Oxagon, NEOM’s Red Sea industrial and logistics hub, as a “must have” while classifying The Line as “good to have” but not important.
Winners, Losers, and Emerging Risks
MBS’ vision for a diversified Saudi economy driven by sovereign investment remains the driving force behind the PIF’s renewed investment strategy, but growing expectations for returns on investment and the shock of the Iran war have impacted the timeline and method of the kingdom’s transformation. Firms unable to show their role in supporting Saudi Arabia’s economic security needs risk being caught on the wrong side of al-Rumayyan’s “must have” / “good to have” dichotomy. US companies with a higher political and reputational risk tolerance will also win out from the PIF’s apparent preference for Trump administration-supported corporate deals. Accompanying these shifts is Saudi Arabia’s growing rivalry with the UAE, whose ability to deploy investments with fewer domestic obligations has sharpened competition for regional influence and international partnerships. The coming years will test whether the PIF’s more disciplined investment strategy will deliver on the Saudi goals set out in Vision 2030 and how the costs of its prior ambitions will weigh on its response to an increasingly volatile Middle East.
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