It is an absolute delight when our favourite classics hit the big screen again. One of our 2013 favourites and a masterpiece, Raanjhanaa was re-released on August 1, 2025. The plot twist however, was that the tragic end of original film was replaced by an AI generated conventional happy ending. Produced under the banner of Eros International, has been promoted as an innovative engagement with new technology. It has also sparked a fierce debate about the limits of artificial intelligence in copyright laws, the scope of moral rights under Indian copyright law and the balance between commercial ownership and creative authorship.
Director Aanand L. Rai as well as the protagonist cast called the alternate ending "artistic vandalism". Eros being the copyright holder, has defended its legal right to modify and re-release the work. The controversy has become a miniature of larger legal questions: What is the scope of control in creative work once it has been released? Do moral rights offer meaningful protection for directors in India? And how does the rise of AI intensify these tensions?
Ownership versus Authorship under the Indian Copyright Regime
The Indian Copyright Act1 defines an author with respect to a cinematographic work u/s 2(d)2 to be the producer. By contrast, the director's creative input, however significant, is not recognised as conferring authorship. As per the Act, being the author of a work makes you the first owner of copyright on the work. However, Section 173 states certain circumstances wherein the author of the work and holder of copyright are different parties. These would be instances of creating the work in lieu of employment, contract of service or apprenticeship, valuable consideration by another person and Government work. These exceptions to the author of the work not being owner of copyright holder do not come to play in the case of cinematographic work since the Act already recognises the producer to be the author and any creative contribution by other parties in a cinematographic work do not confer the status of being the author in the first place.
The Delhi High Court reiterated the existence of this distinction in the case of Sartaj Singh Pannu v. Gurbani Media Private Limited4 and acknowledged the director's contribution but stated that without statutory recognition, rights could not be extended to them.
Moral Rights under the Indian Copyright Regime
The Act explicitly confers certain rights on the author. These rights will prevail even when copyright on the work is assigned wholly or partially or when the copyright holder and author are different persons. Section 575 of the Act provides for two of these rights.
- To claim authorship of the work
- To restrain or seek compensation for any distortion, mutilation, modification or other act with respect to the work given said distortion, mutilation, modification or other such act is prejudicial or harmful to the author's honour or reputation
These rights survive the transfer of economic rights and persist until the author's death and sometimes beyond, depending on jurisdiction.
India is a signatory to the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works and therefore this provision reflects Article 6bis6 of the Convention concerned with moral rights. It lists three aspects in the article.
- To claim authorship and to object to certain modifications and actions jeopardising author's honour or reputation similar to Section 57 of the Act
- Moral rights to persist after the author's death at least until expiry of the economic rights
- Provision of redress governed by legislation of the country where protection is claimed
The Problem for Directors
The most significant limitation on directors in India stems from the definition of "author" under Section 2(d) of the Act. For cinematograph films, the "author" is defined exclusively as the producer, i.e., the person who takes the initiative and responsibility for making the work. This statutory exclusion means that directors despite their undeniable creative role are not recognised as authors of the finished film. The letter of the legislation does not leave space for any other intent to be interpreted.
Consequently, directors cannot directly invoke Section 57 which grants the moral rights of paternity and integrity unless they also qualify as authors of a separate component of the film, such as the screenplay, dialogue or musical score. This narrow definition has led Indian courts to consistently reject directors' claims to moral rights in the overall film.
The iconic film Sholay's director in Ramesh Sippy v. Shaan Ranjeet Uttamsingh7 sought recognition of moral rights in relation to the film in the Bombay High Court in 2013 but the Court firmly rejected the claim, holding that under the Act, only the producer is the author of a cinematograph film. The Court stressed that given the absent statutory recognition, directors cannot assert moral rights in the finished film regardless of their creative stature. Similarly in Indian Performing Right Society Ltd. v. Eastern India Motion Pictures Association8, though not specific to directors, the Supreme Court observed that in collaborative works like films, individual contributions become subsumed within the producer's authorship, reinforcing the producer's primacy. The much-appreciated film Chhapaak, in Fox Star Studios v. Aparna Bha9t, witnessed the court ordering the inclusion of a contributor's name in the credits based on promissory estoppel, not on moral rights. While it signalled judicial sympathy for recognising contributions, it avoided expanding Section 57 since the letter and spirit both of the legislation clear.
Together, these cases underscore a structural imbalance in Indian copyright law. By vesting authorship of a film in the producer, the law prioritises financial initiative and organisational responsibility over creative authorship. The producer is treated as the central figure because they bear the economic risk and coordinate the various elements that make up a film. This approach reflects a commercial logic, the law views a film primarily as an investment-driven enterprise rather than as a work of art shaped by creative vision.
This is very different from the situation in many civil law jurisdictions, most notably France, where the director is explicitly recognised as one of the co-authors of an audiovisual work. French law adopts the droit d'auteur framework10, which emphasises the inseparability of a creator from their creation. Under this system, directors enjoy robust moral rights, including the ability to prevent alterations that would distort the integrity of the film or compromise their artistic reputation. In the US, Visual Artists Rights Act (VARA) applies moral rights primarily to visual art, not film. Directors rely on contractual provisions rather than statutory moral rights. India has inherited a common law model, closer to the UK, which emphasises copyright as a property right tied to investment.
The situation exposes deeper aspects to be contemplated. Whether the copyright law continue to protect investment above creativity or should it evolve to acknowledge the director's role, especially in an era where technological tools make modifications both easier and more disruptive.
2010 Copyright Amendment Bill
The shortcomings have not gone entirely unnoticed. During the discussions leading up to the Copyright Amendment Bill, 2010 lawmakers considered a significant reform and recognised the principal director as a joint author of a cinematograph film. The proposed amendments to Sections 2(d), 2(z) and 17 were aimed at addressing exactly the concern of directors. Had these changes been enacted, directors would have been able to assert moral rights u/s 57 alongside producers and offered directors a degree of protection against modifications including AI-driven alterations that they considered distortive of their artistic vision.
However, the proposal ultimately faltered. The proposal was opposed in very strong terms by all stakeholders appearing before the Review Committee. In contrast to a primary director who charges an upfront price for his services, the producers faced the possibility of loss, thus the representatives of the Film and Television Producers Guild of India ruled that the proposed co-ownership to principal director was wholly unfair and unreasonable. Similar views were endorsed by Indian Motion Picture Producers Association. The South Indian Film Chamber of Commerce representatives further emphasised that it was completely unnecessary to include the principal director as the author of a cinematograph film because the process of making a picture comprised several crafts that were handled by several organisations or people. Only naming the principal director could not be justified. Several other organisations likely to be affected by this amendment also expressed concerns that recognising directors as joint authors could dilute the producer's authority and disrupt the established industry structure where producers assume the financial risk and therefore hold primary control.
As a result, the final amendments passed in 2012 omitted any reference to directors as authors, leaving the status quo intact. The rejection of this proposal is expressive. It demonstrates that the industry concerned has consciously chosen to side with producers reinforcing the view that films are primarily commercial products rather than collaborative artistic works.
Contractual Solutions in the Absence of Statutory Reform
In the vacuum that persists, the most effective protection for directors comes not from legislation but from agreements negotiated at the time of production. These contractual arrangements being preventive rather than remedial can meaningfully balance the relationship between producers and directors.
- Consent Clauses for Alterations
Directors can negotiate clauses that require their written consent before any substantial modification, re-release, or adaptation of the film is made. Such provisions do not override the producer's statutory authorship but create binding contractual obligations. If breached, the director may claim damages or seek injunctive relief.
ii. Indemnity and Reputation Protection
Contracts may also include indemnity clauses, obliging producers to compensate directors if a modified version of the film harms their reputation or diminishes their standing in the industry.
iii. Credit Protection and Attribution Clauses
Even if directors cannot prevent alterations, they can ensure that their contribution is properly acknowledged. Credit protection clauses can require that the director's name be displayed prominently in all versions of the film. In cases where the film is significantly modified against the director's vision, the contract can even allow the director to dissociate their name.
iv. Co-authorship Agreements
Where a director has also contributed to screenplay, dialogue, or music, they may negotiate recognition as a joint author of those works. This gives them a statutory foothold to invoke Section 57 in relation to that component of the film. More ambitiously, contracts could designate the director as a co-author of the cinematographic film itself, even though this recognition is not provided under the Copyright Act. While courts may hesitate to equate such contractual recognition with statutory authorship, such provisions can still grant the director contractual leverage and economic participation.
To Conclude
The Raanjhanaa controversy highlights a gap in Indian copyright regime, the absence of meaningful statutory recognition for directors' creative rights. In the age of AI, where alterations can be swift, seamless and transformative, this gap is becoming untenable. If the law fails to evolve, directors may find themselves watching their artistic vision reshaped by algorithms, with no legal recourse but moral outrage. The debate over Raanjhanaa should be a wake-up call, not only for lawmakers but for the film industry, to ensure that the balance between ownership and authorship is preserved in an era of machine assisted creativity.
Footnotes
1. The Copyright Act, 1957.
2. The Copyright Act, 1957, § 2(d).
3. The Copyright Act, 1957, § 17.
4. 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9627
5. The Copyright Act, 1957, § 57.
6. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Art. 6bis.
7. 2013 SCC OnLine Bom 2564
8. AIR 1977 SC 1443
9. 2020 SCC OnLine Del 36
10. Author's right
The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.
