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The Supreme Court has drawn a clear and decisive line on a question that has repeatedly troubled Section 9 litigation: when does arbitration truly begin? In a firm reaffirmation of statutory principle, the Court in Regenta Hotels Pvt. Ltd. Vs. M/s Hotel Grand Centre Point & Ors. (2026 INSC 32) held that arbitral proceedings commence upon the Respondent’s receipt of a notice invoking arbitration under Section 21 of the Act. The filing of a Section 11 petition is merely a consequential judicial remedy and does not determine commencement. With this clarification, the Court brought clarity and consistency to the statutory framework and ensured that technical procedural requirements do not undermine substantive interim relief.
The controversy arose from a Franchise Agreement relating to the operation of a hotel. Alleging interference with its contractual and operational rights, Regenta Hotels Pvt. Ltd. approached the civil court under Section 9 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 seeking interim measures. On 17th February 2024, the Trial Court granted an ad interim injunction in its favour.
However, Section 9(2) imposes a strict statutory condition. Where interim relief is granted before arbitration begins, the arbitral proceedings must commence within ninety days from the date of such order. Failing this, the interim protection cannot survive.
Acting within this mandate, Regenta Hotels Private Limited (“Regenta”) issued a notice invoking arbitration within the ninety-day period. The Respondent received the notice but declined to cooperate in the appointment of an arbitrator. This refusal compelled the Regenta to approach the High Court under Section 11 for appointment of an arbitrator.
The High Court adopted a technical view. It treated the filing of the Section 11 petition as the date on which arbitration commenced. Since that filing occurred beyond ninety days from the interim order, the High Court concluded that the injunction had automatically lapsed.
The matter thus turned on a narrow but significant question before the Supreme Court: is commencement triggered by a Section 21 notice or by a Section 11 petition?
In answering this, the Court relied upon and reaffirmed earlier authoritative precedents, including Sundaram Finance Ltd. v. NEPC India Ltd (AIR 1999 SC 565)s, Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd (AIR 2004 SC 3145), Geo Miller and Company Pvt. Ltd. v. Chairman, Rajasthan Vidyut Utpadan Nigam Ltd (AIR 2019 SC 4244) and Arif Azim Co. Ltd. v. Aptech Ltd (2024 INSC 155). These decisions consistently recognised that Section 21 provides a statutory and exclusive definition of commencement.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the Act deliberately delinks judicial proceedings from the initiation of arbitral proceedings. A Section 11 petition is only a mechanism to secure constitution of the tribunal where a party defaults. It does not postpone or alter the legally recognised date of commencement under Section 21.
Applying this settled principle, the Court observed that the notice invoking arbitration had been received within ninety days of the interim order. Arbitration had therefore commenced within time. The subsequent filing of the Section 11 petition was legally irrelevant for purposes of Section 9(2).
The Supreme Court accordingly set aside the decision of the High Court, restored the interim protection, and directed expeditious adjudication of the Section 11 petition.
Conclusion
This judgment reinforces the structural clarity of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. By reaffirming through consistent precedent that commencement is anchored in receipt of a Section 21 notice, the Supreme Court has ensured that interim safeguards under Section 9 are not rendered illusory by procedural technicalities. The decision strengthens the principle that arbitration begins with the will of the parties expressed through notice, while courts intervene only to facilitate and not to initiate. In doing so, the Court has brought certainty to Section 9 practice and reaffirmed the party centric foundation of arbitral proceedings in India.
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