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Rejecting Sovereign and "Natural Person" Arguments in CRA Enforcement
In Blake v. Ahmed (2025 BCCA 384), the British Columbia Court of Appeal considered whether a taxpayer could bring civil claims of theft, fraud, and negligence against the Canada Revenue Agency (CRA) and a commercial bank following the lawful CRA garnishment of funds under a Requirement to Pay (RTP).
The case arose after the CRA, through one of its employees, issued an RTP directing the taxpayer's financial institution to remit $12,671 from his account toward an outstanding personal tax debt. The taxpayer, Daniel Blake, subsequently filed an action against the CRA employee, the Attorney General of Canada, and the Toronto-Dominion Bank, alleging theft, fraud, and negligence in the handling of his funds.
The chambers judge of the Supreme Court of British Columbia granted summary dismissal of Blake's claims against both the CRA employee and the bank, determining that the allegations depended on "debunked and false organized pseudo-legal commercial arguments." These included the taxpayer's claim that there is a legal distinction between his "natural person" and a separate "legal fiction," that he has not entered into any binding contract to pay taxes, and that the government lacks jurisdiction over him without such consent.
The chambers judge concluded that these theories, which have been repeatedly rejected by Canadian courts, do not raise a genuine issue for trial under Rule 9-6 of the Supreme Court Civil Rules.
On appeal, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia fully upheld the lower court's decision. Chief Justice Marchand, writing for a unanimous panel, reaffirmed that such pseudo-legal theories—often proposed by self-represented taxpayers—are meritless and have no foundation in Canadian law. The Court highlighted that the CRA's issuance of a Requirement to Pay is a lawful enforcement tool authorized under the Income Tax Act, and civil actions attempting to reframe lawful tax collection as "theft" or "fraud" are destined to fail.
This decision strengthens the judiciary's consistent rejection of organized pseudo-legal commercial arguments (OPCA), first thoroughly examined in Meads v. Meads (2012 ABQB 571). It also demonstrates that Canadian courts are prepared to use summary procedures to dismiss unmeritorious taxpayer claims based on OPCA reasoning, thereby protecting judicial resources and maintaining the integrity of the tax collection process.
For taxpayers, the ruling serves as a reminder that challenges to CRA enforcement must be grounded in legitimate legal principles and evidence—not in discredited theories of consent, sovereignty, or contractual taxation.
Ultimately, Blake v. Ahmed reaffirms the courts' clear stance against pseudo-legal tax arguments and highlights the importance of consulting a qualified Canadian tax lawyer when disputing CRA actions to ensure any claim remains within the boundaries of established law and procedure.
Organized Pseudo-Legal Arguments: Origins and Judicial Treatment Since Meads v. Meads
The British Columbia Court of Appeal's reference in Blake v. Ahmed (2025 BCCA 384) to "debunked and false organized pseudo-legal commercial arguments" (OPCA) invokes one of the most influential Canadian judicial analyses on pseudo-law—Meads v. Meads (2012 ABQB 571).
In Meads, Associate Chief Justice Rooke delivered a comprehensive judgment that has since become the cornerstone of Canadian jurisprudence, addressing pseudo-legal claims advanced by self-represented litigants seeking to avoid tax, financial, and statutory obligations through spurious legal constructs.
In Meads, the Court introduced the concept of the "Organized Pseudo-Legal Commercial Argument (OPCA) litigant", describing these individuals as participants in an informal but ideologically cohesive movement unified by three features:
- A characteristic set of legal strategies or "templates," often marketed commercially by so-called gurus;
- A reliance on meaningless formalities and archaic legal language that litigants mistakenly believe to be legally determinative; and
- A shared source of pseudo-legal materials and concepts, often originating from paid seminars, online "law" communities, or self-styled sovereignty movements.
Justice Rooke observed that OPCA litigants span all social and professional backgrounds—from retired seniors to educated professionals—and may appear in every level of court and across every area of law. What unites them, he explained, is a common rejection of court and state authority and a self-justifying belief that they have been "cheated or deceived" by a hidden system, entitling them to retaliate against perceived oppression.
Among the most recognizable OPCA techniques are "double or split person" schemes, in which individuals claim to exist in two separate legal states: a "natural person" and an "artificial or corporate fiction." OPCA proponents argue that laws apply only to the latter, while the "flesh-and-blood" person stands outside legislative jurisdiction unless they consent to be governed or enter into a "contract." Justice Rooke firmly rejected these theories, emphasizing that:
"There is only one legal identity that attaches to a person... The 'double/split person' strategies have no basis in law." (Meads, para. 417).
He further condemned the broader OPCA phenomenon as a form of commercial fraud, describing the promoters of these theories as "parasites that must be stopped" for abusing legal processes and misleading vulnerable individuals into self-defeating litigation. The Court's reasoning has since been consistently adopted across Canada, including in the Federal Court, the Tax Court of Canada, and various appellate decisions.
In Blake v. Ahmed, the British Columbia Court of Appeal applied this doctrine directly. The appellant, Daniel Blake, advanced precisely the kind of pseudo-legal reasoning condemned in Meads—claiming to be a "natural person" distinct from a "legal fiction," and asserting that he was not contractually bound to pay taxes.
Chief Justice Marchand, citing these arguments as "debunked and false," affirmed that Canadian courts recognize no such distinction and that statutory duties under the Income Tax Act apply equally to all natural and legal persons subject to Canadian jurisdiction.
From a jurisprudential perspective, Blake demonstrates how the Meads framework continues to function as both an analytical and procedural tool for courts to identify and quickly dismiss pseudo-legal arguments. The case also highlights the ongoing importance of judicial vigilance: although OPCA rhetoric evolves with the spread of information online, its legal impact remains ineffective.
The Canadian judiciary's consistent stance ensures that courts are forums of law—not spaces for pseudo-legal experimentation. Knowledgeable Canadian tax lawyers can determine when a taxpayer's dispute with the CRA stems from a valid procedural or evidentiary issue—such as whether a reassessment is within the permissible time limits or whether the CRA has fulfilled its statutory burden of proof—rather than from pseudo-legal misconceptions that lack grounding in Canadian jurisprudence.
CRA Collection Powers and Judicial Deference under a Requirement to Pay (RTP)
A Requirement to Pay (RTP) is one of the Canada Revenue Agency's most potent collection tools under the Income Tax Act. Authorized by subsection 224(1), it enables the CRA to compel third parties—such as banks, employers, or clients—to send amounts that are otherwise payable to a taxpayer with unpaid debts. Once issued, an RTP has the same legal authority as a garnishee order, requiring the third party to send funds directly to the Receiver General of Canada.
In Blake v. Ahmed, the Court of Appeal reaffirmed that the CRA's authority to issue RTPs is firmly grounded in statute and does not require judicial pre-approval. The Court acknowledged that although taxpayers may disagree with the CRA's collection actions, such disputes must be addressed through appropriate administrative or judicial processes, such as objections, appeals, or judicial review—not through civil suits framed as "theft" or "fraud." As Chief Justice Marchand explained, the appellant's attempt to reframe a valid enforcement measure as a criminal or tortious act lacked legal merit.
This position reflects a broader principle of judicial deference to statutory enforcement powers: once Parliament has clearly delegated authority to the CRA, courts will not interfere with its lawful exercise unless there is demonstrable abuse of process, procedural unfairness, or a violation of the taxpayer's Charter rights. The Court's ruling thus maintains the delicate balance between taxpayers' rights and the CRA's mandate to ensure tax compliance.
In practical terms, Blake confirms that banks and other third parties responding to an RTP have a statutory duty. As long as they act in good faith, they cannot be held liable to the taxpayer for remitting funds as instructed by the CRA. This principle helps prevent paralysis of Canada's tax collection system and protects public revenues from being threatened by private litigation grounded in pseudo-legal reasoning.
Pro Tax Tips – Avoiding Pseudo-Legal Pitfalls in CRA Disputes
Taxpayers facing CRA enforcement actions should consult expert Canadian tax lawyers rather than rely on misinformation or online templates that claim to "nullify" tax obligations.
Arguments based on "natural person" distinctions, lack of "consent," or rejection of government authority have been consistently dismissed by Canadian courts. Instead, legitimate disputes should centre on procedural compliance, limitation periods, or evidentiary standards under the Income Tax Act.
Knowledgeable Canadian tax lawyers can determine whether the CRA's actions—such as reassessments, garnishments, or collections—were carried out within legal timeframes and in accordance with due process. They can also negotiate payment plans, apply for taxpayer relief, or contest incorrect reassessments through established appeal processes.
FAQs – CRA Collection Powers and Taxpayer Rights
What is a Requirement to Pay (RTP)?
A Requirement to Pay is a legal notice issued by the CRA to a third party (for example, a bank or employer) directing them to remit money owed to a taxpayer directly to the government. It operates like a garnishment order and is authorized under subsection 224(1) of the Income Tax Act.
Can I sue the CRA or my bank for complying with an RTP?
Generally, no. If the CRA lawfully issues an RTP and the third party complies in good faith, courts have consistently held that neither the CRA nor the third party can be held liable for "theft" or "fraud." The correct avenue to dispute the underlying tax debt is through an objection or appeal, not a civil action.
Why are "natural person" or "sovereign citizen" arguments rejected?
Canadian courts have repeatedly ruled that all individuals and corporations operating in Canada are subject to the country's tax laws. Claims that one can "opt out" of taxation or government authority are classified as Organized Pseudo-Legal Commercial Arguments (OPCA) and have no basis in law.
What are CRA's collection restrictions after an assessment or reassessment?
Under the Income Tax Act, the CRA generally cannot begin most collection actions—such as issuing a Requirement to Pay, certifying a debt in Federal Court, or seizing funds—until 90 days have passed after a notice of assessment or reassessment is issued and the taxpayer has not challenged the assessment or reassessment through a notice of objection or appeal to the Tax Court of Canada. This restriction allows taxpayers to exercise their right to file a Notice of Objection before any enforcement begins, unless the debt relates to source deductions or other amounts held in trust for the Crown.
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