Court Of Appeal Summaries (October 6 – 10, 2025) - Civil Law

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Good afternoon.

Following are our summaries of the civil decisions of the Court of Appeal for Ontario for the week of October 6, 2025.

In SBG-Skill Based Games Inc. v. Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission), the Court dismissed the appellant's motion for a stay pending appeal of a judgment classifying the newest "GotSkill?" as a game of chance that would not be lawfully played in establishments without a gaming licence. The Court accepted there was a serious issue and irreparable financial harm but held the balance of convenience and the public interest in enforcing gambling and alcohol laws decisively favoured the respondent, particularly given that a prior decision relating to a prior version of this game had already been decided against the appellant.

In Ellacott v. Waterloo Regional Police Services, the Court upheld the dismissal of the appellant's lawsuit against the Waterloo Police, its chief, and two employees after she was terminated from her employment. The Court found that the police lawfully disclosed the appellant's marriage to a federal parolee to relevant authorities (the appellant was a supervisor at a halfway house). The disclosure was reasonable, made in good faith, and within statutory authority.

In Titus Steel Company v. Hack, the Court dismissed an appeal from the dismissal of a claim for breach of fiduciary duty, breach of confidence and conversion after a former director and officer resigned to start a competing business.

Other topics covered included stay and production from non-parties pending appeal.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable Thanksgiving weekend.

Civil Decisions

SBG-Skill Based Games Inc. v. Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission), 2025 ONCA 692

Keywords: Administrative Law, Alcohol and Gaming, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s. 197(1), Licensing, O. Reg. 746/21, s. 43(1) under the Liquor Licence and Control Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 15, Sched. 22, Liquor Licence and Control Act, 2019, ss. 13, 68, Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario Act, S.O. 2019, c. 15, Sched. 1, ss. 1(2), 3(2), 7(1), 10.1, 10.2, Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 17, s. 11(2), Play For Fun Studios Inc. v. Registrar of Alcohol, Gaming and Racing, 2018 ONSC 5190, rev'd 2019 ONCA 648, leave to appeal refused, [2019] S.C.C.A. No. 365, BG-Skill v. Registrar, Alcohol and Gaming Commission, 2025 ONSC 4938, RJR-MacDonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, Circuit World Corp. v. Lesperance (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 674 (C.A.), Longley v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 ONCA 149, 223 O.A.C. 102, Zafar v. Saiyid, 2017 ONCA 919, Ontario v. Shehrazad Non-Profit Housing Inc., 2007 ONCA 267, Manitoba (A.G.) v. Metropolitan Stores Ltd., [1987] 1 S.C.R. 110, Maple Ridge (District of) v. Thornhill Aggregates Ltd. (1998), 54 B.C.L.R. (3d) 155 (C.A.), Saskatchewan (Minister of Environment) v. Redberry Development Corp. (1987), 58 Sask. R. 134 (Q.B.), aff'd (1992), 100 Sask. R. 36 (C.A.)

Ellacott v. Waterloo (Police Board), 2025 ONCA 687

Keywords:Torts, Negligence, Misfeasance in Public Office, Police, Breach of Privacy, Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56, Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, ss. 41(1.2), Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46

Titus Steel Company Limited v. Hack, 2025 ONCA 693

Keywords: Corporations, Directors, Officers, Torts, Breach of Confidence, Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary, Levac v. James, 2023 ONCA 73

Kideckel v. Kideckel, 2025 ONCA 689

Keywords:Torts, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Discovery, Non-Parties, Stay Pending Appeal, Self-Represented Litigants, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.683(1)(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr.30.10 and 63.01, R. v. Jaser, 2023 ONCA 24, RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, MacDonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235, Maftoun v. Banitaba, 2012 ONCA 786

Short Civil Decisions

1579959 Ontario Inc., 2025 ONCA 688

Keywords: Contracts, Construction, Liens, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Extension of Time, Jurisdiction, Transfer, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990. C. C.43, s. 110, Construction Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.30, s. 71, Bernard v. Fuhgeh, 2020 ONCA 529

Macpherson v. Wyszatko Estate, 2025 ONCA 690

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Costs, Non-Parties, 11318847 Ontario Ltd. v. Laval Tool & Mould Ltd., 2017 ONCA 184

Luoy v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2025 ONCA 695

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Libel, Negligence, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(b)

KMH Lawyers v. Kasanda, 2025 ONCA 694

Keywords: Contracts, Solicitor and Client, Fees, Assessments, Solicitors Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. S.15, s. 3, Trillium Motor World Ltd. v. General Motors of Canada Limited, 2015 ONSC 3824, Capital Sports Management Inc. v. Trinity Development Group Inc., 2022 ONSC 2657, Rye and Partners v. 1041977 Ontario Inc., 188 O.A.C. 158

CIVIL DECISIONS

SBG-Skill Based Games Inc. v. Ontario (Alcohol and Gaming Commission), 2025 ONCA 692

[Gomery J.A.]

Counsel:

S.C. Hutchison and B.A. Chung, for the moving party

A. Sinnadurai and M.J. Sims, for the responding party

facts:

The appellant moved for a stay pending appeal of the application judge's declaratory judgment, which classified the newest "GotSkill?" as a "game" under s. 197(1) of the Criminal Code, rendering it unlawful in bars and other licensed premises in Ontario. The appellant also seeks other injunctive orders preventing the respondent from enforcing a bulletin the Commission issued on April 23, 2023 (the "Bulletin"), requiring liquor licensees in Ontario to ensure that the appellant's "GotSkill?" game is not operated in their commercial establishments.

After the Court's 2019 Play for Fun decision on a prior version and a lengthy review period, the appellant modified the game. Despite this, the respondent concluded in late 2022 that GotSkill? remained a game and issued the Bulletin directing liquor licensees to cease operating the game on their premises.

In response, the appellant sought judicial review and a declaration from the Divisional Court that the modified version of GotSkill? was not a game under s. 197(1) of the Criminal Code. The application was later transferred to the Superior Court as an application for declaratory relief.

The respondent refrained from enforcement while the modified version was assessed, and the application was litigated. Following the application judge's July 2025 dismissal of the application, the respondent moved to enforce its Bulletin.

issues:

Is there a serious issue to be determined on the appeal?
Will the appellant suffer irreparable harm if a stay is not granted?
Does the balance of convenience favour granting the stay?
Do the interests of justice warrant the interlocutory relief sought?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

1. Yes. The Court accepted that the appeal cleared the low threshold of a serious issue. The respondent properly conceded the point. However, the merits appeared marginal. The application judge applied the Court's binding articulation of "mixed chance and skill" in the earlier Play for Fun decision involving a prior version of the same game. The grounds advanced broadly alleged errors of mixed fact and law tied to the evaluation of the evidentiary record. Such findings attracted deference absent palpable and overriding error. The attempt to treat the modified version as beyond the reach of prior authority was unpersuasive where the legal issues materially overlapped.

2. Yes. The Court found that the appellant will suffer irreparable harm without a stay, but that the extent of harm was overstated. Lost revenues flowing from enforcement would not be recoverable due to statutory immunities protecting good-faith regulatory action. This satisfied irreparable harm. However, the Court observed that some revenue loss is likely even with a stay because licensees face legal risk in continuing to host the game following the application judge's ruling. The asserted reputational harm would not be cured by a stay, given the publicity of the decision. The situation was distinguishable from Ontario v. Shehrazad Non-Profit Housing Inc., where the harm was truly existential and irreversible.

3. No. The balance of convenience favoured the respondent. Courts must be cautious in restraining the enforcement of duly enacted legislation serving the public interest: RJR-MacDonald, at p. 333. Harm to the public interest is presumed when a statutory authority charged with promoting or protecting that interest undertakes enforcement. The respondent's mandate is grounded in "honesty, integrity, and social responsibility." The record included uncontradicted evidence that unregulated gaming in licensed establishments, many accessible to minors, undermines safeguards embedded in the regulated gambling framework, including measures addressing addiction and underage access. The proliferation of similar purportedly skill-based electronic games heightened these concerns. Although the appellant and third parties may incur monetary loss, those harms did not outweigh the identified risks to vulnerable individuals and the broader public interest in enforcement.

4. No. The interests of justice did not support granting the stay. While there was a serious case to be tried and irreparable financial harm, the appeal seemed to revisit and re-litigate issues that have already been resolved. Accordingly, the orderly enforcement of the statutory scheme should not be stayed.

Ellacott v. Waterloo (Police Board), 2025 ONCA 687

[Thorburn, Coroza and Gomery JJ.A.]

Counsel:

LE, acting in person

Boghosian and L. Amaral, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Negligence, Misfeasance in Public Office, Police, Breach of Privacy, Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.56, Police Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.15, ss. 41(1.2), Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board, 2007 SCC 41, R. v. Quesnelle, 2014 SCC 46

facts:

LE appealed the dismissal of her action by way of summary judgment. In her lawsuit against the respondent, Waterloo Police, its chief and two employees, her central allegation was that they unlawfully disclosed to her employer that she was married to a federal parolee, thereby causing her to lose her job as a supervisor at a halfway house for federal parolees. She asserted various causes of action and claimed over $800,000 in damages.

In July 2021, the Waterloo Police began investigating a possible animal cruelty charge against the appellant based on complaints by neighbors who reported sounds of a woman in LE's trailer beating or killing a dog one evening. When two officers attended at LE's residence to investigate these complaints the next morning, the appellant was not home but her husband volunteered to them that he was a federal parolee and that his wife worked at a halfway house for federal parolees. He denied any knowledge of what had happened to the appellant's dog, which was no longer in the residence. The officers found Mr. E's denial suspicious and warned him that he might be charged with obstruction of justice.

A Detective Constable then contacted the parole officer of LE's husband and advised her of the appellant's employment as well as the animal cruelty investigation. The parole officer told her supervisor that LE's husband was married to a supervisor at a federal halfway house, the supervisor shared this information with the Hamilton parole office, and that office relayed it to the appellant's employer. The employer immediately placed the appellant on leave (with pay). After an investigation, it terminated her employment.

The appellant had filed a complaint with the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Ontario alleging that the disclosure of her place of employment by the Waterloo Police to her husband's parole officer breached MFIPPA. The Commissioner's office advised that the police had reasonable grounds for disclosing the information, that it actually was the parole office, not the police, who notified her employer, and that the information disclosed might not even qualify as personal information under MFIPPA.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in finding that the Waterloo Police or its chief was not vicariously liable for negligence, breach of privacy, or misfeasance in public office?
Did the motion judge err in finding that there was no basis to hold the respondents directly liable for failure to train or supervise officers?
Were the motion judge's findings inconsistent with evidence from examinations for discovery in a related action she took against other defendants?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. The appellant relied on the Supreme Court decision in R. v. Quesnelle which broadly confirms Canadians' entitlements to provide information to police for safety with the guarantee that it will only be disclosed for good reason. The motion judge found that there was "good reason" for the police to disclose the appellant's employment to her husband's parole officer.

Section 41(1.2) of the Police Services Act permits disclosure of personal information about an individual in accordance with the regulations, where disclosure is made for the purpose of law enforcement, for correctional purposes, or for the protection of the public. Per the regulation under the Act (Disclosure of Personal Information, O. Reg. 265/98, s. 5), a police officer may disclose personal information about an individual if the individual is under investigation for an offence under the Criminal Code.

On the evidence before him, the motion judge found that the police officer's disclosure was for purposes permitted under the Police Services Act while the appellant was under investigation for the Criminal Code offence of animal cruelty. He noted that, even if the officer had disclosed personal information, the police chief and Waterloo Police are shielded from liability for such disclosure provided it was made in good faith, pursuant to s. 49(2) of the Municipal Privacy Act, which states that: "No action ... lies against a head, or against a person acting on behalf or under the direction of the head, for damages resulting from the disclosure or non-disclosure in good faith of a record or any part of a record under this Act...."

2. No. The Court found no error in the motion judge's analysis of the relevant standard of care from Hill v. Hamilton-Wentworth Regional Police Services Board. There was no evidence that the police officer fell below the standard of care in his disclosure.

3. No. The appellant's filing of the transcripts of these examinations for discovery breached the deemed undertaking rule. The respondents also had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses who gave this evidence, so the Court disregarded it.

Titus Steel Company Limited v. Hack, 2025 ONCA 693

[Hourigan, Sossin and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

F.S. Turton, for the appellant

M.P. Forget, for the respondents

Keywords: Corporations, Directors, Officers, Torts, Breach of Confidendence, Conversion, Breach of Fiduciary, Levac v. James, 2023 ONCA 73

facts:

Titus Steel Company Limited ("Titus") is a family-run business specializing in ballistic steel products. In 2001, Titus hired W as a director and later promoted him to Vice President. In 2016 W resigned from Titus and subsequently began operating Progressive Armor, a company which also sold ballistic steel.

Shortly after W's resignation, Titus advised W that it had evidence showing that before he left, W copied and downloaded confidential and proprietary information. It asked him to return the material, which he later did. Titus alleged that W breached his obligations as a fiduciary, or in the alternative, as an employee when he set up his competing business. Titus also claimed damages for W's alleged willful misconduct or negligence relating to the sale of armour plates to two competing companies.

The trial judge found that W was not a fiduciary and thus could not breach any fiduciary duty nor did he breach his employment duties of good faith, loyalty, and fidelity by competing. However, he did breach these duties by virtue of misappropriating Titus' business documents and sharing them with his competitive business. This constituted the tort of conversion. The trial judge was not persuaded, however, that Titus suffered any damages because of this breach. The appellant appealed.

issues:

Did the trial judge err in deciding each major issue at trial?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

The Court held the trial judge's findings were entitled to deference. The appellant sought, through the appeal, to relitigate the findings of the trial judge. The Court held the trial judge's reasons made clear the basis for each of her key findings with reference to the record. It was not in dispute that a trial judge may accept all, some or none of the evidence tendered at trial. The question for the Court was whether those findings were open to the trial judge on the record, and whether they revealed any reversible error. The Court found no basis to conclude the trial judge's reasons failed to permit meaningful appellate review.

Kideckel v. Kideckel, 2025 ONCA 689

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

B.K., acting in person

Simovonian, for the responding party

A.T. Antoniou and I. Sinke, for the non-parties, A. Simovonian and Scalzi Caplan LLP

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Discovery, Non-Parties, Stay Pending Appeal, Self-Represented Litigants, Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46, s.683(1)(a), Rules of Civil Procedure, rr.30.10 and 63.01, R. v. Jaser, 2023 ONCA 24, RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311, MacDonald Estate v. Martin, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 1235, Maftoun v. Banitaba, 2012 ONCA 786

facts:

BK and DK were estranged brothers, living in California and Ontario respectively. On February 1, 2024, DK sued BK for defamation ("DK's action"). BK, a self-represented litigant, failed to defend and was noted in default. BK moved to set aside the noting in default but formally abandoned this motion in May 2025. Nevertheless, at the default judgment hearing the motion judge permitted BK's participation. In this forum, BK argued that he had never been served with his brother's statement of claim, asserting that the affidavit of service sworn by DK's counsel, A. Simovonian ("Simovonian"), was fraudulent. Noting that BK failed to adduce credible evidence supporting these claims, the motion judge found that the statement of claim had come to BK's attention. Moreover, via a July 25, 2025 judgment, the motion judge found that BK had defamed DK, who was entitled to general, aggravated and punitive damages totalling $90,000, plus costs, and a permanent injunction restraining BK from publishing false or defamatory statements about DK.

Earlier, on May 10, 2024, BK commenced a separate action against DK, DK's wife DS, Simovonian, Simovonian's former law firm, Scalzi Caplan LLP, the Toronto Police Service including certain officers, the Province of Ontario, and Doug Downey as Attorney General ("BK's action"). The claims against various parties, including the law firm, were struck in January 2025 for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action. BK's action against DK and DS was subsequently struck as a vexatious abuse of process and BK was prohibited from pursuing further proceedings against his brother and his sister-in-law without leave of the court. BK appealed this order separately, which appeal is pending.

In this motion, BK sought various relief including production orders, a stay of the July 25^th judgment, and disqualification of Simovonian and I. Sinke ("Sinke"), LAWPRO-appointed counsel to Simovonian and Scalzi Caplan.

issues:

Should production be ordered from the non-parties Google LLC and Scalzi Caplan LLP?
Should a stay of enforcement of the July 25^th judgment under appeal be granted?
Should the two lawyers be disqualified from participating in the appeal?

holding:

Motion dismissed.

reasoning:

1. No. BK sought an order compelling Google LLC to produce data from BK's email account between January and May 2024, and an order requiring Scalzi Caplan to produce any retainer agreement authorizing Simovonian to represent any party in DK's action, or an affidavit confirming whether such retainer existed. BK wanted this production for use in a future fresh evidence motion in his appeal of DK's action. BK believed it would support his claims that he never received DK's statement of claim and that Simovonian was acting ultra vires since he was allegedly not properly retained.

The Court deemed both non-party production requests meritless. BK relied solely on the criminal law decision in R v Jaser, which authorized appellate courts to order document production pursuant to s.683(1)(a) of the Criminal Code. This authority was limited to the criminal context, and the Rules contained no comparable provision. The Court explained that rule 30.10, which sets out a procedure to order non-party production prior to trial, has no application on appeal. No fresh evidence order had been sought or granted, such that BK's appeal would be based on the evidentiary record from the hearing. BK also failed to serve the relevant production request on Google, and it was unclear why he needed a court order to obtain data from his own email account. The Court also commented that the retainer agreement was presumptively privileged. BK had not argued any basis to override that privilege aside from his unsupported fraud allegation and had not established the agreement's relevance to any issues on appeal.

2. No. The Court declined to grant a stay of enforcement of the July 25^th judgment pending appeal. The order to pay damages and costs was already automatically stayed pursuant to r. 63.01 of the Rules, such that only the order that BK refrain from further defaming DK remained in effect pending the outcome of the appeal. In considering whether to stay this order, the Court applied the tripartite RJR-Macdonald stay of enforcement test which requires considering: i) whether there is a serious question to be determined on appeal ii) whether the moving party would suffer irreparable harm if the stay were refused; and iii) which of the parties would suffer greater harm from the granting or refusal of a stay pending appeal (the balance of convenience).

Regarding the appeal's merits, BK failed to identify a reversible error in the motion judge's finding that proper service occurred. BK's mere disagreement with the motion judge's factual finding was not a basis for appellate intervention. Turning to the second prong, BK failed to identify any harm, let alone irreparable harm, that he would suffer should the requested stay be refused and the injunction prohibiting him from further defaming his brother remain. Finally, the balance of convenience also did not favour granting a stay, since BK would not suffer harm by simply not defaming DK, while DK would likely be harmed if the stay was granted and BK continued making defamatory remarks, which the motion judge found likely.

3. No. The Court held that BK's request that Simovonian and Sinke be disqualified was unfounded. Though a defendant in BK's action, Sinke was not a party or counsel of record in the within appeal. Disqualifying him would be pointless. BK sought to disqualify Simovonian by asserting that he was a "material witness" on appeal, since Simovonian swore an affidavit of service stating that he had served BK with DK's pleading via email, in accordance with a substituted service order. The test for disqualification was whether a fair-minded, reasonably informed member of the public would conclude that counsel's removal was necessary for the proper administration of justice. The Court acknowledged that lawyers routinely swear affidavits of service, particularly where substituted service has been ordered. If counsel who swore such commonplace affidavits were conflicted from representing their clients, pointless litigation would ensue. BK provided no credible evidence to support his assertion that Simovonian's affidavit was false or fraudulent, and hence BK's attempt to disqualify Simovonian was utterly frivolous.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

1579959 Ontario Inc. v. Sheikh, 2025 ONCA 688

[Monahan J.A. (Motion Judge)]

Counsel:

N.J. Kasozi and F. Uyuklu, for the moving party

Zhang and H. Lu, for the responding party

Macpherson v. Wyszatko Estate, 2025 ONCA 690

[Copeland, Wilson and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Steven Sands, for the appellants

D.A.S. Mills and A. Subzwari, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Costs, Non-Parties, 11318847 Ontario Ltd. v. Laval Tool & Mould Ltd., 2017 ONCA 184

Luoy v. Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2025 ONCA 995

[Hourigan, Sossin and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

Steven Sands, for the appellants

D.A.S. Mills and A. Subzwari, for the respondent

Keywords: Torts, Defamation, Libel, Negligence, Civil Procedure, Striking Pleadings, No Reasonable Cause of Action, Rules of Civil Procedure, r. 21.01(1)(b)

KMH Lawyers v. Kasanda, 2025 ONCA 694

[Hourigan, Sossin and Pomerance JJ.A.]

Counsel:

F.P. Boutin, for the appellants

M.V. Peters, for the respondents

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be ought about your specific circumstances.

Court Of Appeal Summaries (October 6 – 10, 2025)

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