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12 August 2026

More AI Slop In The Fair Work Juris­dic­tion: The Fight Back

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Swaab, established in 1981 in Sydney, Australia, is a law firm that focuses on solving problems and maximizing opportunities for various clients, including entrepreneurs, family businesses, corporations, and high-net-worth individuals. The firm's core values include commitment, integrity, excellence, generosity of spirit, unity, and innovation. Swaab's lawyers have diverse expertise and prioritize building long-term client relationships based on service and empathy.
Recent court decisions reveal the pitfalls of relying on artificial intelligence in employment litigation, as judges dismiss cases where applicants used AI to generate evidence and submissions without proper verification. These rulings highlight the dangers of treating AI chatbots as legal advisors and the consequences of failing to disclose or properly supervise AI-generated content in court proceedings.
Australia Litigation, Mediation & Arbitration
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In two recent cas­es both the Fair Work Com­mis­sion (FWC) and Fed­er­al Cir­cuit and Fam­i­ly Court of Aus­tralia (FCF­CoA) have fought back against the indis­crim­i­nate and mis­guid­ed use of arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence (AI) by applicants.

Ba v Ster­ling Parts Aus­tralia Pty Ltd [2026] FedCFamC2G 1245

In Ba v Ster­ling Parts Aus­tralia Pty Ltd [2026] FedCFamC2G 1245, Judge Symons of the FCF­CoA dis­missed an appli­ca­tion in which the Appli­cant had, so her Hon­our inferred, inap­pro­pri­ate­ly used AI to pro­duce an orig­i­nat­ing process doc­u­ment that was inte­gral to the case being advanced. 

Judge Symons sets the scene at para­graph one:

What fol­lows is a cau­tion­ary tale about the dan­gers of befriend­ing Arti­fi­cial Intel­li­gence (AI)-powered chat­bots who mas­quer­ade as legal advi­sors.”

At the heart of this deci­sion was a repeat­ed fail­ure by the Appli­cant to pro­duce doc­u­ments in an Evi­dence List (com­pris­ing three sched­ules set­ting out a total of 38 doc­u­ments) that was attached to his Form 2 Application. 

In response to the court’s sus­pi­cion that the Appli­cant may have been using gen­er­a­tive AI and had failed to dis­close it in accor­dance with the rel­e­vant FCF­CoA prac­tice note, the Appli­cant respond­ed, “…all of the deci­sions are made by myself”. Judge Symons, how­ev­er, drew an infer­ence that, “…the Evi­dence List was gen­er­at­ed by an AI tool of some descrip­tion, and the doc­u­ments referred to do not exist and/or do not bear the descrip­tion that they have been assigned, mak­ing them impos­si­ble to iden­ti­fy.

The Respon­dent, in response to the repeat­ed fail­ure of the Appli­cant to pro­duce the doc­u­ments list­ed in the Evi­dence List upon which he was rely­ing, sought that the Appli­ca­tion be dis­missed. Judge Symonds grant­ed this relief, stat­ing “I had lit­tle hes­i­ta­tion in acced­ing to this appli­ca­tion.

At para­graph 52 Judge Symons acknowl­edges that AI, used appro­pri­ate­ly, can have a con­struc­tive role to play in litigation:

The Court acknowl­edges the poten­tial appeal of a gen­er­a­tive AI tool, such as a chat­bot, to a self-rep­re­sent­ed lit­i­gant and espe­cial­ly one who does not speak the lan­guage adopt­ed in the Court as his first lan­guage. The Court also acknowl­edges that respon­si­ble use of gen­er­a­tive AI tools can have sig­nif­i­cant ben­e­fits for effi­cien­cy and access for jus­tice; indeed, this is a cor­ner­stone of the Court’s Prac­tice Direc­tion: Use of Arti­fi­cial Intel­li­gence that was issued on 29 May 2026. With­out being exhaus­tive or pre­scrip­tive about its ano­dyne and help­ful uses, AI tools can be used to improve the effi­cien­cy of rou­tine or admin­is­tra­tive tasks by, for exam­ple, organ­is­ing mate­r­i­al that already exists or sum­maris­ing infor­ma­tion that has been gen­er­at­ed inde­pen­dent­ly of the AI sys­tem. It might also use­ful­ly and as a start­ing point, iden­ti­fy legal infor­ma­tion, such as whether time lim­its apply for the mak­ing of a par­tic­u­lar claim. Where this infor­ma­tion is capa­ble of inde­pen­dent ver­i­fi­ca­tion, it can assist in the demys­ti­fi­ca­tion and acces­si­bil­i­ty of legal avenues for redress.”

Judge Symons did, how­ev­er, strike a more sober­ing note about AI at para­graph 53:

How­ev­er, there are sig­nif­i­cant dif­fi­cul­ties when AI answers a job descrip­tion for legal advi­sor. This is because AI is not a lawyer, does not hold a prac­tis­ing cer­tifi­cate and is not autho­rised in any juris­dic­tion in Aus­tralia to engage in legal prac­tice and to pro­vide legal advice.

Her Hon­our con­tin­ued her cri­tique of AI being used as a de fac­to lawyer at para­graph 55:

“…because AI is not a legal advi­sor, it owes no duty to the Court or the admin­is­tra­tion of jus­tice and owes no duty to act in the best inter­ests of Mr Ba or to observe reg­u­la­to­ry or eth­i­cal stan­dards, includ­ing in its engage­ment with oth­er prac­ti­tion­ers and par­ties. In oth­er words, any AI tool used by Mr Ba did not care as to the truth or oth­er­wise of any mate­r­i­al that it might have gen­er­at­ed. The syco­phan­tic ten­den­cy of large lan­guage mod­els to pri­ori­tise user approval over truth, can make them espe­cial­ly dan­ger­ous and unpre­dictable unless care­ful over­sight, cal­i­bra­tion and ver­i­fi­ca­tion is applied.”

Judge Symons end­ed the deci­sion, in which the appli­ca­tion was dis­missed, by not­ing at para­graph 59:

There is one final obser­va­tion that I wish to make about this case. Although both respon­dents deny, for dif­fer­ent rea­sons, that Mr Ba’s case has any mer­it, the con­se­quence of his deci­sion to place blind faith in his AI “legal expert” means that he will not have the ben­e­fit of the Court’s adju­di­ca­tion of this ques­tion. While AI has the capac­i­ty to flat­ter and beguile, it also has the capac­i­ty to obscure and under­mine. It would be an unsat­is­fac­to­ry out­come indeed if the mis­use of AI result­ed in a good (or at least arguable) claim being thrown on the prover­bial scrap heap.”

Ms Wayan Buschman v Good to Great Schools Aus­tralia (C2026/5556)

In the case, Ms Wayan Buschman v Good to Great Schools Aus­tralia (C2026/5556), Deputy Pres­i­dent Dob­son of the FWC, in mak­ing orders dis­miss­ing a gen­er­al pro­tec­tions appli­ca­tion deal­ing with a dis­missal, not­ed the coun­ter­pro­duc­tive role of AI in the case observing:

In short I found that the Appli­cant was engaged by Upwork, a Dig­i­tal Labour Plat­form in the Unit­ed States of Amer­i­ca and there­fore the mat­ter was out­side the juris­dic­tion of the Fair Work Act and the Fair Work Com­mis­sion. I note that this was a case where arti­fi­cial intel­li­gence (AI) was used to pre­pare the Applicant’s case. Case law was incor­rect­ly applied and gave false hope as to the mer­its of the case. The Appli­cant cer­ti­fied that they had checked the AI work care­ful­ly how­ev­er dur­ing the pro­ceed­ings it became clear that the Appli­cant had not thor­ough­ly read or under­stood the case law instead only read­ing ‘the excepts pre­sent­ed by the AI”. This result­ed in the Appli­cant bring­ing a case that should not have been brought cre­at­ing unnec­es­sary cost to the Tri­bunal and the Respon­dent.

Some Obser­va­tions

While there may be a legit­i­mate role for the use of AI in employ­ment lit­i­ga­tion, giv­en the present state of devel­op­ment of AI appli­ca­tions, and the man­ner appli­cants are com­mon­ly using them, AI is caus­ing ongo­ing headaches for respon­dents, courts and the FWC. These issues are exac­er­bat­ed by appli­cants either not declar­ing the use of AI (as some­times required by pro­ce­dur­al rules) or not being entire­ly can­did in declar­ing the extent or nature of such use. 

There are two fac­tors that might lead to some san­i­ty being restored. 

The first is adverse costs orders being made against appli­cants, although the costs pro­vi­sions in the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (FWA) do place some lim­i­ta­tions on the extent to which a court or the FWC can do this. Sure­ly, how­ev­er, using AI to pro­duce pur­port­ed evi­dence or sub­mis­sions that include unchecked hal­lu­ci­na­tions, and then being less than can­did about AI use when asked, is square­ly in the ter­ri­to­ry of an “unrea­son­able act” for the pur­pose of sec­tion 570 (for court pro­ceed­ings) or sec­tion 400A (for unfair dis­missal mat­ters in the FWC).

The sec­ond is a real­i­sa­tion by appli­cants that they are being had and the promise of AI being a sub­sti­tute for an expert advi­sor is large­ly a hol­low claim prop­a­gat­ed by hype mer­chants. While AI might, at this point, large­ly be an exam­ple of the “Emper­or’s New Clothes”, it is the unwit­ting employ­ee appli­cants rely­ing upon it being left exposed and vul­ner­a­ble in a court or the FWC, with only spe­cious doc­u­ments and false hope cov­er­ing their dignity.

For further information please contact:

Michael Byrnes, Partner
Phone: + 61 2 9233 5544
Email: mjb@swaab.com.au

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.

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