Unprecedented FCC Enforcement Of “Team Telecom” Agreement Is A Wake-up Call To Prioritize National Security Compliance Efforts

This article was originally published in Pratt’s Privacy & Cybersecurity Law Report.

Companies with foreign ownership or subject to national security agreements should promptly reassess their compliance posture as the FCC expands reporting requirements and intensifies enforcement. Even unintentional lapses could trigger investigations, fines, and heightened government oversight.

Foreign involvement in U.S. telecommunications is under intense and escalating scrutiny from U.S. regulators. In January 2026, the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC”) took the unprecedented step of enforcing a violation of a 2022 Team Telecom Letter of Agreement (LOA) against satellite operator Marlink, Inc. (“Marlink”). In its settlement agreement, the FCC alleged that Marlink violated its LOA by allowing foreign employees to access U.S. communications infrastructure and/or customer information without timely obtaining the required prior approval from the Department of Justice (DOJ). In addition to heightened scrutiny of compliance with Team Telecom agreements and conditions, the FCC recently adopted two Orders imposing new attestation, disclosure, and reporting requirements on companies with foreign ownership or controlled by foreign adversaries. Together, these measures signal a significantly more aggressive framework for monitoring and enforcing national security obligations in the U.S. telecommunications sector.

For businesses with foreign ownership or involvement, the message is clear: companies subject to national security agreements and similar FCC obligations should promptly assess their operations and compliance measures, as even unintentional lapses could trigger investigations, fines, and heightened government oversight.

Team Telecom: Securing approval through risk mitigation conditions

The FCC refers certain applications with reportable foreign ownership¹ to an Executive Branch interagency body with national security expertise to assess potential impacts on national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy that may arise from the applicants’ foreign ties. This body, known as the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector (commonly referred to as Team Telecom), includes representatives from the Departments of Justice, War, and Homeland Security, among others.

After an extensive review (often spanning close to a year or longer), Team Telecom may advise the FCC that the application:

During its review, Team Telecom identifies potential national security or law enforcement risks that must be resolved before issuing its recommendation to the FCC. These risks often involve internal physical and cybersecurity controls, including supply chain risks; employee and third-party access to sensitive equipment and data; incident response protocols; and relationships with non-U.S. businesses and individuals, especially those connected to designated “foreign adversaries,” including China and Russia.

If risks are identified, Team Telecom requires applicants to negotiate and execute an extensive, perpetual LOA or “National Security Agreement” containing mitigation conditions. These conditions may include detailed and ongoing reporting on the business’s corporate structure and operations; disclosure of the applicant's service providers and manufacturers of network and communications equipment; identification of employees and third parties with access to sensitive materials; and the development and implementation of robust security policies.

Marlink case study: The new normal for Team Telecom compliance

In response to rising national security risks to U.S. networks, Team Telecom has significantly expanded the scope of its investigations and mitigation agreements, imposing more comprehensive and stringent commitments on applicants than ever before. In practice, recent mitigation agreements have effectively doubled in size, reflecting the increased number and granularity of new compliance obligations. Although Team Telecom’s risk analysis—and the resulting mitigation agreement—takes into account the unique facts of the specific transaction or license review, recent agreements share many of the same requirements, including:

• Providing access to all network management information;
• Disclosing and obtaining pre-approval for any new individuals—employees or third parties—requiring access to sensitive equipment and information, particularly non-U.S. persons;
• Disclosing and obtaining pre-approval for changes to equipment, service providers, record storage locations, sensitive facilities, and other company-­wide operations;
• Implementing expansive training requirements and more frequent background checks for individuals with access to sensitive information;
• Submitting certain customer information; and
• Retaining a third-party auditor to monitor compliance with the agreement itself.

Against the backdrop of these heightened security obligations, the recent Marlink action highlights the FCC’s new willingness to enforce violations of existing mitigation agreements. Marlink entered into its LOA during the acquisition of its corporate parent by a foreign-owned entity, which required FCC approval for the transfer of control of Marlink’s FCC authorizations.² The LOA required Marlink to notify DOJ (on behalf of Team Telecom) and obtain pre-approval for “all its Foreign person employees . . . that it intends to allow Access to U.S. Records” and other domestic communications and underlying systems.³

According to the FCC, Marlink’s “reliance on an inadequate manual screening procedure” resulted in the company’s failure to submit 186 employees for vetting.⁴ Although Marlink ultimately sought and obtained DOJ approval for all affected employees, DOJ referred the matter to the FCC before approvals were secured. The FCC’s investigation was settled with a $175,000 penalty and additional compliance obligations designed to ensure strict adherence to Marlink’s existing Team Telecom mitigation agreement.

The FCC characterized the action as a “landmark enforcement” of Team Telecom commitments and “strong precedent” for the FCC to “enforce Team Telecom mitigation commitments to protect American national security.”⁵

Navigating an increasingly complex national security landscape 

For businesses with foreign ownership or involvement, the message is clear: Team Telecom compliance is increasingly critical, and violations can trigger aggressive FCC and other enforcement actions. Enhanced mitigation requirements, coupled with the new threat of FCC enforcement, create new risks for businesses with current or prospective foreign ownership interests.

Companies already subject to a Team Telecom mitigation agreement (or currently undergoing Team Telecom review) may need to dedicate sufficient resources toward compliance, including implementing robust internal compliance programs and other company-wide reforms. Beyond the employee screening procedures highlighted in the FCC’s recent enforcement action, businesses must also carefully manage vendor and other third-party relationships, which raise legal and compliance issues such as disclosure of personal information and cross-border data transfers.

In addition to the heightened Team Telecom enforcement risks, the FCC recently released two Orders imposing new attestation, disclosure, and reporting requirements that directly affect how companies with foreign ownership (or controlled by foreign adversaries) must manage their FCC authorizations, increasing the risk of regulatory scrutiny and enforcement.⁶

Given the scope of Team Telecom’s investigations, the breadth of its mitigation requirements, and the real risk of FCC enforcement, as well as new FCC foreign ownership rules, businesses considering mergers, acquisitions, transactions, and other matters involving foreign interests should look ahead and proactively familiarize themselves with this evolving regulatory ecosystem.

• Due Diligence: Implement internal policies and controls to monitor non-U.S. ownership interests, governance, and access to sensitive data and operations.
• Third-Party Risk Management: Evaluate existing third-party relationships, including service providers and vendors; understand their roles, responsibilities, and access to sensitive systems; and carefully vet future third-party relationships.
• Security and Data Privacy: Review physical and cybersecurity safeguards, address compliance gaps, and ensure adherence to privacy laws, particularly regarding access to domestic communications, personal data, and cross-border data transfers.

The obligations, compliance requirements, and enforcement risks from Team Telecom and the FCC are not limited to current and future M&A deals. Any company with foreign ownership or involvement—or that falls under Team Telecom’s purview—also may face ongoing regulatory and enforcement risks in day-to-day operations, licensing, vendor relationships, and employee access controls. Team Telecom can review existing licenses to “identify any additional or new risks to national security or law enforcement interests”—an authority that it is increasingly invoking.⁷ Ongoing compliance with the FCC’s rules and other federal law should not be taken for granted, and companies should engage experienced counsel to assess risk, ensure compliance, and navigate Team Telecom obligations in this rapidly evolving global tech and telecom regulatory landscape. 

Footnotes

1. Team Telecom reviews applications for the transfer of a license or new authority to provide international telecommunications service to or from the United States, subsea cable landing licenses, and petitions to exceed statutory foreign ownership limits in certain regulated services.

2. Marlink’s authorizations included several earth station licenses and a Section 214 authorization to provide telecommunications services to and from the United States.

3. Petition to Adopt Conditions to Authorizations and Licenses of the National Telecommunications and Information Administration, File Nos. ITC-T/C-20210913-00135 et al. (filed May 24, 2022); see Letter of Agreement from Thomas Collins, President, Marlink, Inc., and Sinisa Krnic, Manager, P8 Holding 1 S.à r.l., to the Chief of the Foreign Investment Review Section et al., National Security Division, U.S. Department of Justice, File Nos. ITC-T/C-20210913-00135 et al. (May 5, 2022).

4. See Marlink, Inc., Consent Decree, DA-26-25, ¶ 12 (rel. Jan. 8, 2026), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/ attachments/DA-26-25A1.pdf.

5. See News Release, FCC, FCC Announces Landmark Enforcement of Team Telecom Commitments, at 2 (rel. Jan. 8, 2026), https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DOC-417571A1.pdf.

6. See, e.g., Protecting Our Communications Networks by Promoting Transparency Regarding Foreign Adversary Control (requiring authorization holders to comply with new attestation and disclosure requirements that vary based on the national security risk posed by foreign adversary control); Review of Foreign Ownership Policies for Broadcast, Common Carrier and Aeronautical Radio Licensees under Section 310(b)(4) of the Communications Act of 1934 (codifying foreign ownership policies, clarifying the controlling U.S. parent and ownership requirements, and streamlining the review process for common carrier and broadcast licensees).

7. Exec. Order No. 13913, Executive Order on Establishing the Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the United States Telecommunications Services Sector, 85 Fed. Reg. 19643, 19645, § 6 (2020), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/presidential-actions/executive-order-establishing-committee-assessment-foreign-participation-united-states-telecommunications-services-sector.