The Trump Administration’s Security-for-Minerals Model Faces Test In The DRC

Minimal progress has been achieved towards a permanent settlement of conflict between the DRC and the Rwanda-backed rebel group M23. Fighting in the eastern Congo persists, and both sides continue to accuse one another of violating the ceasefire. Perceived US favoritism toward Kinshasa has angered Kigali and M23. Recent US sanctions on former Congolese President Joseph Kabila, who allegedly provides political and financial support to M23, have solidified Rwanda's distrust of the peace framework. Mounting frustration from Rwanda risks derailing the fragile peace process. At the same time, Kinshasa perceives itself as the Trump administration’s preferred regional partner, emboldening President Félix Tshisekedi to prolong conflict and consolidate power. Both Rwanda’s frustration and the DRC’s perceived momentum present substantial obstacles to US policy and demonstrate the potential limitations of the security-for-minerals model. Complex historical grievances and regional ambitions underpin the conflict and complicate efforts to secure a lasting settlement. If the security situation continues to degrade, US businesses may hesitate to enter the DRC’s mineral sector, ceding it to rivals like China and complicating the US’ long-term mineral supply chain ambitions.

Conflict Update: Continued Fighting and Expanding Rebel Control Undermine Peace Talks

The next round of Qatar-mediated peace talks between the DRC and M23 will reportedly occur in Switzerland, following talks in mid-April led by Qatari officials and US Africa envoy Massad Boulos. However, even as M23 agrees to more negotiations, the group has moved to establish parallel governance structures in areas of the DRC it controls. Earlier this month, M23 announced it had completed “ideological training” for 416 political cadres to govern captured territory in North Kivu province. This follows two earlier rounds of training involving hundreds of political cadres, reflecting explicit efforts to supplant Kinshasa’s authority over the eastern Congo. Rwanda continues to deny it provides material support to M23 but likely backs the group’s administrative consolidation in the east.

The rebel group has also continued to circumvent attempts to reverse its military gains. Drone strikes and clashes between M23 and the Kinshasa-aligned Wazalendo fighters occurred earlier this month. M23’s December 2025 withdrawal from Uvira, a major city in South Kivu province strategically located near cobalt mines, marked an uncertain first step towards respecting the Washington Accords. Since then, the group has made additional territorial concessions but only after tremendous pressure from the US, signifying the group’s (and likely Kigali’s) reluctance to relinquish territory. Despite its public criticism of the US as an uncredible mediator, M23 rebels withdrew from positions in South Kivu this week following diplomatic pressure from Washington. The Trump administration has some leverage over M23, possibly stemming from recent sanctions, but it remains unclear whether that leverage can translate into durable concessions, especially as Rwanda continues to support the group.

The Armed Forces of the DRC (FARDC) and pro-Kinshasa forces continue to engage M23 in North and South Kivu. In February, the FARDC and allied militias conducted an offensive that killed a senior rebel leader, but repeated battlefield losses have led to uncontested M23 control over the Kivu provinces. The DRC relies on a drone campaign and Wazalendo fighters in a bid to contain the insurgency rather than reclaim significant portions of territory directly. Like M23, the DRC has stalled provisions of the framework reached in the April talks, such as prisoner exchanges. Humanitarian aid, another provision, began flowing through South Kivu earlier this month, but intensified fighting could halt or obstruct aid convoys.

Economic Incentives Alone Cannot Address Regional Ambitions and Historical Grievances

The Trump administration’s Strategic Partnership Agreement with the DRC contains economic development and security cooperation agreements, including a negotiated end to the conflict, in exchange for access to critical minerals. The US has offered comparatively fewer economic and security initiatives to Rwanda. The Washington Accords, signed in December 2025, committed to establishing a minerals transport corridor managed by both countries and ensuring territorial integrity and the prohibition of hostilities. This approach faces two challenges. First, while the minerals corridor is a major economic concession to Rwanda, this bargain does not address root historical causes behind M23’s political agenda. Second, Washington’s emphasis on engagement with the DRC has empowered President Tshisekedi at the risk of alienating Kigali, lowering incentives on both sides to end the conflict.

Rwanda’s strategic imperatives and militarism are partly rooted in historical trauma from the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. The Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR), a predominantly ethnic Hutu militia operating in the eastern DRC, has ties to former members of the Rwandan Armed Forces responsible for the genocide against ethnic Tutsis. Kigali views this group as an existential threat. It has demanded that the FARDC eliminate them, but the FDLR has long maintained a relationship with the Congolese military.

Rwanda’s power projection in the eastern Congo through its support for the M23 insurgency is not solely grounded in historical grievances. Despite its smaller size, the Rwandan Defense Force (RDF) is among the most formidable militaries in the Great Lakes Region, and Kigali relies on its credible military threat to alter the strategic calculations of the DRC, Burundi, and Uganda. M23’s highly successful operation to capture Uvira last December was supported by the RDF and exposed the weakness of the FARDC and Burundian forces. Kigali also seeks access to the DRC’s mineral resources in the east. In this vein, M23 has attempted to undercut the DRC’s economic leverage in negotiations by proposing to control mineral deposits near the Kivu provinces and sell to the US.

Meanwhile, the Tshisekedi government perceives the Trump administration as favoring the DRC, prompting the government to align its rhetoric with US peace initiatives while simultaneously pursuing the eradication of M23 and erosion of Rwandan influence in the region. Kinshasa likely believes that the US’s desire to diversify its mineral supply chains can be tacitly leveraged to ensure regime survival and deter regional rivals. This may have contributed to Tshisekedi’s recent proposal to delay elections and remain in office until the eastern Congo has been stabilized. Furthermore, while US sanctions on M23 are a source of leverage over Rwanda, they also carry the risk of emboldening Tshisekedi in his campaign to consolidate power and eliminate sources of opposition, including within M23-controlled areas. The Congolese government has reportedly accelerated efforts to assassinate Joseph Kabila (a former president charged with treason and now residing in M23-controlled Goma) and categorized certain M23 prisoners as war criminals, causing M23 leaders to doubt Kinshasa’s sincerity in negotiations.

Risks of Prolonged Conflict

Failure to attain a lasting peace risks undermining US-backed infrastructure projects and discouraging investment in the region’s minerals sector. An expansion of the Lobito Corridor, a major US-financed railway connecting the DRC’s minerals-rich regions to Angola’s Lobito port, could be threatened if competition between M23 and the FARDC over control of mineral sites intensifies. There is also a risk of conflict escalation, as further strategic gains by M23 may invite greater involvement from Burundi. This increases risks of regional spillover reminiscent of the Second Congo War (1998-2003).

In the long term, an unstable eastern Congo could drive out most formal exporters and produce fragmented and opaque supply networks dominated by M23 and other non-state intermediaries. This environment will make compliance more difficult, favoring actors willing to operate despite instability, typically firms linked to rival geopolitical powers. Chinese mining companies are already deeply entrenched in the DRC’s minerals industry, and, given the resilience of Chinese supply chains in conflict zones, their risk thresholds are higher compared to US competitors. A protracted conflict therefore weakens the US’ standing in its broader strategic competition against China. Moreover, a breakdown in peace talks would call into question the efficacy of the security-for-minerals approach. Should the Strategic Partnership fail to produce a durable peace and mutually beneficial economic agreements, it could reinforce uncertainty about the viability of linking conflict stabilization with securing critical minerals. This, in turn, may reduce confidence in similar security–investment frameworks in other resource-rich and conflict-affected regions where external actors seek to combine peacebuilding with economic engagement.

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