- with Inhouse Counsel
In September 2023, Nick Ephgrave QPM assumed the directorship of the SFO. During his tenure, the SFO has appeared reinvigorated and engaged. Ephgrave committed to increasing the pace of investigations, promising an organisation “characterised by its strength, its dynamism, its confidence and its pragmatism”1 True to his word, we have seen a number of new investigations and fast-paced charging decisions from the agency in the past two years, alongside, amongst other things, the strengthening of international partnerships with overseas anti-corruption agencies, and the implementation of a new fraud prevention programme with the private sector.
On 15 January 2026, however, Ephgrave announced that he would be leaving the SFO, and was replaced at the end of March by Graham McNulty QPM, who stepped into the role of interim director pending the appointment of a permanent successor. McNulty initially joined the SFO as COO in September 2024 following a 31-year career in the Metropolitan and Hampshire police forces.2 It is notable that McNulty’s background echoes that of Ephgrave, who was the first non-lawyer to lead the SFO and held roles as Chief Constable of Surrey Police, and later, as Assistant Commissioner of London’s Metropolitan Police. Ephgrave has drawn a distinction between his perspective and experience as a ‘law enforcer’ and the background of his predecessors, noting that this experience brought with it an action-focused approach and “a sense of urgency”.
2026 was set to be a pivotal year for the Serious Fraud Office (SFO), with many waiting to see whether the agency could successfully tackle a series of long running cases at trial.
At the end of the first quarter, however, the picture is looking somewhat different. The agency has an interim director and is grappling once again with disclosure failings which have already led to a trial collapse and the review of further historic cases.
However, and despite ongoing challenges, Ephgrave leaves the SFO on a firmer footing and in a stronger place than he found it. The question is now: can the SFO continue this momentum through 2026?
Against that background, the BCL Business Crime team reflect on the key developments from the past year and ask what is to come in 2026 for the specialist prosecutor.
What happened in 2025?
Tackling international fraud and corruption
Acknowledgement of the SFO’s success in recent years has sometimes been tempered by claims that its focus has shifted from high-profile international investigations towards comparatively low-level domestic offending. Yet criticism of these “easy pickings” appears overstated when the SFO’s caseload is considered in full.
In 2025, the SFO launched two new investigations into international bribery offences: Blu 3 & Mace Group Associates and United Insurance Brokers Ltd (UIBL). The former relates to the alleged payment of over £3 million in bribes to associates of the global construction firm Mace Group in relation to the development of a data centre in the Netherlands for Microsoft. In the case of UIBL, the company is accused of failing to prevent associates from bribing state officials in Ecuador between October 2013 and March 2016. Similarly, in 2025, the SFO secured a guilty plea from Jose Yrala in the SFO’s investigation into global aircraft parts supplier, AOG Technics.
The AOG Technics investigation was conducted with the “critical” co-operation of the Portuguese authorities, and the SFO’s ongoing investigation into Thales Group is being conducted in conjunction with France’s Parquet National Financier (PNF).3
Both demonstrate the impact of Ephgrave’s desire to strengthen partnerships with overseas authorities. This was central to Ephgrave’s strategic agenda, with the SFO’s 2024-2029 strategy paper articulating an ambition to “secure enduring partnerships with jurisdictions across the globe”.4 We have since seen the SFO build on its relationship with international agencies, joining a tri-national anti-corruption alliance with the PNF and the Office of the Attorney General of Switzerland in March 2025. The agency also became part of the International Anti-Corruption Coordination Centre, a group housed within the UK’s National Crime Agency, in June 2025.
Set alongside these newer international cases are two of the SFO’s most high-profile international legacy matters: Glencore and Petrofac.
Both demonstrate the agency’s capability in securing corporate admissions of wrongdoing in relation to historic, large-scale international bribery, and the SFO now seeks to prosecute the individuals allegedly responsible. Following Glencore’s 2022 guilty pleas, six former employees were charged in connection with oil contracts in Cameroon, Nigeria and Ivory Coast, with trial listed for October 2027. Similarly, in Petrofac, two individuals were charged with bribery offences in February 2024 following the company’s October 2021 guilty plea to seven separate offences of failure to prevent bribery. These cases are particularly significant given longstanding criticism that the SFO has struggled to convert corporate admissions of wrongdoing into successful individual prosecutions – the SFO has only secured one conviction of an individual following admissions made by the relevant corporate in connected DPAs in the twelve years that DPAs have been available.
Taken together, Glencore and Petrofac represent a critical opportunity for the agency to shift that narrative, but also to make good Ephgrave’s ambition for the SFO to be the “partner of choice both domestically and internationally,” in leading the fight against serious complex fraud, bribery, and corruption.
Continued investigative momentum
In June 2025, the SFO launched an investigation into Rockfire Investment Finance Plc, which is alleged to have offered fraudulent investment opportunities into renewable energy bonds.
In November 2025, the SFO announced an investigation into Basis Markets, providing evidence of the SFO’s commitment to tackling crypto-related fraud, an ambition outlined in its 2025–2026 Business Plan.5 Basis Markets concerns an alleged $28 million scheme and marks the SFO’s first major investigation into suspected cryptocurrency fraud.
Earlier this year, the SFO also announced an investigation into Home REIT relating to allegations of bribery and fraud. Ephgrave’s reputation as a “law enforcer” was characterised in part by his use of dawn raids; in his first speech as Director, he confirmed that he had overseen more dawn raids in his first three months than the SFO had conducted in the previous three years combined.6 Several years on, dawn raids are still being deployed, as the SFO carried out seven simultaneous site raids in January in connection with Home REIT. Most recently, in late April the SFO searched six sites across the UK and made four arrests as part of its new investigation into alleged fraud by three companies delivering ECO4 contracts, a UK government energy efficiency scheme designed to tackle fuel poverty and help reduce carbon emissions.7
Another defining feature of Ephgrave’s tenure has been his ambition to expedite investigative timelines, as outlined in his maiden speech in February 2024. Charging decisions suggest that he has made tangible progress in his efforts to “crunch the timeline.” The case of Axiom Ince provides perhaps the clearest example; five individuals were charged with fraud offences in December 2024, within just 15 months of the investigation into the firm’s collapse, faster than any charge previously brought by the SFO. A similar pattern can be seen in the Safe Hands Plans Ltd case, where two former directors were charged with conspiracy to defraud in January this year, just over two years after the investigation was first announced.
Whilst case progression is one part of the picture, Ephgrave appears to have recognised the importance of redirecting resources where an investigation is unlikely to lead to a prosecution. From the outset of his tenure, Ephgrave professed that he would “not be afraid to shut down investigations, if it is increasingly apparent it is never going to reach the threshold for charge”.8 Accordingly, the SFO’s 2024-2025 annual report confirmed that eight investigations were closed in the 12-month period up to March 2025, which included a four-year corruption probe into Bombardier.9
Maintaining this pragmatic case management is likely to serve Ephgrave’s replacement well. With this in mind, many will be keen to see how the agency’s legacy investigations, such as London Capital & Finance (commenced in March 2019), are ultimately resolved.
Policy and legislative objectives
In addition to its investigative action, Ephgrave’s SFO worked towards a number of key policy and legislative objectives in 2025:
- Whistleblower regimes: The incentivisation of whistleblowers was a clear priority for Ephgrave, who emphasised the “many benefits” of compensating whistleblowers during his maiden speech as Director.10 In the past year, this issue appears to have transcended just SFO ambition. The Home Office UK Anti-Corruption Strategy 2025 identified whistleblowers as ‘one of the most effective assets in identifying wrongdoing’ and HMRC has now introduced a formal whistleblowing rewards scheme, whereby the reporting of serious tax avoidance or evasion (leading to the collection of at least £1.5 million in tax) may lead to a discretionary award of up to 30% of the amount collected.11 Together, these developments signal a more structured and supportive environment to encourage whistleblowers such that, notwithstanding Ephgrave’s resignation, the issue seems here to stay.
- Drive for prevention and incentivising self-reporting: A cornerstone of Ephgrave’s strategy has been the movement towards a prevention-led enforcement model, encouraging a partnership-focused approach with corporates, in order to “forge new, powerful relationships with those in the private sector who are committed to playing their part in defending the economy.”12 Adjacent to this strategy is the SFO’s drive for corporate self-reporting. In April last year, the agency published corporate cooperation guidance which set out, on a clearer basis than before, what businesses can expect in return for self-reporting wrongdoing.13 In particular, it confirmed that corporates who self-report promptly and co-operate with the SFO can expect to be given the opportunity to negotiate a Deferred Prosecution Agreement (DPA) (for more information see our article here). Prior to 2021, DPAs were a well-utilised tool. Between 2021 and 2026, however, not a single DPA was concluded and it appears likely that the aim of this guidance is to breathe a new lease of life into the regime. Early signs indicate that this might be working – after a five-year hiatus, a DPA has been announced in the case of Ultra Electronics Holdings Ltd in relation to failure to prevent bribery offences (discussed further below).
- Widening criminal liability: Ephgrave was forceful in his warning to companies weighing up their options: “If you have knowledge of wrongdoing, the gamble of keeping this to yourself has never been riskier”.14 This doesn’t appear to be an idle threat, as behind it lies a growing arsenal of prosecutorial powers. In particular, the introduction of the Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency Act 2023 brought with it, as of 1 September 2025, a new failure to prevent fraud (FTPF) offence, alongside an extension of corporate criminal liability for specific economic crimes where they are committed by ‘senior managers’ acting within the scope of their authority (a widening of the previous – hard to prosecute – ‘directing mind’ principle15), discussed further here.
- In relation to the FTPF offence, the new statutory provisions can now hold large organisations criminally liable if they fail to prevent fraud committed by an individual for the benefit of the business, with a potential penalty of an unlimited fine. The offence mirrors other ‘failure to prevent’ offences, and as such there is a defence for companies to have in place ‘reasonable fraud prevention procedures.’ Corporates had time to digest the SFO’s principles-based guidance (published in November 2024) before the offence came into force, but uncertainty remains. The guidance is expressly not a safe harbour, and even strict compliance with it may not amount to having reasonable procedures. There is also no meaningful judge-led guidance on how the ‘reasonable procedures’ defences operate in practice or how they would be interpreted in criminal proceedings. Some guidance may emerge, however, if the case of UIBL proceeds to trial, as it will mark one of the rare occasions to date whereby a “failure to prevent bribery” charge is considered by a jury. For more information, see BCL’s detailed analysis on the failure to prevent offence, and its statutory guidance.
- As for its use, despite a government impact assessment published in October last year16 suggesting that prosecution was not the main objective of the FTPF offence (but rather “cultural change”), Ephgrave was candid about his appetite to prosecute under it.17 In public commentary he is reported to have said “…I’m very, very keen to prosecute someone for that offence. We can’t sit with the statute books gathering dust; someone needs to feel the bite”.
2026: What next for the SFO?
A not-so busy 2026 after all
2026 was set to be a pivotal year for the SFO. A series of major trials (Ethical Forestry, Patisserie Valerie, Petrofac, London Mining and Raedex Consortium) promised to answer a key question: can this re-energised and dynamic SFO under Ephgrave succeed where the agency had historically failed, and obtain convictions at trial in complex and high value fraud and corruption cases?
A few months in, and the landscape looks very different.
Despite news of Ephgrave’s retirement, the year started with a success for the SFO on 16 January 2026 when defendants in Ethical Forestry entered guilty pleas to charges of fraudulent trading, having initially pleaded not guilty in March last year. Sentencing is expected in June 2026.
But then, on 9 February 2026, trial in the case of Patisserie Valerie was relisted for 4 January 2028 following an application from the Defence for further time to prepare.
A couple of days later, on 12 February 2026, the SFO confirmed that, following a thorough review, it would no longer be proceeding with the trial which was due to commence in the London Mining investigation, having concluded that there was no longer any realistic prospect of conviction. The SFO stated that this decision was due to a “combination of factors including significant delays to trial, difficulties obtaining and reviewing material and challenges with witness evidence”.
And with that, three cases were wiped from this year’s trial timetable, leaving only Petrofac and Raedex.
Consistency is key
Operationally, continuity appears to be the immediate priority for the SFO. In the foreword to the 2026-2027 Business Plan, published on 16 April 2026 – less than two weeks into his tenure as interim director – McNulty emphasised his intention to build on the “firm foundations” laid by Ephgrave, maintaining a focus on intelligence-led investigations, innovative tools and effective disclosure.18 He struck a similar note when speaking at GIR’s Annual Investigations Meeting the same day, observing: “We’re halfway through our five-year strategy, which Nick [Ephgrave] and the team designed, and I joined about a year later. I think that’s a good strategy and I don’t think we should change it".19
Disclosure remains a perennial issue
The collapse of the London Mining trial refocused the spotlight firmly on the issue of disclosure. The SFO’s decision to offer no evidence in that case was caused in part by issues arising from the SFO’s legacy disclosure software, Autonomy. In particular, digital container files containing tranches of evidence were not properly opened, meaning that significant volumes of material had never been reviewed for disclosure purposes, leaving the prospect of a trial untenable. BCL acted for the former company CFO in this case, for further information see here.
This fatal issue with the SFO’s disclosure software may not only affect the London Mining trial either. Since the collapse of London Mining, the SFO has announced that it is reviewing approximately 20 cases which may have been impacted by the same technical failure.20 At the time of writing, one case has already been resolved as part of the review, it having been determined that there was no evidence of any material having been missed.21 The SFO is continuing to conduct this review and has confirmed that the issue does not affect its current e-discovery system.
This is not the first time that Autonomy has caused problems for the agency. In February 2025, the SFO launched a review of 66 historic Autonomy cases after concerns that the application of search-terms may have prevented disclosable documents being provided to defendants. The review is reported to be nearly complete. Whilst, crucially, no issues affecting the safety of past convictions have so far emerged, the process has diverted valuable resources away from the SFO’s live enforcement activity. For more information see our article which discusses this development in further detail.
At GIR’s Annual Investigations Meeting, McNulty reportedly acknowledged that the SFO’s “single biggest challenge” is disclosure; set on developing an improvement plan and implementing the SFO’s first-ever case management system, McNulty has demonstrated an early commitment to tackling this enduring issue.22 These ambitions have also been reiterated within the SFO’s recent Business Plan.23
The Business Plan recognises that, with document volumes routinely running into the millions, the SFO’s disclosure obligations can be “monumental” with effective delivery ultimately depending on a combination of innovative technology and “robust assurance by experienced specialists”. Against that backdrop, recent scrutiny by HM Crown Prosecution Service Inspectorate (HMCPSI) into the SFO’s use of external counsel has brought its resourcing challenges into sharp focus.24 HMCPSI’s report identifies that the SFO struggles to recruit and retain experienced lawyers, losing talent to higher-paying organisations such as the Financial Conduct Authority. This is said to create a particular (and costly) reliance on external counsel, sometimes for operational necessity rather than strategic need. The SFO’s recruitment efforts are ongoing, but it may be that the agency’s effectiveness in handling disclosure in the near term is closely tied to its ability to manage these human resource constraints.
The recent practical problems for the SFO in managing disclosure in large cases will no doubt be read alongside the second part of the Fisher Review when it becomes available. The second and final report of Chairman Jonathan Fisher KC’s independent review of disclosure and fraud offences, “Fraud in the Digital Age”, was submitted to the Home Secretary in December 2025.25 This marks the first independent review of fraud legislation in the UK since 1986.
The report follows the first part of Fisher’s review, “Disclosure in the Digital Age”, which was presented to Parliament on 20 March 2025. That report made 45 recommendations to modernise and streamline the investigation and prosecution of complex fraud and economic crime cases, including the greater use of advanced technology to significantly reduce administrative burdens (see our detailed analysis of Part 1 here).
Fisher confirmed in January that the second part of his report, which is yet to be made public, identifies “several systemic issues” which include: “weak deterrence, significant delays within the investigative and court processes, fragmented enforcement structures, and persistent gaps in the framework governing corporate and platform accountability”.26 In response, Fisher identifies a number of opportunities to be considered by Government, including “enhancing data sharing, strengthening upstream prevention, modernising the use of technology across the system, and deepening the United Kingdom’s international co-operation in combating a crime that recognises no borders.”
The Government plans to publish its full response to the independent review by 20 May 2026, “aligned with wider reforms across the criminal justice system”.27
Where’s the jury?
The idea of drastic reform to the criminal justice system has been a topic of heated debate since the publication of the recommendations of Sir Brian Leveson’s independent review following which the Government has proposed a set of radical reforms to the court system and criminal procedure through the Courts and Tribunals Bill, currently at the Report Stage in the House of Commons.28
Among measures aimed at addressing the substantial court backlog is a proposal to permit judge-only trials in certain complex or lengthy fraud cases. The proposed test, set out in draft section 42A(3), requires the court to be satisfied that “the complexity of the trial or the likely length of the trial (or both) makes it appropriate for the trial to be conducted without a jury”, alongside consideration of the public interest. If enacted, this reform could materially reshape the SFO’s case strategy, influencing decisions on charging, case presentation, and trial management, as well as having potential downstream implications for appeals.
However, the proposal remains highly contentious; critics point to the breadth of judicial discretion inherent in the undefined concept of “appropriateness”, as well as broader constitutional concerns. Notably, more than 300 KCs and 22 retired judges are among the 3,236 legal professionals who have signed a letter urging the government against what they describe as “an unpopular, untested and poorly evidenced change to our jury system”. There remains a real question as to whether such a fundamental shift can be achieved without undermining the right to trial by jury and eroding public confidence in the criminal justice system.
Long-awaited return of DPAs
After a flurry of DPAs (and the consequent fines contributing significantly to the public purse), the tool had appeared notably absent from the enforcement landscape in recent years. However, after a five-year hiatus, DPAs have re-emerged.
On 1 May 2026, a DPA was approved between the SFO and Ultra Electronic Holdings Ltd (Ultra) for failure to prevent bribery, under which the company will pay £10 million in penalties and £4.8 million in SFO investigative costs (as reported here).29 This DPA follows eight years after the investigation, which concerned the suspected payment of bribes in Algeria and Oman, was first opened. This announcement appears to close a door on a legacy case, as the SFO has indicated it will not be pursuing individual prosecutions in connection with this matter.
The dramatic slow-down in DPAs may be due to many reasons, one being a lack of corporate appetite following the SFO’s failure to achieve successful prosecutions of individuals on the very evidence that caused the corporate to enter into the DPA in the first place.
Some will be wondering whether this DPA signals the start of a change in tide for the regime. The Ultra DPA stemmed from a self-report in 2018, and as such, may not be the best yardstick by which to measure current corporate attitudes. However, given the SFO’s drive for stronger corporate cooperation, the agency will no doubt be hoping that its heightening investigative and legislative powers – alongside successful outcomes in the upcoming Glencore and Petrofac cases – will be sufficient incentive for corporates to re-evaluate whether to self-report.
In the meantime, however, the SFO has another knotty DPA-related matter to wrangle with, namely, what to do with a corporate in breach of its DPA.
In January, the High Court delivered its ruling in the case of Güralp Systems Ltd v Director of the Serious Fraud Office [2026] EWHC 37 (Admin), following a failure by Güralp to disgorge profits pursuant to a DPA agreed with the SFO. The judgment found that the DPA, finalised in October 2019, remained enforceable despite the company’s failure to satisfy any of its financial obligations by the relevant expiry date of the agreement. The judgment, and the subsequent refusal of Güralp’s application for leave to appeal to the UK Supreme Court, paves the way for the SFO to take enforcement action against the company. More importantly, it reinforces the SFO’s capacity (and appetite) to hold corporates to account for the terms agreed under DPAs.
However, as we have written about previously (see our detailed analysis here), in circumstances where the main consequence for a breach of a DPA is the revival of the prosecution that was deferred, the SFO will have to tackle a difficult evidential question. Whilst Güralp accepted the payment of bribes within its Statement of Facts, the three individuals later charged with conspiracy to make corrupt payments (as described in the DPA) were ultimately acquitted at trial on the weight of the evidence available. There is, therefore, serious doubt as to whether the full code test could be satisfied in respect of any corporate prosecution.
Conclusion
With the foundations laid in 2025, there remains much for the SFO to tackle in 2026. On initial review, one might be forgiven for concluding that the agency cannot escape its reputation for slow and ineffective investigations, beset by disclosure failings and legacy issues. The SFO’s recent decision to abandon the decade-long bribery prosecution of London Mining executives invites scrutiny of Ephgrave’s tenure and the challenges awaiting his successor.
However, a closer examination of Ephgrave’s impact and the full portfolio of cases under his direction gives some cause for optimism. They show tangible achievements that should not be obscured by the recent developments. In fact, the disclosure failings sit in tension with the operational momentum that characterised Ephgrave’s time in office. As a result of his action-orientated focus, we saw a marked increase in investigative activity, including a surge in dawn raids, arrests and charging decisions. Ephgrave also appears to have modernised the SFO, driving forward the investigation of new types of fraud (such as cryptocurrency), fresh methods of evidence-gathering, such as whistleblower incentivisation, and encouraging international collaboration. Whilst we did not see Ephgrave’s SFO tackle a suite of cases at trial this year as expected, there were still wins. Recent guilty pleas in AOG Technics and Ethical Forestry Limited, along with the successful resolution of the investigation into Ultra with a DPA, go some way in demonstrating that the SFO is an efficient and agile prosecutor who can hold individuals and corporates to account.
There is, however, a lot for Ephgrave’s permanent successor to take on: resolving legacy issues, implementing and embedding a new agency strategy, and navigating upcoming procedural change. We must now wait and see whether he or she can steady the ship and then build on the momentum provided under Ephgrave to help the organisation move beyond past difficulties and into a new era.
Footnotes
1 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/director-ephgraves-speech-at-rusi-13-february-2024
2 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/interim-director-appointed-to-lead-the-serious-fraud-office
3 SFO announces bribery investigation into defence firm - GOV.UK
4 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/672cbbe062831268b0b1a305/SFO_2024-29_Strategy.pdf
6 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/director-ephgraves-speech-at-rusi-13-february-2024
7 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sfo-launch-appeal-into-suspected-home-heating-insulation-fraud
8 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/director-ephgraves-speech-at-rusi-13-february-2024
9 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/686f95fc10d550c668de3d9c/SFO_Annual_Report_and_Accounts_2024-25.pdf (p. 22 & 28)
10 https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/director-ephgraves-speech-at-rusi-13-february-2024
11 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6929b353345e31ab14ecf735/E03444720_Budget_2025_Web_Accessible.pdf (page 110); https://www.gov.uk/guidance/reporting-serious-tax-avoidance-or-evasion
13 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/sfo-corporate-guidance/sfo-corporate-guidance
14 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sfo-sets-out-route-for-businesses-to-avoid-prosecution
15 See BCL’s detailed articles here.
19 https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/interim-sfo-director-promises-continuity
20 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/update-on-the-serious-fraud-offices-e-discovery-review
21 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/update-on-the-serious-fraud-offices-e-discovery-review 2]nbsp;https://globalinvestigationsreview.com/article/interim-sfo-director-promises-continuity
27 https://questions-statements.parliament.uk/written-statements/detail/2026-01-26/hlws1271
28 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-the-criminal-courts-part-1;https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/independent-review-of-the-criminal-courts-part-2
29 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/sfo-secures-10m-from-british-defence-supplier; https://www.gov.uk/guidance/sfo-dpa-with-ultra-electronics-holdings-limited-formerly-plc
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