Justice In Limbo: How Procedural Delays / Exploiting Loopholes In The Juvenile Justice Act, Undermine Both Rehabilitation And Accountability Of The Juvenile

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INTRODUCTION

The Constitution of India protects children as a distinct category requiring special protection, that the objective of juvenile justice legislation is meant to penal in rehabilitative and not penal in nature. Nonetheless, in the practical world, the intent of the legislations sometimes slip of out the mind of the judiciary. The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 was designed as a progressive framework, premised on the belief that children are capable of reform and must be treated differently from adults. Yet, when applied to heinous offences committed by juveniles aged 16 to18, the Juvenile Justice Act 2015 reveals deep fissures. Loopholes in age determination, preliminary assessment, and definitional ambiguities have created a system where accountability is delayed and rehabilitation is denied. Cases drag on for years while courts wrestle with procedural questions, leaving both victims and accused suspended in uncertainty. The law’s noble intent to balance compassion with responsibility has been weaponised into an escape route, where technicalities overshadow justice. This article examines how the exploitation of these loopholes erodes both fairness and effectiveness, making the juvenile justice system appear less as an instrument of reform and more as a machinery of delay.

THE JUVENILE JUSTICE (CARE AND PROTECTION OF CHILDREN) ACT, 2015

The trajectory of juvenile justice in India began in the 19^th century which coincided with an increased understanding of childhood as a distinctive period of social and individual development¹. However, significant development was seen in the 20^th century, wherein with some suggestions from the Indian Jail committee and evidence of the working of a juvenile

court, the First Children’s Act was enacted, in the state of Madras, in the year 1920². Pursuant to various legislative enactments, currently, the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (“the JJ Act”) is the primary legislation governing juvenile delinquency in India.

The JJ Act was introduced in response to a brutal gang rape and subsequent death of a para medical student in the National Capital, committed by 6 assailants including a juvenile offender i.e., the Nirbhaya Case, the case that shook the country to its very roots. The brutal Nirbhaya Case changed the legal narrative and outlook on juvenile justice and set off the debate on age limits in the juvenile justice legislations. In response to the public outcry after the Nirbhaya case, the government established a committee headed by Justice J.S. Verma (“the Verma Committee”) that was required to provide their views on the current state of the criminal justice system³.

The Verma Committee firmly opposed lowering the juvenile age threshold from 18 to 16. It argued that a 16-year-old sentenced to a life term could still emerge in mid-adulthood without having been properly rehabilitated, undermining both accountability and reform. More fundamentally, the Committee held that the real failure lay not in the law itself but in its inadequate implementation juvenile homes and protective institutions were ill-equipped and, often, harmful environments that bred recidivism rather than reform. The Report conclusively determined that the law was sufficient to deal with juveniles (i.e., the 2000 Act) and instead directed the central and state governments to improve infrastructure and services for juveniles in conflict with the law. In 2015, the Government disregarded the recommendations and gave in to the popular demand of the people by successfully passing its latest comprehensive legislation on juvenile justice, that was intended to focus on children in need of care and protection as well as those in conflict with the law.

PROCEDURAL LAPSES IN THE JJ ACT.

A. Age Distinction:

The issue of age has become one of the most misused loopholes in India’s juvenile justice framework. The problem was elucidated in Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh⁴, where the Supreme Court warned that the process of age determination was often manipulated through easily produced school certificates and birth records. Courts, overburdened and lacking verification mechanisms, have routinely accepted such documents at face value. As a result, individuals who may in fact be adults are allowed to claim the status of juveniles, effectively shielding themselves from proportionate punishment⁵. The intent of the Juvenile Justice Acts of 2000 and 2015 was to recognise that children aged 16 to 18 accused of heinous crimes might not fully comprehend the consequences of their actions. The law sought to test their capacity before deciding if they should be tried as adults. But in practice, the time taken by courts to resolve the age question itself has become a decisive weapon. Years are spent litigating whether the accused was a day short of eighteen or just above it. By the time a determination is made, the accused is well into adulthood, while the trial for the underlying crime remains frozen. In this way, the very distinction meant to protect juveniles ends up destroying the accountability process altogether.
The consequences are stark. In Karan @ Fatiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh⁶, the accused, convicted of murder, was eventually declared a juvenile at the time of offence. Because Section 18 of the 2015 Act bars life imprisonment or death and caps confinement at three years in a special home, he was released immediately, having already spent that time. Years of litigation thus ended not in rehabilitation, but in release without meaningful reform. The definitional vacuum in “heinous offences” further compounds the problem. In Shilpa Mittal v. State⁷, the Court held that offences with a maximum punishment of seven years but no minimum term cannot be treated as “heinous.” The result is that juveniles accused of serious offences are automatically excluded from even being assessed for trial as adults. Here again, the law, intended to balance protection with accountability, becomes a shield against responsibility. The NCPCR’s Annual Report 2021–22 underscores this disturbing reality, recording cases where accused persons relied on fabricated documents to claim juvenility, thereby stalling proceedings and evading proportionate consequences (pp. 141– 144). Victims’ families remain in limbo, while accused individuals exploit the delay to emerge without either accountability or genuine rehabilitation⁸.
The harsh truth is that there is no biological difference between someone who is 17 years, 11 months, and 25 days old and someone who has just turned 18. Yet, because of the time consumed in proving which side of that line an accused falls on, the system delivers radically different outcomes: one escapes with at most three years in a juvenile home, the other faces life imprisonment. The Justice J.S. Verma Committee (2013) recognised this as a failure of the State—not of the law itself, but of its enforcement. Poorly trained Boards, hostile institutions, and endless age disputes have made the law an instrument of delay rather than justice⁹.
The age distinction, designed as a protective shield, has thus become a sword cutting through both accountability and rehabilitation. Until the system is strengthened to resolve age disputes swiftly and credibly, juveniles will continue to misuse the law as an escape route, and justice will remain indefinitely suspended.

B. Conducting the preliminary assessment u/s. 15 of the JJ Act.

The Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 introduced the concept of a preliminary assessment in Section 15. This was meant as a safeguard in cases where children aged 16–18 were alleged to have committed heinous offences. Instead of automatically treating them as adults, the JJ Act required the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) to evaluate their mental and physical capacity to commit the offence, their ability to understand its consequences, and the circumstances of its commission¹⁰. In principle, this provision was designed to ensure that children were not indiscriminately exposed to the adult criminal system. It balanced the need for accountability with the rehabilitative spirit of juvenile justice.
However, in practice, the very safeguard has become another loophole. The Draft Guidelines on Conducting Preliminary Inquiry under the JJ Act (NCPCR, 2023) reveal that while the statute envisages that such assessments should be carried out within a “reasonable period,” inquiries are often delayed by several years¹¹. By the time the assessment is completed, the juvenile has already crossed the age of eighteen or even twenty-one, while the question of whether they should be tried as an adult remains unresolved. This delay paralyzes the trial process, leaving victims without closure and juveniles without timely rehabilitation. The system thus denies justice to both.
The misuse goes further. Instead of serving as a protective evaluation, the preliminary assessment often turns into a quasi-confessional exercise. The Draft Guidelines specifically caution that the assessment “is not to be conducted in the nature of a trial” and should not involve coercive questioning. Yet in practice, reports show that children are subjected to probing about their motives, prior conduct, and even character, in a manner that borders on eliciting admissions of guilt. This not only violates the principle of presumption of innocence but also poisons the rehabilitative environment. A child who is questioned as if already guilty is unlikely to benefit from reformative interventions.
Judicial commentary has acknowledged the dangers of delay. The SCC Blog analysis on belated preliminary assessments highlights cases where inquiries dragged on for five to six years, undermining both the spirit and purpose of the JJ Act¹². By the time such a process concludes, the child has aged out of the juvenile system, but cannot meaningfully be reintegrated through the adult system either. What was meant to be a bridge between protection and accountability has instead become a bottleneck that stalls both.
The NCPCR’s Annual Report 2021–22 echoes these concerns, recording that JJBs across states lack trained personnel, standardised procedures, and adequate psychologists to conduct assessments¹³. Without expertise, Boards rely on superficial indicators or delay proceedings indefinitely, undermining the law’s intent. The result is a perverse cycle: juveniles exploit the absence of strict timelines to avoid trial, while the State’s inertia ensures they are neither punished adequately nor reformed meaningfully.
The harsh reality is that preliminary assessment, instead of being a child-sensitive safeguard, has become a tool for delaying accountability and derailing rehabilitation. A juvenile accused of a heinous crime can spend years in limbo, their case caught in procedural backlogs. During this time, the victim’s family receives no closure, and the juvenile receives no timely intervention. By the time the process is resolved, the opportunity for meaningful reform is lost, and the accountability process has collapsed.
Unless strict timelines, standardised methods, and child-sensitive safeguards are enforced, the preliminary assessment will remain a hollow formality—weaponised not for protection, but for escape.

RECOMMENDATIONS

The recurring failures in age determination and preliminary assessment under the Juvenile Justice Act demand urgent systemic reforms. The following recommendations, drawn from statutory bodies and judicial observations, can address the twin concerns of accountability and rehabilitation:

Enforce Time-Bound Assessments: Although the JJ Act prescribes a three-month period for completing preliminary assessments, delays of several years remain common. Strict statutory adherence, with consequences for non-compliance, is essential. NCPCR (2023) recommends mandatory recording of reasons for any extension, subject to appellate oversight¹⁴.
Strengthen Verification of Age Proof: Manipulation of age records continues to undermine accountability. The NCPCR Annual Report 2021–22 highlights repeated misuse of fabricated documents¹⁵. A centralised, technology-driven mechanism—linking school, municipal, and Aadhaar records—would reduce fraudulent claims of juvenility.
Standardise Assessment Procedures: The Draft Guidelines caution that assessments must not resemble trials or confessional interrogations¹⁵. Boards require clear, uniform protocols developed in consultation with child psychologists to prevent coercion and maintain the rehabilitative character of proceedings.
Build Institutional Capacity: The Verma Committee (2013) flagged the lack of trained personnel and infrastructure as the core weakness of the system¹⁶. Dedicated training of JJB members, psychologists, and probation officers must be institutionalised, supported by adequate funding.
Judicial Monitoring and Data Transparency: The Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal¹⁷ urged legislative clarity on definitional gaps. Regular monitoring by High Courts and mandatory publication of assessment data can ensure greater consistency and accountability.

CONCLUSION

The juvenile justice system stands at a crossroads. Age distinctions and preliminary assessments were introduced as safeguards, but their misuse has hollowed out both accountability and rehabilitation. A juvenile accused of a heinous crime today can spend years in limbo, shielded by delays and definitional gaps, only to emerge without reform and without facing proportionate responsibility. Victims’ families remain trapped in cycles of uncertainty, and society receives neither justice nor reformed citizens. The truth is stark that “there is no meaningful difference between a seventeen-year-old offender and one barely past eighteen, yet the law delivers radically different outcomes”. Unless timelines are enforced, procedures standardised, and institutions strengthened, the JJ Act will continue to be manipulated as a shield rather than a path to reform. The challenge now is to reclaim the JJ Act’s original vision protection and accountability in equal measure before justice slips further into limbo.

Footnotes

1. Sailesh Kumar, ‘Shifting Epistemology of Juvenile Justice in India’, (2019) 41(1) Contexto International, (https://www.scielo.br/j/cint/a/TLnZLwVfpBgg48VSdxSwM8s/?lang=en&format=pdf) , accessed on 30^th August, 2025.

2. Professor B.B Pande “Setting the juvenile justice course right: a critique of Pratap Singh v. State of Jharkhand”, Eastern Book Company – Practical Lawyer, (https://www.ebc-india.com/lawyer/articles/2005_6_1.htm), accessed on 30^th August, 2025.

3. Gauri Pillai ^ Shrikrishna Upadhyay, ‘Juvenile maturity and heinous crimes: a re-look at juvenile justice policy in India’, NUJS Law Review, (https://nujslawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/2017-10-1-Gauri-Pillai-Shrikrishna-Upadhyay-Juvenile-Maturity-and-Heinous-Crimes.pdf), accessed on 30^th August 2025.

4. Ashwani Kumar Saxena v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2012) 9 SCC 750

5. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, No. 2 of 2016, §§ 15, 18, INDIA CODE.

6. Karan vs. Fatiya v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2023) 7 SCC 1

7. Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2020) 2 SCC 787

8. National Commission for Protection of Child Rights., Annual Report 2021–22, at 141–44 (2022).

9. Justice J.S. Verma, Justice Leila Seth & Gopal Subramanium, Report of the Committee on Amendments to Criminal Law 263–66 (2013).

10. Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, No. 2 of 2016, § 15, INDIA CODE.

11. National Commission for Protection of Child Rights, Draft Guidelines for Conducting Preliminary Assessment under Sec. 15 of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, ch. IV, ¶ 4.1 (2023).

12. Maharukh Adenwalla & Gayatri Virmani, Belated Preliminary Assessment: Prejudicial to the Interest of CCLs, 2024 SCC OnLine Blog OpEd 27.

13. National Commission for Protection of Child Rights, Annual Report 2021–22, at 141–44 (2022)

14. NCPCR, Draft Guidelines for Conducting Preliminary Assessment, ch. IV, ¶ 4.1 (2023). ¹⁵ NCPCR, Annual Report 2021–22, at 141–44 (2022).

15. Supra, 14

16. Supra, 9

17. Supra, 7

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