Land Acquisition For Solar And Wind Parks: Reconciling LARR Act, 2013 With Energy Transition Goals

I. Introduction: The Paradox of Renewable Energy Land Acquisition

India has committed to achieving 500 GW of renewable energy capacity by 2030, a target requiring unprecedented land acquisition amidst competing sectoral demands. Solar and wind parks, constituting the backbone of this transition, are land-intensive infrastructure—requiring 3.5 to 7.5 acres per megawatt of installed capacity¹. This fundamental requirement immediately invokes the machinery of the LARR Act, 2013, enacted to provide “just and fair compensation” and ensure affected families become “partners in development².”

The statutory imperative to honor land rights stands in apparent conflict with the urgency of energy transition. This tension is particularly acute given that renewable energy projects, unlike thermal power or defense, are formally exempted from Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) and classified under the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change's “White Category” industries, historically perceived as non-polluting and therefore operationally exempt from extensive pre-project scrutiny³. Yet, the exemption from EIA does not exempt renewable energy projects from LARR compliance, nor does it diminish the social and livelihood impacts of land acquisition. This article examines how the legal framework reconciles these competing imperatives.

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II. Consent Thresholds Under LARR Act and Their Application to Renewable Parks

A. Statutory Consent Requirements

The LARR Act, 2013 establishes differentiated consent thresholds based on project category. For renewable energy parks, the consent regime depends on whether the project is undertaken by government, public-private partnership (PPP), or private developers.

For private sector renewable projects: The LARR Act mandates that land acquisition shall not proceed without the consent of at least 80% of affected families⁴. This threshold is designed to prevent unwilling dispossession, requiring developers to demonstrate genuine acceptance among project-affected persons (PAPs) through a “prior informed process.” In practice, developers must conduct consultations with landowners, disclose project details, and obtain documented consent, though the Act does not prescribe specific methodologies for consent verification⁵.

For PPP renewable projects: A lower 70% consent threshold applies,reflecting the hybrid nature of public-sector involvement and the assumption that public interest considerations partially mitigate private profit motive concerns⁶.

For government-led solar parks: No consent requirement applies, government projects proceed under the principle of eminent domain, provided they serve a “public purpose.” The definition of public purpose has been interpreted expansively to include renewable energy generation⁷.

B. Practical Application to Large-Scale Parks

The consent thresholds create asymmetries in the landscape of renewable energy park development. The Ministry of New & Renewable Energy (MNRE) Solar Parks Scheme, rolled out in December 2014, primarily facilitates state-government-led or state-agency-led development of solar parks with minimal private land components⁸. In this model, state governments nominate implementing agencies (Solar Power Park Developers, SPPDs) to acquire land largely on government revenue land with deemed land-use changes, effectively circumventing the 80% consent requirement applicable to purely private projects.

Conversely, developers acquiring significant private land tracts, as occurred in the Pavagada Solar Park (Karnataka, 12,700 acres) or Charanka Solar Park (Gujarat, 2,000 hectares), must navigate the 80% consent threshold⁹. The practical challenge is demonstrating bona fide consent in areas where land ownership is fragmented, disputed, or where oral/traditional claims to land exist without formal title recognition.

C. The “Land Pooling” Model and Consent Gaps

Recent policy frameworks have introduced land pooling or aggregation mechanisms, wherein a designated “land aggregating agency” procures a mix of government and private lands and leases them collectively to project developers¹⁰. Under this model, operationalized in states like Gujarat and Rajasthan, the government agency may acquire private land on behalf of the renewable energy developer using private sector purchase mechanics rather than statutory land acquisition procedures.

This arrangement creates a regulatory gap: if the government purchases private land consensually (through “consent award”) without invoking the land acquisition process, the LARR Act's 80% consent requirement may be bypassed entirely. While theoretically requiring willing buyer-willing seller transactions, the pressure exerted by state acquisition announcements and the bargaining asymmetries between individual farmers and institutional purchasers often render such consent nominal rather than authentic¹¹.

Recommendation: Policy guidelines should explicitly mandate that land pooling models comply with LARR's consent requirements proportionately, if a pooled park contains 30% private land, that 30% must demonstrate 80% consent from affected families, or the park should be restructured to rely exclusively on government or willing-seller land.

III. Social Impact Assessment: Statutory Obligations and Exemption Paradoxes

A. SIA as Mandatory Under LARR, Not EIA

A critical distinction exists between exemptions from Environmental Impact Assessment and obligations under the LARR Act. While renewable energy projects (solar and wind) are placed in the White Category and exempted from EIA under the EIA Notification, 2006, they remain subject to the Social Impact Assessment (SIA) requirements embedded in the LARR land acquisition process¹².

Under Section 4 and Chapter IV of the National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 (which operationalizes LARR principles), SIA becomes mandatory when proposed land acquisition will involuntarily displace 400 or more families in plain areas, or 200 or more families in tribal/hilly areas, DDP blocks, or Scheduled Areas (Schedule V/VI areas). The SIA must be¹³:

• Conducted within 6 months of commencement of acquisition proceedings
• Evaluated by an independent multi-disciplinary expert group (including non-official social science experts, SC/ST welfare secretaries, and project representatives)
• Made public with formal hearing in affected areas to allow objections and suggestions
• Cleared by the appropriate government before acquisition proceeds

B. Gaps Between EIA Exemption and SIA Reality

The exemption of renewable energy projects from EIA creates a false impression of regulatory lightness. In reality, the SIA framework, triggered by land acquisition thresholds, may be equally or more demanding than EIA, as it must comprehensively assess livelihood impacts, access to common property resources, and social cohesion disruption¹⁴.

However, a structural gap exists: the SIA requirement is not automatically triggered merely because a renewable energy project is announced; it is triggered by the act of initiating formal land acquisition. In cases where state governments acquire land and subsequently lease or allocate it to developers, the SIA may be conducted under state administrative authority with minimal public disclosure, particularly if the process is not formally notified under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (the procedural prerequisite to LARR engagement).

Case Study – Charanka Solar Park, Gujarat: The 216 MW park, commissioned in 2012, acquired 2,000 hectares of land classified as “unused” but critically dependent upon by Rabari pastoral communities. Post-commissioning reports indicate that SIA, if conducted, failed to accurately assess or mitigate the livelihood impact—the pastoral community was not consulted, alternative grazing land was not provided, and the community was relegated to casual labor within the park. This suggests that even where formal SIA requirements existed, their implementation was inadequate¹⁵.

IV. Rehabilitation Obligations: Legal Mandates and Implementation Realities

A. Statutory Framework and Entitlements

The National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007 (NRRP) establishes comprehensive rehabilitation entitlements for affected families, binding on all requiring bodies (including renewable energy developers)¹⁶. Key obligations include:

Critically, all costs of rehabilitation are borne by the requiring body (developer/government agency), integrated into project cost; the developer cannot pass these costs to land-leasing arrangements without violating statutory principles.

B. Differential Implementation: Large Parks versus Private Acquisitions¹⁷

Large Government Solar Parks (e.g., MNRE-supported parks): These developments, led by state agencies and funded partially by MNRE grants, typically have dedicated R&R budgets and Administrator-Rehabilitation appointments (district-collector-level officers). However, implementation delays are chronic, R&R completion timelines often extend 2-3 years beyond land possession, leaving displaced families in limbo.

Private Sector Acquisitions: Developers acquiring private land through negotiated purchase (without formal land acquisition invoking LARR) often lack statutory R&R obligations. If a developer purchases 100 acres through market transactions without invoking the land acquisition process, the LARR rehabilitation framework technically does not apply. This creates a perverse incentive: developers prefer consensual land purchase (bypassing LARR) over statutory acquisition, resulting in minimal rehabilitation.

Case Study – Pavagada Solar Project, Karnataka: The 2,000 MW solar project required acquisition of 12,700 acres via government land acquisition in 2016. While an R&R scheme was notified, implementation has been hampered by: – Disputes over “affected family” definition (whether tenant farmers qualify) – Delays in identifying equivalent agricultural land for land-for-land compensation – Inadequate alternative livelihood creation, forcing small farmers to migrate to Bangalore – Social unrest and farmer protests (2018-2020) against the project, later partially reversed

This case illustrates that statutory rehabilitation obligations, while comprehensive in design, face severe implementation deficits when state capacity is limited or developer incentives are misaligned with public welfare.

V. Comparative Models and Reconciliation Framework

A. Large-Scale Parks (Government-Led Solar Parks Scheme)

Characteristics: – Land pooled through state nodal agencies; mixed government and private land – 30-year lease model; developers bid competitively for allocation – Central Financial Assistance (CFA) available for infrastructure; R&R funded by MNRE

Advantages for Reconciliation: – Centralized R&R administration reduces fragmentation – Public oversight through state nodal agencies and MNRE monitoring – Integrated infrastructure (roads, power evacuation, water) reduces individual land disputes

Disadvantages: – Government land-use changes (agricultural to non-agricultural) often bypass environmental/livelihood scrutiny – Consent of landless pastoralists/laborers not systematized – State capacity constraints delay R&R implementation

B. Private Negotiation and Land Pooling Models

Characteristics: – Developers or land aggregators negotiate directly with multiple landowners – Lease or purchase arrangements negotiated individually – R&R obligations dependent on whether formal land acquisition is invoked

Advantages for Reconciliation: – Potentially more nuanced, community-responsive compensation – Faster land assembly (months vs. years for statutory acquisition) – Developer bears full R&R cost, creating incentive for fair dealing

Disadvantages: – High risk of exploitative agreements, particularly with marginal/landless farmers – No standardized SIA; impacts on common property resources unassessed – Inadequate rehabilitation for non-title-holders (tenants, pastoralists, laborers)

C. Reconciliation Pathway

1. Mandatory SEIA Threshold for Renewable Parks: Amend MNRE guidelines and state policies to require Social and Environmental Impact Assessment (SEIA) for all solar/wind parks exceeding 100 MW or acquiring 500 hectares—regardless of whether formal land acquisition is invoked. This ensures that private land pooling models undergo impact scrutiny equivalent to government-led parks.
2. Consent Verification Framework: Establish independent third-party consent verification for land pooling models. Before a pooled park can be operationalized, a government-appointed commissioner (akin to LARR's consent officer) should verify that 80% consent has been secured through documented, properly informed processes, not merely notarial deeds.
3. Livelihood Impact Bonds: For renewable parks involving displacement of 200+ families or acquiring productive agricultural land, developers should be required to post a “Livelihood Impact Bond” (3-5% of project cost, held in escrow for 5 years). This bond is released only upon independent verification that displaced families have restored or enhanced livelihoods, incentivizing genuine rehabilitation.
4. Tiered R&R Scaling: Standardize R&R entitlements based on park size: – 100-500 MW: Mandatory housing, land, and livelihood grants per NRRP – 500-1000 MW: Enhanced entitlements + public infrastructure in resettlement areas – >1000 MW: Dedicated R&R Commissioner; tribal development plan mandatory; 5-year livelihood monitoring
5. Consent Exemptions for True Wasteland: Clarify that solar parks on genuinely uncultivated, government wasteland (verified through satellite imaging and revenue records) with no customary users or encumbrances require no affected family consent. This streamlines large parks while protecting legitimate land claims.

VI. Conclusion: Aligning Legal Duty with Energy Transition

The LARR Act, 2013, is not an impediment to renewable energy transition; properly implemented, it is the constitutional foundation for equitable transition. The consent thresholds (80% for private, 70% for PPP) and comprehensive rehabilitation obligations reflect the principle that energy security cannot be built on dispossession of livelihood security.

The paradox between EIA exemptions and LARR obligations reveals that renewable energy's environmental benignity does not translate to social benignity. Social impact assessment, mandatory under land acquisition procedures, must be practiced with rigor—not as a box-ticking exercise, but as a genuine engagement with affected communities.

The distinction between government-led large parks and private acquisition models, while administratively useful, should not become a mechanism for circumventing statutory protections. Land pooling and aggregation models, increasingly popular for their efficiency, must be explicitly reconciled with LARR compliance through independent consent verification, mandatory SEIA, and transparent R&R oversight.

India's ambition to achieve 500 GW of renewable capacity is achievable without compromising the rights of project-affected families. The legal framework is sufficiently robust; what is required is committed implementation, capacity building of state administrators, and clarity in policy guidelines. The 2030 energy transition goal will be durable only if the communities whose land anchors that transition are genuine partners in its benefits, as the LARR Act mandates and the Constitution demands.

Footnotes

1. Development of Solar Parks and Ultra Mega Solar Power Projects | MINISTRY OF NEW AND RENEWABLE ENERGY | India 

2. A2013-30.pdf

3. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. “Environmental Impact Assessment Notification, 2006.” Official notification; solar PV and wind projects classified as White Category industries, exempt from EIA clearance. – environmentclearance.nic.in/report/EIA_Notifications.aspx

4. Section 2(2)(b)(i), LARR Act, 2013: “the consent of at least 80% of the affected families shall be obtained through a prior informed process” for private projects.

5. The LARR Act and NRRP specify that consent shall be obtained through consultation with affected families in gram sabhas (rural areas) and public hearings, with documentation by district administration. See Chapter III, NRRP-2007.

6. Section 2(2)(b)(ii), LARR Act, 2013: “the consent of at least 70% of the affected families” for PPP projects.

7. Ministry of Rural Development, Department of Land Resources, Government of India. “National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007.” – Acts, Rules & Policies | Home – DEPARTMENT OF LAND RESOURCES | India

8. MNRE Guidelines, Section 4, note that state governments and state-authorized entities (SPPDs) are primary implementers; land is typically government revenue land or deemed non-agricultural on state notification.

9. Shakti Foundation. “Addressing Land Issues for Utility Scale Renewable Energy Deployment in India: Study Report.” 2018. https://shaktifoundation.in/. Documents case studies of Charanka and Pavagada parks illustrating private land acquisition challenges.

10. Clarus Law. “Renewable Energy Policy Framework.” 2024. Analysis of Gujarat's land aggregating agency model under GUVNL (Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited).

11. TERI. “Socio-environmental De-Risking Instruments for Solar Power in India.” Published 2021. Chapter 1.1 discusses land-use complications and the role of aggregators in potentially facilitating “corruption at the aggregators' level.”

12. Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change. “Environmental Impact Assessment Notification, 2006,” amended 2016. Solar PV power projects and wind power projects are listed under White Category industries under the Schedule to the Notification, exempting them from requirement of EC.

13. National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007, Chapter IV, Section 4.1: SIA mandatory for “involuntary displacement of four hundred or more families en masse in plain areas, or two hundred or more families en masse in tribal or hilly areas, DDP blocks or areas mentioned in the Schedule V or Schedule VI to the Constitution.”

14. TERI report identifies that SIA process can serve multiple objectives: early identification of problem areas, livelihood restoration planning, infrastructure design, and public consultation enabling—all critical for renewable energy sustainability and investor confidence.

15. Shardul Amarchand Mangaldas. “Why India's Solar Push Could Kill the Livelihood of Pastoral Communities.” Analysis of Charanka Solar Park and Rabari displacement, Business Standard, 2019.

16. National Rehabilitation and Resettlement Policy, 2007, Chapter VII, Section 7.1 onwards: Comprehensive entitlements including housing, land, livelihood grants, and vulnerable person protections, binding on all requiring bodies

17. NRRP-2007, Chapter VI, Section 6.16: “the entire estimated cost of rehabilitation and resettlement scheme or plan forms an integral part of the cost of the project for which the land is being acquired… shall be borne by the requiring body.”

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