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I. INTRODUCTION
The International Arbitration system has been endowed with a flexible process that enables the efficient reduction in time and cost of resolution of commercial disputes and the main aim of any justice system is to deliver fair and early justice to both parties. This efficient mechanism of making time and cost an essence makes arbitration a preferable choice over litigation. Moreover, the arbitral process is selected today not because it is particularly fast and cheap, but because it is also the only form of international dispute resolution that offers neutrality and international enforceability in the resolution of significant international disputes.1 Further, with the increasing burden on the judiciary, entities as well have turned to arbitration for timely dispute resolution. Taking note of these needs, arbitration institutes have established dispute resolution according to their respective rules, which aims for a mechanism for the faster redressal of cases. These expediated measures include expeditated procedures, emergency reliefs, documents only proceeding, summary procedure, and others. Amongst these, summary procedure has remained as the most disputed form of expedited measure to resolve disputes, with both, takers and eye raisers, the grounds for the same have been discussed ahead.
Summary procedure is a mechanism followed in common law countries for faster disposition of cases.2 It is a procedure through which parties save time and cost by resolving the matter by concluding the obvious result of the dispute at hand. Black’s Law dictionary has defined summary judgment as, “judgment granted on a claim or defence about which there is no genuine issue of material fact and on which the movant is entitled to prevail as a matter of law”3. The same procedure has been accommodated by the international arbitration centres in their rules.
Through the mechanism of summary procedure, the arbitrator disposes-off unmeritorious claims without hearing every argument.4 Application of this expeditated mechanism is limited to disputes which do not raise complex issues of facts and law, therefore, allowing for the summary disposal of issues by using the procedure stated in the institutional rules5. This application is based on express presence of procedure in the institutional rules and parties’ Contractual Agreement to abide by the rules. Arbitration tribunals like SIAC, ICSID, HKIAC, and SCC each provide the possibility to seek summary procedure of claims and defences.6 On the other hand, in certain tribunals implied application of the rule can be traced where the tribunal has considered one or both party’s requests for summary disposition of the matter even though the rule is not expressly stated for example, the previous ICC rules. The discretion to dispose-off the matter by the application of summary procedure is with the arbitrator, who derives its powers from the pre-established institutional rules and the powers which have been conferred through the Agreement entered by the parties.7 After the summary disposition of the issue the arbitrator passes a summary award which has to be enforced by the parties. Although, this discretionary power of the Arbitrator, which has been elaborately discussed further ahead, might be regarded as violative of ‘fair proceeding’ and ‘due process’, which shall be discussed elaborately further ahead.
II. PROCEDURAL FUNTIONING OF SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Summary procedure is implemented on claims or defences which are contested to be unmeritorious as they lack the legal merit, jurisdiction or are not admissible before the tribunal or the arbitrator.8 The parties have to request for summary procedure for the particular claim or defence which does not raise issues of law or facts and is clear and obvious to be decided by analysing it prima facie. The meaning of “manifestly without legal merit” can be inferred from various judgments by different tribunals and courts. In the landmark case of Trans Global, the very first case in which issues were decided using summary disposition, the ICSID tribunal held that the summary procedure is to be “directed only at clear and obvious cases”9. A more comprehensive judgment was given in the case of MOL v. Croatia, where it was held “the Rule... envisages a claim that is so obvious defective from legal point of view that it can properly be dismissed outright. By contrast, an objection to the jurisdiction or a substantive defence [..] which requires for its disposition more elaborate argument or factual enquiry, must be made the subject of a regular preliminary objection [to jurisdiction][..] or a regular defence on the merits.”10 These are succinctly the instances where the rule of summary procedure can be invoked.
The final discretion to decide whether to allow the application to proceed or not for summarily disposition of the claim or defence, lies with the arbitration tribunal, that is constituted in accordance with the consensus between both parties11. This discretionary power of Tribunal is drawn from the arbitration clauses as an indirect conferment of power which takes place when the parties have agreed that the arbitration is to be conducted according to pre-established rules of the arbitration that set out the power of Tribunal12.
Even though the procedure aims to cut down costs and time, it does possess certain practical challenges for enforcement. These include, parties exploiting the procedure on frivolous grounds of lack of standard procedure in order to delay the enforcement of the award. Also, often questioning the arbitrator’s discretion in implementing these procedural rules against the fundamental requirement of due process which has been elaborated in further chapter.
III. CHALLENGES TO SUMMARY PROCEDURE
Summary procedure though bought into arbitration with the intention to fasten the arbitral proceedings are not without limitations and shortcomings. The flip side of summary procedure shall be looked into this part where it shall be discussed what all restricts arbitration tribunals or the arbitrator to satisfy and fulfil the purpose for which summary procedure was introduced by the arbitration institutions in the very first place.
A. Concerns of Failing Natural Justice
The challenge to summary disposition of claims does not end at the dismissal of the claim by the arbitrator. The challenge has to be faced during the time of enforcement of the award as well. After the award is passed by the tribunal, there are three recourses that the losing party may opt for. Firstly, the party will carry out the award voluntarily. Secondly, the losing party might use the award as the basis for negotiating a settlement with the other part. And thirdly, it may challenge the award if it is possible under the rules of arbitration or any other relevant law.13
When the arbitration award is challenged in the court of law and the courts may set aside the award passed by the arbitral tribunal if the procedural law and if the principles of natural justice are not adhered to by the tribunal14. The arbitral award can be challenged by the parties on various grounds one of them being the procedural grounds which include excess of jurisdiction or lack of due process15. These procedural grounds and standards have been created to ensure that the parties are treated with equality and given equal opportunity for a fair hearing, along with an opportunity to present their case as well.16 The foremost procedural ground that raises the question of summary procedure being a detriment to principles of natural justice is audi alter patrem or equal treatment which was also reiterated in the case of Soh Beng Tee & Co Pte Ltd v. Fairmount Development Pte Ltd17. It arises due to the total discretion exercised by the arbitral tribunal to dismiss the claim or defence by the application submitted by a party, hence leading to the inference that the other party does not get the opportunity to present their respective side of the case or they have been denied a fair hearing. According to the principle of due process, every party has a right of defence18, and in many countries arbitration awards are equivalent to court decisions19 and hence are required to conform with the procedural requirements. Therefore, while arbitrating a matter the tribunal or the arbitrator is well aware of the fact that generally, the losing party may challenge the award on these very grounds of due process which makes them wary of the dissatisfaction that is created amongst the parties. This causes a domino effect which leads to the phenomena known as ‘due process paranoia’ and further also ensues other challenges that summary disposition has to face.
B. Case of Due Process Paranoia
In the recent years, the arbitration set up has called out on its hindrance on providing parties too much of due process to ensure due process has been followed and no party is at a back footing in the arbitration proceeding. Keeping these constraints in mind, the arbitral tribunal develops an apprehension that the parties might set aside the award or challenge the award in the court of law. This thought process and the actions taken thereof lead to the sacrifice of efficient and streamlined dispute resolution and creates an abundance of procedure which arises on every turn as the arbitrator attempts to avoid the dissatisfaction of the parties so that the award may not be set aside20. The preconceived and extra caution taken by the arbitrators to ensure due process notion is referred to ‘due process paranoia’.
Due process paranoia is defined as “a reluctance by the tribunal to act decisively in a certain situation for the fear of arbitration award being challenged on the basis of a party not having had the chance to present its case fully.”21 Due to this paranoia that due process has to be maintained throughout the proceedings creates unnecessary burden on the parties and also disables the purpose of opting for a faster and alternative dispute resolution mechanism, that the parties entered into in the first place. The concern of extra cautiously ensuring due process which would include following procedural rule arises due to the costs attached to litigating the matter in the court of law. It is also because of the reasoning that if the award is declared to be unenforceable and set aside, the dispute between the parties will be litigated upon which in turn will add up to the costs and time. This is opposed to the reason due to which the parties opted for arbitration. The reason why this apprehension arises amongst the arbitrators is because the rules and regulations that have been laid down provide for challenging the enforcement of the award. Therefore, a challenge to summary procedure is to not just created by human judgement but has also been created by the standardisation of procedure which is created by the institutional rules itself.
Moreover, due to the robust case management of the arbitrator or the tribunal the party may challenge the award on the basis of the biased nature of the arbitrator leading to cautious approach to take ‘too much of due process’ which often results into due process paranoia. This cautious approach prevents him from exercising of discretionary power vested in him to ensures the timely and effective management of the dispute. Thus, leading to dilution of the very aim for which the arbitration mechanism was opted by the parties while choosing arbitration as their dispute resolution mechanism.
C. Circumscribing Summary Procedure in “One Size Fit All”
Arbitration was created to accommodate and expeditely resolve the commercial dispute that has arisen between two parties.22 This ensures the timely disposition of the matter in a cheap and efficient manner. But, with the institutionalisation and formalisation of the arbitration process it reflects the increasingly litigious character of the parties and their counsel, rendering international arbitration proceedings extremely burdensome. Arbitration now almost involves the systematic recourse of document production and adversarial cross-examination of witnesses, two procedural features that necessarily add to the cost and time of the arbitration, and further intensify its contentious nature23.
With the institutionalisation of arbitration, the process has to follow a standard procedure to resolve the dispute. A straight jacket formula in the form of rules has been created to be applicable to all the disputes, due to this the mechanism has become less or lost flexibility. Even though, standardisation of the process provides for reasonable predictability and trust in the arbitration process. It is essential for commercial disputes as the parties are prepare well and they know what to expect next and how to proceed further ahead.24 But with predictability and standardisation comes the onerous completion of exhaustive procedural compliances which deviate the cost and time effective aim of the resolution. And the process of arbitration is trusted for its cost benefits and timely dispute resolution which is diluted due to standard rules and regulations that have been laid down in SIAC, ICC, SCC, etc.
Another problem which has arisen with standardisation is the problem of categorisation of disputes. Arbitration rules have tried hard to harbour complex and simple dispute resolution mechanisms to suit up the dispute that are bought to the arbitral tribunal. Likewise, summary procedure is also tailored to suit a class of disputes. This tailoring has led to categorisation of disputes and hence requires to conform with all requirement of the procedure of dispute resolution. The problem of standardisation lies within itself -its nature to and generalise all the matters. Each dispute is distinctive and has different intricacies which need different approaches of solving it and a blanket procedure cannot be applied to resolve it efficiently.
These challenges need to be viewed from the prism of efficacy which summary procedure has deemed to promised. This calls for striking balance between the process and the aim which it envisages to achieve. Therefore, a need arises for a balance and also a deviation from the mundane understanding of the principles of natural justice and standard procedure which have been argued in following chapters.
IV. SUMMARY PROCEDURE IN INDIA ARBTRIATION RELAM
Despite several progressive amendments to the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996, Indian legislation still lacks an express provision empowering Arbitral Tribunals to summarily dismiss manifestly unmeritorious claims or defences at an early stage of the proceedings. Given the increasing complexity and volume of commercial disputes in India, the need for a codified summary procedure within the arbitral framework is more pressing than ever. This gap is particularly evident when viewed against India’s ambition to position itself as an international arbitration hub, comparable to jurisdictions such as Singapore, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong, each of which has expressly incorporated summary dismissal mechanisms into their institutional rules or national legislation.
While the Indian framework does not provide for such a procedure, Section 29B of the Act offers a “fast-track procedure,” permitting parties to mutually adopt an expedited mechanism. Under clause (4), this procedure requires the arbitral proceedings to conclude within six months of commencement and generally excludes the opportunity for oral hearings. However, Section 29B suffers from multiple limitations: (i) the requirement of mutual consent, making its invocation dependent entirely on party cooperation; (ii) the near-elimination of oral hearings, save in exceptional circumstances; and (iii) the mandatory appointment of a sole arbitrator, unlike regular arbitration where parties may constitute a panel of arbitrators under Section 11(3). These structural deficiencies have resulted in parties overwhelmingly opting for the standard arbitral process, rendering Section 29B largely ineffective and underutilised.
A procedural analogue to a summary mechanism can be traced to the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, particularly Order XXXVII, which provides for a summary procedure in cases involving an unambiguous written admission of debt. The central inquiry in such proceedings is whether the defendant has raised a bona fide triable issue—a jurisdictional fact forming the basis for granting or refusing leave to defend. Under Rule 2 of Order XXXVII, once summons is issued and the defendant enters appearance, the plaintiff may serve a summons for judgment. The defendant cannot contest the suit unless they obtain leave to defend; failing this, the plaintiff becomes entitled to an immediate decree. Rule 3 further prescribes that the defendant must apply for leave to defend within ten days of receiving the summons.
This mechanism serves as an effective tool to prevent frivolous or dilatory defences in certain commercial matters. However, its applicability is limited to suits based on bills of exchange, hundis, and promissory notes, thereby restricting its usefulness and excluding broader categories of civil and arbitral disputes. Consequently, the absence of a comparable, expressly codified summary dismissal mechanism within the arbitral process remains a significant procedural gap in the Indian arbitration landscape.
V. STREAMLING CHALLENGES WITH EFFICACY, FLEXIBILITY & ENFORCEBILTY
Having already established and discussed how fear of challenge to awards could result in excessive diligence which would in turn result in loss of essence of expedited procedures. This part will try to highlight how arbitration agreement itself enables the arbitrator to exercise due discretion to avoid delay and enhance efficacy. Also, it will take forward the idea of how the exercise of such discretion is in tandem with due process and principles of natural justice which have been outstretched as primary reason for paranoia amongst the arbitrators.
Firstly, this part will put forth the idea of how no unlimited right to be heard or to present one’s respective case can be termed as due process and only just and fair opportunity is requisite for the same. Also, such due process has already been accommodated in resolution of dispute by summary procedure. Secondly, this part will put forth two principles to establish broader understanding of natural justice. Further, making a case against standardisation of process with the need for simpler approach in adjudging manifestly unmeritorious claims. Lastly, this part will conclude by proposing measures like inclusion of the wavier clause in the agreement to avoid challenges to awards and improve enforceability.
A. Broader Notion of Natural Justice in The Arbitration regime
The primary fear that creeps in the mind of the arbitrator in passing awards summarily is the fear of challenge on the grounds of lack of fair opportunity to present one’s case is misplaced. The idea of due process also enunciates “Right to be heard is not unqualified. It is subject to ‘Standards of Reasonableness’”. This stance can be traced back to the case of Triulzi Cesare SRL v. Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd25 where it was further stated that ‘reasonable opportunity’ to be heard ‘does not equate to a reasonable opportunity to optimally present everything that it wants to’26. There exists a need of weighing down the parameters of reasonableness against efficient resolution of the dispute in accordance with other parties’ right to efficient redressal as opted by the parties by the virtue of their agreement. 27
In cases of application for summary procedure, the connotation of natural justice may vary from other contexts as it requires only two tests to be fulfilled to check standards of reasonableness. These tests include- firstly, a party should have an opportunity to present its case28. This encompasses an ‘opportunity to understand, test and rebut its opponent’s case’29. This opportunity needs to understood in a limited sphere by taking into account the mechanism of summary procedure which does not require full-fledged presentation of all intricacies of the case which parties want to30present as this process is suitable for claims which are manifestly without merit31.
Secondly, a finding by the arbitral tribunal breaches natural justice if it is not reasonably foreseeable. This notion emerged in case of TCL v. Castel Electronics32which also applied in case of the Emerald Grain33. In the case it was observed that Emerald Grain had submitted that although it was given a hearing, the tribunal ignored critical submissions and was later surprised ‘by a conclusion which was said not to have been supported by the evidence’. It was held, that the evidence of Emerald Grain was insufficient for establishing a direct link as it could not have reasonably foreseen the tribunal’s reasoning.
These two standards point towards the need for construing principles of natural justice in a broader sense so as to keep in mind the object sought to be achieved by opting for arbitration against the courts for the resolution of disputes. This broader construction of natural justice in context of arbitration allows for lowering the standard safeguards in favour of the agreement between the parties. Also, the courts will be unjustified in undoing an award, as it is a product of an arbitration which the parties had agreed to abide by and in which no practical injustice could be traced. Therefore, breach of procedural fairness should be assessed in a practical sense and on the basis of ‘real practical injustice or real unfairness in conduct’ of proceeding as resorted in case of TCL v. Castel Electronic34.
B. Avoiding Standardisation in attempt to secure Flexibility
By far what can be inferred is that setting up equal standards in cases of summary procedure could hamper its efficacy. This leads to a need for another reform that has become inevitable that is non-standardisation of process of arbitration especially where application for summary procedure is made. One of the major reasons for parties to contract and agree to redress via arbitration is its flexibility as opposed to the exacerbated procedures that is followed in courts which results in unavoidable delay and extra cost. Reasoning against standardisation that leads to sluggish procedure in cases for summary disposition can be traced to two thresholds that tribunals have set up where summary procedure can be applied. First threshold is a pecuniary one i.e. tribunals have set up a certain amount of claim below which a matter would automatically be resolved summarily. Like, according to the Swiss Rule the threshold is kept at CHF 1 million, whereas ICDR puts its value of claim at less than US$250,000 and similarly other institutions have their own pecuniary threshold limits wherein cases with claim amount below which would be resolved summarily35. This compulsory application of summary procedure in cases where disputed amount is lower is to keep cost of resolution minimal. So, standardised procedure in these cases will only put extra burden on the parties and make the process ineffective.
The second threshold is based on merits of the claim i.e. tribunals like SIAC, HIAKC, ICSID36 allows for summary procedure wherein the claim is manifestly without merit. As already discussed, cases where claim is ‘clearly and out rightly’37 without merit can be disposed-off summarily. In these cases, standardisation would only result in unnecessary delay. This makes a case for allowing and selecting a procedure that best suits the dispute based on case to case basis i.e. a need for summary procedure in straightforward dispute and more exhaustive approach in a complex dispute.
Therefore, standardisation stands in direct conflict with two primary objectives of any arbitration agreement i.e. avoiding extra cost and delays. This only lends support to the view that summary procedures should not circumscribe itself to the siege of “one size fits all” standardised procedures same role which any arbitration is expected to adhere to38.
C. Arbitrator’s Discretionary Power to Determine the Appropriate Procedure
Having elaborated upon the need to have wider understanding natural justice and avoiding standardisation in arbitration, the burden lies on the arbitrator to actively exercise his discretion to apply such principles. The role of the arbitrator becomes pertinent to preserve the competitive advantage of international arbitration. The arbitrator needs to act actively to keep in check the tactics that are often used by other parties only to delay the proceedings like devising counterclaims in order to rise above the pecuniary threshold so as to avoid summary dismissal. Here, the arbitrator needs to use his discretionary powers that he derives from the very arbitration clause. Also, many institutions borrow from Article 17.1 of UNICTRAL rules in for exercise of discretionary power to conduct proceeding in such a manner as it considers appropriate to avoid unnecessary delays and expenses39.
This discretionary power of the tribunal is drawn from the arbitration clause as in this case there is an agreement which is the source of power which is assigned by the parties when the parties agree that the arbitration is to be conducted according to pre-established rules of the arbitration that set out the power of Tribunal40. Courts have also extended support to such wide exercise of discretionary powers of arbitrator taking into account express agreement between the parties to have chosen the institutional rules that allow for the use of discretionary powers to expedite the procedure. This exercise is held to be consistent with party autonomy41. In exercise of this discretionary powers the arbitrator may allow for limited discovery and forego the lackadaisical procedure like systematic document production, cross examinations according to needs and complexity of disputes(42.
D. Inclusion of Waiver clause to enhance enforceability
By far what has been put forth gives strength to the arbitrator in allowing him to exercise his discretion extensively and shred the fear of any challenges. But what remains beyond his control is the use of tactics that the parties implement to delay enforceability of the award even after being content with the reasoning of the award. This creates a need for clever and sophisticated drafting of the arbitration clause which shall create extensive scope for allowing for summary procedure, and avoid any prospect of challenges. Such avoidance to challenge the award could be well formulated into the ‘exclusion to challenges clause’ or inclusion of clauses which expressly waive their ability to apply for the award to be set aside. These exclusion clauses need to be express, unambiguous in the jurisdictions. In line with this thought, certain institutions like SIAC43, ICC44 in their rules have accommodated for inclusion of wavier of right to appeal.
The issue of wavier raises the question relating to whether the court’s power of review could be subjugated by party autonomy juxtaposing private and public interest. There exists a need to strike balance between these two interests. With the courts taking varying stand on validity of such waive the right, where on one hand upholding a clear and unequivocal intention of parties to waive off which was also ruled in case the of Kim-C1 LLC v. Valent Biosciences Corp45. While on the other, in the case of Hoeft v. MVL Group46 such wavier was declared invalid on the basis that contractual freedom must have certain limits. A cautious approach suggests that allowing waiver might affect the overall fairness by curtailing the already skewed role of courts in the process of arbitration. Further, these waivers can only be applicable to the extent of limiting private interests and not excluding public interest in the form of going against public policy which is inclusive of ‘fundamental notion of justice and fairness’47. But this cautious approach could be relaxed by skilled drafting of a clause only to limit challenges of enforcement reflecting clear intention of parties. Also, precluding such a clause seems unfair taking into account firstly, the multiple avenues for challenges which are already in existence and opting summary procedure as a measure to quickly resolve disputes and challenges so that it will defeat its inherent purpose which can be strengthened by waiver to enforcement clauses.
VI. CONCLUSION
International arbitration regime has been accommodating reforms lately with the tribunal actively taking into account the needs of the parties. These measures have shaped arbitration to become a faster and cost-efficient model and ensures the advantage of arbitration against courts does not dilute away. In this effort developments like summary procedure should be tested through the prism of efficacy. This paper attempted to resolve this dilemma of balancing procedure to achieve justice against efficacy of justice. In this attempt what could be concluded is that the need for wider understanding of natural justice has to be imbibed to avoid the standardisation of the proceedings. This standardisation needs to be foregone and the tailoring of procedure from case to case shall be allowed on the basis of complexity and economic threshold of the dispute. Here, there is a need for the arbitrator to play an active role to exercise discretion vested in him to shape the process according to the needs and intricacies of the dispute which allows for some fresh air of flexibility. Apart from the arbitrator parties could at a very nascent level take on themselves the responsibility to avoid barriers of enforceability by inclusion of waiver clause at the drafting stage. This clause can enable parties to achieve the original intent and protect the susceptibility of these proceedings being challenged in the court of law. This stands in affirmation with the principle of party autonomy after all, the chief promise of an arbitration is consent from the very beginning to the very end of the arbitration process.
Footnotes
1. Constantine Partasides & Ben Prewett, Rediscovering the Lost Promise of International Arbitration, 16 in Laurent Lévy and Michael Polkinghorne (eds), Expedited Procedures In International Arbitration, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law, 110, 132
2. Yas Banifatemi, Expedited Proceedings in International Arbitration, 16, Expedited Procedures in International Arbitration, Dossiers of the ICC Institute of World Business Law 9,33
3. Summary Judgment, Black's Law Dictionary (10 ed. 20014)
4. Francis Hornyold-Strickland & Duncan Speller, Preliminary Determination—Path to Efficiency or Treacherous Shortcut, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (Apr. 21, 2016), available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/04/21/preliminary-determinations-path-to-efficiency-or-treacherous-shortcut/ (last accessed on 1 February, 2018).
5. Supra at 5
6. See generally, HKIAC Rules 2013, Rule 43; ICSID Rules, Rule 41; SCC Rules, Rule 43; SIAC Rules 2016, Rule 29.
7. Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern &Martin Hunter, Redfern and Hunter on international arbitration (6th ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015)
8. See generally, James P. Duffy, Dispositive Motions and the Summary Disposition of Claims in International Arbitration, International Arbitration in the United States 275, 288 (2017)
9.Trans-Global Petroleum Inc. v Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/7/25, 2008
10.MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas Company Plc v. Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/32
11. John Choong, Mark Mangan and Nicholas Lingard, A Guuide to the SIAC Arbitration Rules (2nd ed., Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2018)
12. Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, Redfern And Hunter: Law And Practice Of International Commercial (6th Ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015)
13. UNIITRAL Model Law, Article 34(2)(c)(ii); Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern &Martin Hunter, Redfern And Hunter: Law And Practice Of International Commercial (6th Ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015)
14. Supra at 2.
15. James P. Duffy, Dispositive Motions and the Summary Disposition of Claims in International Arbitration, International Arbitration in the United States 275, 288 (2017)
16. Supra at 7.
17. Soh Beng Tee Co Pte Ltd v. Fairmount Development Pte Ltd, CA 100/2006, 2007
18. Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern &Martin Hunter, Redfern And Hunter: Law And Practice Of International Commercial (6th Ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2015)
19. Ibid.
20. See generally Michael Polkinghorne and Benjamin Ainsley Gill, Due Process Paranoia: Need We Be Cruel to Be Kind?,34(6) Journal of International Arbitration 935, 946 (2017)
21.Remy Gerbay, Due Process Paranoia, Kluwer Arbitration Blog (Jun. 6, 2016), available at http://arbitrationblog.kluwerarbitration.com/2016/06/06/due-process-paranoia/ (last accessed on 30th Jan 2020)
22. See generally, Francis Burdick, What is the Law Merchant?, Columbia Law Review 472, 472 (1902)
23. See, Remy Gerbay, Is the End Nigh Again? An Empirical Assessment of the Judicialisation of International Arbitration, 15 (2) The American Review of International Arbitration 227, 230 (2014).
24. See, Ibid.
25. Triulzi Cesare SRL v. Xinyi Group (Glass) Co Ltd., (2014) SGHC 220
26. Ibid.
27. Klaus Peter Berger Peter and Ole Jensen, Due Process Paranoia and the Procedural
Judgment Rule: a safe harbour for procedural management decisions by international
arbitrators, 32(3) Arbitration International 415,435 (2016)
28. Emerald Grain Australia Pty Ltd v. Agrocorp International Pte Ltd, (2014) 314 A.L.R. 299, 327
29. Parties Trustees of Rotoaria Forest Trust v. Attorney-General, (1998) 2 N.Z.L.R. 452, 463
30. ADG v. ADI (2014) 3 S.L.R. 481
31. ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules, 2006 Rule 41(5); SIAC Arbitration Rules,2016, Rule 29; HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules,2013, Rule 41.
32. Castel Electronics v. TCL (2012) 232 F.C.R. 311, 352.
33. Supra at 28
34. TCL Air Conditioner (Zhongshan) Co Ltd v Castel Electronics Pty Ltd (2014) 232 F.C.R. 361, 394.
35. Swiss Rules of International Arbitration 2012, Rule 42(2); ICDR Arbitration Rules 2014, Rule 1(4); JCAA Arbitration Rules 2015, Rule 75.2; CIETAC Arbitration Rules 2015, Rule 56(1)
36. SIAC Arbitration Rules 2016, Rule 29; 2013 HKIAC Administered Arbitration Rules, Rule 41; ICSID Convention Arbitration Rules 2006, Rule 41(5)
37. Trans-Global Petroleum Inc. v Jordan, ICSID Case No. ARB/7/25, MOL Hungarian Oil and Gas Company Plc Republic of Croatia, ICSID Case No. ARB/13/32
38. Three Rivers District Council and Others v Governor and Company of the Bank of England, (2004) UKHL 48 260,261
39. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, 2013, Article 17.1
40. Nigel Blackaby, Constantine Partasides, Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, REDFERN AND HUNTER: LAW AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION, 302 (2016).
41. Travis Coal Restructured Holdings Llc v Essar Global Fund Ltd, (2014) EWHC 251.
42. Lauran San Roman Guijarro, Summary Disposition: The Only Way Out Is Through?, 66 University of Miami Law Review (2012).
43. SIAC Arbitration Rules 2016, Rule 32.11
44. ICC Rules 2017, Rule 32
45. Kim-C1 LLC v. Valent Biosciences Corp., 2010 WL 4944638 (E.D. Cal. 2010).
46. Hoeft v. MVL Group 343 F.3D 57 (2d Cir. 2003)
47. Supra at 28.
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