Staged Collisions, Surprise Discoveries, And The Limits Of Privilege

Motor vehicle accident litigation in Ontario is rarely short on complexity, but Parweez v. Manbauman stands out. What began as a seemingly routine rear-end collision evolved, after a candid and damaging examination for discovery, into allegations of a staged crash, insurance fraud, and conspiracy. Many of the principles are applicable to tort litigation in general.

The April 2026 endorsement of Associate Justice Josefo addresses three discrete but interconnected issues:

1. the scope of litigation privilege over pre-litigation adjuster investigations,
2. the threshold for amending pleadings based on newly discovered evidence, and
3. the procedural rights of a proposed third party who arrived unrepresented.

The decision offers useful guidance on each.

Background Facts

The action arises from an October 24, 2018 motor vehicle accident in which defendant Malik Manbauman, driving a U-Haul truck rented from defendant U-Haul Co. (Canada) Ltd., rear-ended the vehicle in which plaintiff Shuieb Parweez was travelling. For years the matter proceeded as a conventional MVA claim. That changed on October 29, 2024.

At his examination for discovery, Manbauman testified that he knew the plaintiff and his brother Alli Parweez before the accident, that he had been paid approximately $200 to drive the U-Haul truck, and that he had admitted to lying on the accident report, writing down what someone in the plaintiff’s vehicle told him to write. The so-called “bombshell evidence” prompted Manbauman to retain separate counsel and caused both defendants to seek significant amendments to their pleadings.

Issue 1: Litigation Privilege Over U-Haul’s Pre-Litigation Investigation

The Dispute

The plaintiff sought production of documents from U-Haul’s own investigation of the accident before litigation was commenced, material that might illuminate how the collision occurred, who was liable, and whether witness statements had been taken. U-Haul refused on the basis of litigation privilege, which requires, per established case law, that the dominant purpose of the documents in question be the contemplation of actual or expected litigation.

The Court’s Analysis

The court accepted uncontested affidavit evidence that U-Haul “outsources” its MVA investigations to Rep-west, a third-party claims adjuster, and found this arrangement analogous to the retention of an insurance adjuster. The critical analytical distinction, the court noted, is between an adjuster engaged in the inherently adversarial work of assessing tort liability and damages, and an internal company process, such as a workplace safety review after an industrial accident, where the dominant purpose may not be litigation at all.

The court found the decision of Justice Quinn in Panetta v. Retrocom et al., 2013 ONSC 2386 most on point. In that slip-and-fall case, Quinn J. held that:

“….in third-party or tort claims (as opposed to claims by an insured against his or her own insurer), there is no preliminary investigative phase where privilege does not attach to notes, reports and files of adjusters. In third-party insurance claims, the sole reason for any investigation by or on behalf of an insurer is because of the prospect of litigation.”

Applying that principle, Associate Justice Josefo concluded that as soon as the MVA occurred and U-Haul engaged Rep-west to investigate, U-Haul was in an adversarial position, and the dominant purpose of the investigation was the contemplated litigation, litigation that, unsurprisingly, did materialize. The refusal was upheld.

This ruling reinforces the broad application of litigation privilege in the tort context. Plaintiffs seeking disclosure of a defendant’s pre-litigation adjuster file will face a high bar: in third-party claims, the adjuster’s engagement itself signals adversarial positioning, and privilege attaches from that moment. The contrast drawn with internal safety reviews is a useful reminder that the doctrine turns on purpose and context, not merely on who prepared the documents.

Issue 2: Amendment of Pleadings to Allege a Staged Collision

Both Manbauman and U-Haul sought to amend their Statements of Defence. Manbauman’s proposed amendments alleged that Alli Parweez, the plaintiff’s brother, and driver of the plaintiff’s vehicle, recruited Manbauman to unknowingly participate in a staged collision; that Manbauman was paid to follow closely behind the BMW in the U-Haul; that the BMW stopped suddenly without warning causing the rear-end impact; and that Alli and his associates then directed Manbauman to give a false account in the accident report.

U-Haul’s proposed amendments framed the same factual narrative as intentional fraud and civil conspiracy, pleading that the plaintiff and Alli set up the collision with the intention of obtaining an insurance payout and that Manbauman was used as an unwitting participant.

The Court’s Reasoning

Rule 26.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure requires the court to grant leave to amend absent non-compensable prejudice, and the court found no such prejudice here:

• no pre-trial conference had been scheduled,
• no trial date fixed, and
• the plaintiff still required an extension of time to set the matter down.

The amendments were found to be tenable, grounded as they were in Manbauman’s sworn testimony at discovery, and the court observed that putting this version of events front and centre in a pleading rather than holding it back for trial, gave the plaintiff advance disclosure and further opportunity to conduct examinations. Transparency, in the court’s view, was “the antithesis of prejudice.”

On the limitation period, the plaintiff argued U-Haul should have discovered the alleged fraud earlier and that its pleading was time-barred. The court disagreed. Applying the discoverability principle, the court found it likely that Manbauman’s discovery evidence came as a genuine surprise to all parties, and that if the new evidence could not have been discovered before October 29, 2024, the parties have two years from that date to amend, a deadline they were well within. The court declined to make a definitive discoverability finding on the record before it, leaving the plaintiff free to plead the limitation defence in reply if she wished to pursue it.

The court also placed the pace of the litigation in context. It noted that the case had not been advanced with any urgency even before the new allegations arose, including a period of delay attributable to the untimely death of plaintiff’s prior counsel, and that resulting delay from amendments grounded in newly discovered evidence was not the primary cause of the matter’s slow progress.

This aspect of the decision illustrates the relatively generous approach Ontario courts take to pleading amendments where:

• the proposed amendments are grounded in sworn discovery evidence rather than speculation;
• no trial date has been set; and
• any delay caused by the amendment is modest relative to the overall timeline.

The discoverability analysis is a useful reminder that limitation arguments in the amendment context cut both ways. A plaintiff asserting a defendant should have discovered fraud earlier may find that same logic applies to themselves.

Issue 3: Procedural Fairness for an Unrepresented Proposed Third Party

U-Haul’s motion also sought to commence a third-party claim against Alli Parweez. Alli appeared at the hearing without counsel and was attempting to contact his motor vehicle insurer for representation. Associate Justice Josefo adjourned that portion of the motion to afford Alli a fair opportunity to obtain legal advice before being required to respond. The court was clear that the rescheduling would be addressed at a case conference with all counsel present, and the decision urges Alli directly to retain counsel.

This aspect of the endorsement, though brief, reflects a consistent judicial concern: the introduction of a third party into complex, multi-defendant litigation raises real stakes, and basic procedural fairness requires that the proposed third party be heard before such an order is made.

A Note on Procedure: Compendiums Are Mandatory

The endorsement closes with a procedural rebuke. Rule 4.05.3.3 makes compendiums mandatory for contested motions, yet none were provided. The court noted that compendiums with relevant excerpts would have been very helpful when reviewing the voluminous material and warned that future non-compliance risks adjournment of the motion.

The content of this article is intended to provide a general guide to the subject matter. Specialist advice should be sought about your specific circumstances.