In February 2025, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) handed down a landmark judgment that opened the door to “long-arm” jurisdiction in infringement proceedings, allowing courts to rule on infringement actions in respect of patents granted by states outside their ordinary jurisdiction (C-339/22, BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux, 25 February 2025). The judgment came in what was already an interesting time for European patent litigation, with the Unified Patent Court (UPC) having opened its doors in 2023. Now, over a year on from BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux, we are seeing more clearly how the judgment is being interpreted by the UPC and the national courts, and what it means for patent enforcement strategies in Europe and beyond.
This article was first published by the American Intellectual Property Law Association (AIPLA) for the AIPLA Spring 2026 Chemical Chronicles newsletter.
Jurisdictional framework and terminology
Before turning to the law, it is helpful to set out some definitions. States that are party to the European Patent Convention (EPC) are “EPC Contracting States”. A European patent may be granted for any or all of the EPC Contracting States.
In this article, EU Member States (such as Germany, France, Italy and Spain) and states that are party to the Lugano Convention (such as Norway and Switzerland) will often be referred to together as “EU/Lugano States” because the same jurisdictional framework broadly applies to both: for EU Member States, jurisdiction in civil matters is governed by the Brussels I bis Regulation (Recast), and the Lugano Convention applies similar rules. The Brussels I bis Regulation (Recast) will be referred to by the abbreviation “BR”.
“UPC Member States” refers to the EU Member States that participate in the UPC, including France, Germany and Italy. The UPC is a common court which has jurisdiction over actions where the courts of a UPC Member State would have jurisdiction (Articles 71a and 71b BR). Notably, the UPC Agreement (UPCA) expressly limits the UPC’s jurisdiction to European patents, whereas some national courts may face no such limitation.
Straightforwardly, “non-UPC states” refers to all states which do not participate in the UPC, while “non-UPC EU/Lugano States” refers to a subset of the non-UPC states which are EU/Lugano States. Examples of non-UPC EU/Lugano States are Spain, Norway and Switzerland. “Third states” refers to states that are neither EU Member States (and therefore cannot be UPC Member States) nor parties to the Lugano Convention. Examples of third states include EPC Contracting States such as the UK and Türkiye, as well as states outside the European patent framework, such as the US and Japan.
The situation before BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux
Article 4(1) BR provides that parties can be sued in the courts of the EU Member State in which they are domiciled. However, following a decision of the CJEU in 2006 (GAT v LuK, C‑4/03, 13 July 2006) the common understanding was that a court of an EU Member State hearing an action relating to infringement of a patent granted by another EU Member State could not proceed once invalidity had been raised (either as a defence or a counterclaim). This is because the Brussels Regulation provides that the state in which a patent was granted has “exclusive jurisdiction” as to the validity of the patent.
That said, cross-border preliminary injunctions have nonetheless been possible, because courts may grant provisional measures without jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter (Article 35 BR). Also, in Solvay v Honeywell, C-616/10, 12 July 2012, the CJEU held that the exclusive jurisdiction provisions do not necessarily preclude the granting of provisional measures. After Solvay v Honeywell, some European courts (such as the Dutch courts) became well known for issuing cross-border preliminary injunctions, but many others adopted a much more cautious approach.
BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux
In BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux, the CJEU considered again the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the court of the state in which a patent was granted as to the validity of a patent (Article 24(4) BR). The judgment distinguishes between EU/Lugano States and third states, such as the UK.
For the national part of a European patent in an EU/Lugano State, the CJEU held that the “exclusive jurisdiction” relates only to the part of the dispute relating to the validity of the patent. Accordingly, a court of an EU Member State (or the UPC) with jurisdiction over an infringement action regarding a national part of a European patent in an EU/Lugano State by virtue of the defendant’s domicile does not lose jurisdiction where the defendant raises invalidity. However, the CJEU noted that the infringement court may stay proceedings if it considers that there is a reasonable, non-negligible possibility of the relevant patent being declared invalid by the court of the state in which the patent was granted.
For patents granted in a third state, the CJEU held that Article 24(4) BR does not apply at all. Thus, Article 24(4) BR does not preclude a court of an EU Member State (or the UPC) from considering the validity of patents granted in third states in an infringement action brought against defendants under the jurisdiction of the court by virtue of their domicile. However, this consideration of validity will not affect the existence or content of the patents in the third state, or cause its national register to be amended. As such, the decision only has inter partes effect.
Thus, BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux substantially altered the position following GAT v LuK and set the stage for long-arm jurisdiction in infringement proceedings in Europe.
A straightforward case: HL Display v Black Sheep
The application of BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux is most straightforward when the patent as granted is found to be valid, as it was in HL Display v Black Sheep, UPC_CFI_386/2024 and 610/2024, 10 October 2025. An infringement action was brought against a company domiciled in the Netherlands at The Hague Local Division of the UPC. As the Netherlands is a UPC Member State, the UPC had jurisdiction over the infringement action by virtue of the domicile of the defendant (Article 4(1) BR). The infringement action encompassed UPC Member States, non-UPC EU/Lugano States (e.g. Poland, Switzerland and Norway) and a third state (the UK). Invalidity was raised by the defendant, as a revocation counterclaim in respect of the UPC Member States, and an invalidity defence in respect of the non-UPC states.
The Hague Local Division substantively examined validity and found the patent as granted to be valid. There were several implications of this. First, the counterclaim for revocation in respect of the UPC Member States was dismissed. Next, applying BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux for the non-UPC EU/Lugano States, the court found that there was no serious, non-negligible chance of the patent being revoked by the competent national courts. Finally, applying BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux for the third state (the UK), the court held that the patent was valid inter partes. Consequently, the court granted an injunction in respect of all of the states.
Partial validity and injunctions in non-UPC EU/Lugano states: Mul-T-Lock v IMC Creations
The situation becomes more complex when, as in Mul-T-Lock v IMC Creations, UPC_CFI_702/2024 and 369/2025, 16 January 2026, the patent is found to be valid in amended form. In this case, an infringement action was brought against a French defendant at the Paris Local Division of the UPC. Jurisdiction was established by virtue of the domicile of the defendant (Article 4(1) BR). By the time of the hearing, the action concerned the UPC Member States and Switzerland (a non-UPC EU/Lugano State).
During proceedings, the patentee requested (as its main request) an amendment to the claims for the UPC Member States to improve their inventive step position. The amended claim was found to be valid and infringed. This amendment in the UPC proceedings had no effect in Switzerland, and the patentee did not initiate amendment proceedings in Switzerland. Applying BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux, the court held there was a serious doubt as to the validity of the unamended Swiss part of the patent, resulting in a reasonable, non-negligible risk of invalidation by the Swiss courts. Consequently, the court dismissed the infringement claim insofar as it related to Switzerland. This suggests that initiating local amendment proceedings may be required to obtain long-arm injunctions in non-UPC EU/Lugano States.
Partial validity and injunctions in third states: Kodak v Fujifilm
In Kodak v Fujifilm, UPC_CFI_365/2023, 18 July 2025, an infringement action was brought against three German entities at the Mannheim Local Division of the UPC. Jurisdiction was established on the basis of the domicile of the defendant (Article 4(1) BR). The action was in respect of acts performed in Germany and the UK. The court applied BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux and held that the UPC has jurisdiction to decide upon the infringement in the UK, and to consider the validity of the UK part of the European patent on an inter partes basis.
During the proceedings, the patentee requested (as its main request) an amendment to claim 1, and the amended claim was found to be valid and infringed. The German patent register was updated to reflect this amendment. However, for the UK part of the patent, the court stated that the amendment only had inter partes effect, and the amended claim was held to be valid inter partes. Thus, the patent on the UK register remained unchanged. The court went on to grant a UK injunction without requiring any limitation of the UK part of the patent. This outcome should be compared to that in Mul-T-Lock v IMC Creations discussed above.
One can see that a curious situation arises here, where the patent in respect of which the UK injunction has been issued (i.e. the patent as amended during the proceedings) is different to the patent that is actually in force in the UK. This leads to some questions. For example, could Kodak bring proceedings in respect of the patent against a different party at the UPC or at the UK courts, and amend the patent in a different way (e.g. in order to cover a different infringement) during those proceedings?
Also, how would the matter proceed if, in the future, the UK courts were to revoke the UK part of the patent? Kodak may need to request that the UPC rescind the UK injunction ordered by the Mannheim Local Division on the basis that the UK part of the patent never existed. The Mannheim Local Division did not provide for this eventuality. However, Rule 354(2) of the UPC Rules of Procedure gives the UPC a discretion to order that an order is no longer enforceable, e.g. to lift an injunction. Another question raised is that of whether the infringement defendant would be permitted to bring a revocation action in the UK. While the Mannheim Local Division suggested that any validity declaration it made would not be binding between the same parties in revocation proceedings in the UK, the patentee may argue that the defendant should be estopped from bringing a revocation action in the UK on the grounds that doing so would amount to a re-litigation of the same cause of action between the same parties.
The UK injunction is to be enforced by the imposition of a penalty payment. Since issuing the UK injunction in July 2025, the Mannheim Local Division has commented on the enforcement of the UK injunction (Kodak v Fujifilm, UPC_CFI_365/2023, 30 January 2026). In the opinion of the Mannheim Local Division, for an order of the UPC in respect of a non-UPC state to be enforceable, and in the absence of a relevant treaty, the order of the UPC must be recognised by the courts of the non-UPC state. The comments of the Mannheim Local Division seem to suggest that this applies both (i) to the injunction being enforced by the UPC itself (e.g. by imposing penalty payments) and (ii) to the injunction being enforced locally in the UK by the UK courts. If this reasoning is followed by other Local Divisions and the UPC Court of Appeal, it may limit significantly the practical reach of the UPC’s long arm.
The Kodak case is currently under appeal, with a decision of the Court of Appeal being expected in mid-2026.
The role of anchor defendants and a CJEU referral: Dyson v Dreame
So far, all of the cases discussed have been infringement actions brought against a defendant domiciled in a UPC Member State, allowing the UPC straightforwardly to claim jurisdiction over the defendant under Article 4(1) BR. However, in the Dyson v Dreame dispute, we see BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux applied by the UPC to consider infringement in a non-UPC state (Spain) by a non-UPC-domiciled defendant – in this case a Hong Kong-based manufacturer (“HK manufacturer”). The HK manufacturer offers to supply allegedly infringing products throughout Europe (including in Spain) via its website. A co-defendant in the proceedings was the HK manufacturer’s EU authorised representative (“authorised representative”). In many cases, it is a legal requirement that non-EU manufacturers have an authorised representative in the EU.
Dyson filed an application for a preliminary injunction at the Hamburg Local Division against, amongst others, the HK manufacturer and the authorised representative (UPC_CFI_387/2025, 14 August 2025). The court noted that provisional measures may be granted even if the courts of another EU Member State have jurisdiction over the substance of the matter (Articles 35 BR and 71b(2) BR). However, the court did go on to consider the underlying jurisdictional principles substantively, and this is discussed below.
A first finding of the Hamburg Local Division was that the authorised representative can be subject to a preliminary injunction. This was because the authorised representative is an intermediary whose services are being used to infringe a patent within the meaning of Enforcement Directive 2004/48/EC, which is incorporated into the UPCA in Article 63(1) and into the Spanish Patent Act. The UPC has jurisdiction over the authorised representative because of its domicile in Germany (a UPC Member State), and so granted a preliminary injunction against the authorised representative extending across the UPC Member States and to Spain.
Jurisdiction over the HK manufacturer in respect of the UPC Member States was established based on Article 7(2) BR (with Article 71b(2) BR), which provides that parties can be sued in the courts of the state where the harmful event occurred or may occur. More interestingly, the Hamburg Local Division also held that the authorised representative acts as an anchor defendant within the meaning of Article 8(1) BR, and thus the UPC has jurisdiction over the HK manufacturer in respect of Spain. Article 8(1) BR states the following, and Article 71b(2) BR opens this up to defendants domiciled outside of the EU for proceedings at the UPC.
A person domiciled in a Member State may also be sued… where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.
The Hamburg Local Division went on to issue preliminary injunctions against the HK manufacturer and the authorised representative in respect of the UPC Member States and Spain.
This is not the first time that the UPC has applied Article 8(1) BR to establish jurisdiction over defendants domiciled in non-UPC states performing acts outside of the UPC Member States: in Moderna v Genevant & Arbutus, UPC_CFI_191/2025 and 192/2025, 23 May 2025, The Hague Local Division established jurisdiction over three Moderna entities domiciled in non-UPC EU/Lugano States (Norway, Spain and Poland) and performing acts in their respective states. This was on the basis that a Dutch Moderna entity was an anchor defendant, because it played a central role in the sales and supply across Europe, including in Norway, Spain and Poland.
Also, in February 2026, we saw another example of a UPC first instance court (The Hague Local Division) granting a long-arm preliminary injunction covering a non-UPC state (Spain) against a manufacturer domiciled outside of Europe (China) on the basis of an EU authorised representative acting as an anchor defendant (Abbott v MicroTech, UPC_CFI_830/2025, 6 February 2026).
Back to the Dyson v Dreame dispute, on appeal the UPC Court of Appeal stayed proceedings to the extent that they concern the action against the HK manufacturer in respect of Spain and the action against the authorised representative in respect of all states, and referred four questions to the CJEU (UPC_CoA_789/2025 and 813/2025, 6 March 2026).
The first question asks: is a situation in which (i) a first company from a non-EU state (e.g. Hong Kong) is alleged to have infringed a European patent in a non-UPC EU/Lugano state (e.g. Spain), and (ii) a second company from a UPC Member State (e.g. Germany) is alleged to be an intermediary whose services are used by the first company for the infringement (e.g. a European authorised representative) capable of leading to “irreconcilable judgments” resulting from separate proceedings, as referred to in Article 8(1) BR?
The second question asks whether, for provisional measures, a common court (e.g. the UPC) has jurisdiction over a company from a non-EU state (e.g. Hong Kong) that is alleged to infringe a patent in both (i) a UPC Member State, such as Germany, and (ii) a non-UPC EU/Lugano State, such as Spain, if the company is offering the same product through identical websites in both (i) and (ii). This question does not require that the company uses the services of an intermediary in a UPC Member State, and is therefore quite broad. The third question builds on the second question, asking whether the fact that the company uses the services of an intermediary (e.g. a European authorised representative) in a UPC Member State is relevant.
The fourth question asks whether preliminary injunctions can be granted against authorised representatives to prevent or prohibit infringement by other parties.
The referral of these questions to the CJEU is far from a request for the CJEU to provide clarification of the general principle of long-arm jurisdiction. Rather, the questions are mainly focused on the specific situation that has arisen in the present case, involving a non-EU manufacturer working with a European service provider (though question 2 is slightly broader). Thus, the answers provided by the CJEU will not be relevant to every case involving long-arm jurisdiction. However, proceedings involving non-European manufacturers and EU authorised representatives are not uncommon. It is worth mentioning that CJEU preliminary rulings can take 15-24 months to be handed down, so we will not get answers to the questions for some time.
No long-arm jurisdiction based on place of infringement: Adobe v KeeeX
In all of the cases discussed above, long-arm jurisdiction has been established on the basis of the domicile of at least one of the defendants. However, a court can also establish jurisdiction in an infringement action if the harmful event (e.g. the infringement) occurs in the court’s territory (Article 7(2) BR). But can Article 7(2) BR be used to establish long-arm jurisdiction over defendants domiciled outside of the UPC Member States?
The UPC Court of Appeal considered this question in Adobe v KeeeX, UPC_COA_922/2025, 923/2025, 924/2025 and 925/2025, 13 March 2026, in which none of the defendants was domiciled in a UPC Member State, and the action involved UPC Member States, non-UPC EU/Lugano States, and a third state. The court noted that the CJEU has previously ruled that, where jurisdiction is established under Article 7(2) BR, the court of the place where the harmful events occurred or threaten to occur has jurisdiction only to hear cases concerning the harmful events that have occurred or threaten to occur in the territory of the court. Thus, in Adobe v KeeeX, under Article 7(2) BR, the UPC could consider infringement actions in respect of the alleged infringements in the UPC Member States, but not in non-UPC states.
There is another provision which might allow the courts of EU Member States and the UPC to exert long-arm jurisdiction when jurisdiction is established on the basis of where the harmful event occurred. Article 71b(3) BR provides that, where the UPC has jurisdiction over a defendant in a dispute concerning infringement of a European patent that gives rise to damage within the EU, it may also exercise jurisdiction over damage arising outside the EU from the infringement. The Court of Appeal left open the question of whether “damage arising outside the EU” could in theory be interpreted to mean infringement of parts of a European patent in non-UPC states.
The Court was able to leave open this question because KeeeX had not properly substantiated its arguments supporting the UPC’s jurisdiction based on Article 71b(3) BR. On this, the first headnote of the Court of Appeal order states that “[a]s a rule, the Statement of claim should contain the facts and legal arguments necessary to justify the jurisdiction of the Court.” This should be borne in mind by patentees looking to seek long-arm injunctions in cases where the jurisdictional situation is not straightforward.
Long-arm jurisdiction is not just for the UPC: Regeneron v Formycon
BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux is not just for the UPC. This is shown by Regeneron/Bayer v Formycon, 7O9382/25, 7O9383/25, 25 September 2025, in which the Munich Regional Court I granted, on the basis of a nationally validated European patent, a preliminary injunction in respect of twenty-two of the EU Member States.
The defendants were domiciled in Germany, and so jurisdiction was established on the basis of Article 4(1) BR. Interpreting BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux, the Munich Regional Court set out that it is not always necessary to suspend pending infringement proceedings in response to invalidity proceedings in another EU Member State or to the raising of an invalidity defence by the defendant; rather, it will depend on whether the court seised of the infringement proceedings considers validity to be “sufficiently secured”. In earlier invalidity proceedings before the German Federal Patent Court, the patent-in-suit was held to be valid in amended form. Based on the decision of the German Federal Patent Court, it was assumed that the corresponding patents in the other EU Member States would be valid in the same amended form. Thus, validity was considered to be sufficiently secured.
Interestingly, the issuance of the preliminary injunction for the other EU Member States was not contingent on the amendment of the patents in those other EU Member States. This should be compared to the outcomes in Kodak v Fujifilm and Mul-T-Lock v IMC Creations.
This case shows that it is possible to obtain geographically broad injunctive relief in Europe without using the UPC. This is an important consideration for those considering bringing infringement proceedings in Europe. In some cases, the national courts of an EU Member State may be more attractive than the UPC, for example because of the types of relief available or procedural aspects of proceedings before the court.
Can long arms reach the US: BMW v Onesta
Whereas the UPC is limited to disputes concerning European patents, the national courts of EU Member States are not restricted in the same way. In a dispute between BMW and Onesta, we have seen an attempt to use BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux to assert US patents at a European court. In October 2025, Onesta (a non-practising entity) filed three infringement actions against BMW at the Munich Regional Court I, two of which were based on US patents. BMW is domiciled in Germany, and so would come under the jurisdiction of the Munich Regional Court under Article 4(1) BR. Under BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux, the US is a third state, and so Article 24(4) BR seems not to preclude a court of an EU Member State (or the UPC) from considering the validity of US patents if the court has jurisdiction over infringement because of the defendant’s domicile.
BMW responded in the US, filing a declaratory judgment action and seeking an anti-suit injunction (ASI) preventing Onesta from pursuing the infringement actions in Germany. This action was filed at the US District Court for the Western District of Texas. Hearing the case, Judge Albright granted a temporary restraining order (TRO), and then later issued the anti-suit injunction (Bayerische Motoren Werke Aktiengesellschaft (BMW) v. Onesta IP, LLC, No. 6:25-cv-00581, 2026 WL 474871 (W.D. Tex. 13 February 2026)).
In granting the anti-suit injunction, Judge Albright noted that the German proceedings threatened to frustrate US policy that disputes over US patents should be adjudicated in US courts, and that the German proceedings would prejudice BMW by depriving it of procedural protections available under US law, including discovery and the right to a jury trial.
Onesta has now withdrawn all of the German infringement actions and, according to some reports, has irrevocably waived any substantive claims against BMW arising from the patents in suit. The actions were withdrawn before the Munich Regional Court issued any judgment or reasoned order, so we have no indication of how the German court would have responded to the assertion of the patents in jurisdictions outside of the EPC Contracting States, such as the US and Japan. Accordingly, whether courts of EU Member States will in fact seek to exercise long-arm jurisdiction over US patents remains to be seen.
The BMW v Onesta dispute suggests that, for infringement actions concerning US patents, anti-suit relief granted by a US court may offer an effective means of resisting the reach of the long arms of European courts. However, this option may not always be available, since it depends on the party bringing the European action being under the jurisdiction of a US court. Moreover, although Judge Albright of the Western District of Texas was willing to grant an anti-suit injunction in this case, the law governing such relief differs across the federal circuits, and other US courts may not necessarily take the same approach.
It remains to be seen whether the courts of other non-UPC states will be amenable to granting anti-suit relief to restrain proceedings before the UPC.
Concluding thoughts
Both the UPC and the national courts of EU Member States are, in appropriate circumstances, willing to apply BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux to establish long-arm jurisdiction, hearing infringement actions extending beyond their ordinary jurisdiction. However, the case law is still developing, and we are yet to see complete clarity on issues such as the effect of validity challenges, the effect of claim amendments, the nature of the anchor defendant, and the enforcement of long-arm injunctions. We are also yet to see whether BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux will allow European courts to establish jurisdiction over patents outside of the EPC Contracting States, such as in the US. What is clear, though, is that BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux has expanded the strategic options available to patentees in Europe, and so it is now even more important that questions of forum and territorial reach are considered in detail by all parties that are, or may become, engaged in infringement proceedings in Europe.
This article has been prepared by Chris King (European Patent Attorney; cking@jakemp.com), John Hornby (Partner, Solicitor; jhornby@jakemp.com) and Thomas Compton (European Patent Attorney, UPC Representative; tcompton@jakemp.com) of J A Kemp LLP. J A Kemp LLP has a large number of European Patent Attorneys and UPC Representatives, and is able to advise on both contentious and non-contentious European patent matters.
Postscript (April 2026)
Developments on long-arm jurisdiction from the UPC continue to arrive thick and fast, and since the above article was submitted for publication, there have been two notable orders.
Anchor defendants and the UK: Dyson v Dreame
In another episode of the dispute between Dyson and the Dreame Group (Dyson v Dreame, UPC_CFI_2255/2025, 7 April 2026), an application for a preliminary injunction was brought by Dyson against several defendants, including (continuing with terminology used above): the HK manufacturer; a Netherlands-based authorised representative (a different party to the authorised representative referred to earlier); and a UK-based operating company of Dreame. The authorised representative in this more-recent case also imported products into the EU. The UK-based operating company distributed products through the UK, including in Northern Ireland. The preliminary injunction application included Spain (a non-UPC EU/Lugano state) and the UK (a third state).
Jurisdiction over the HK manufacturer in respect of Spain was established on the basis that the authorised representative acts as an anchor defendant (Article 8(1) BR). Answers to the questions referred to the CJEU in the earlier Dyson v Dreame case were not required for the Hamburg Local Division to come to this conclusion, because here the authorised representative is an importer as well as being involved to fulfil regulatory obligations.
Next, the court considered jurisdiction over the UK-based operating company for the acts performed in the UK. An EU authorised representative is still required for non-EU manufacturers to sell products in Northern Ireland, even though Northern Ireland is not part of the EU. This is so that a hard border with the Republic of Ireland (which is part of the EU) can be avoided. The question, then, is whether the authorised representative (who served as the authorised representative for Northern Ireland) allows jurisdiction over the UK-based operating company to be established on the basis that the authorised representative serves as an anchor defendant (Article 8(1) BR).
The Hamburg LD held that the answer to this question was no: the relationship between the UK-based operating company and the authorised representative did not amount to the necessary “close relationship”. This was because the reasons for requiring the installation of an authorised representative for Northern Ireland are different to (and lesser than) the reasons for requiring the installation of an authorised representative within the EU itself. Also, the court held that it was not “foreseeable” that the very limited role of the authorised representative in Northern Ireland could make the UK-based operating company subject to the jurisdiction of the UPC as a co-defendant. This foreseeability test comes from established case law of the CJEU.
Stays of proceedings: Dainese v Alpinestars
Dainese v Alpinestars, UPC_CFI_472/2024, UPC_CFI_792/2024, UPC_CFI_831/2024, UPC_CFI_182/2025, 21 April 2026 relates to an infringement action brought at the Milan Local Division against three defendants, including two defendants domiciled in UPC Member States and a defendant domiciled in Spain (a non-UPC EU/Lugano state). The Spanish defendant was alleged to have sold infringing products in Spain, as well as in Portugal and Italy (UPC Member States). Jurisdiction over the Spanish defendant in relation to acts performed in Spain was dependent on establishing one of the defendants domiciled in a UPC Member State as an anchor defendant (Article 8(1) BR).
The defendant sought a stay of proceedings pending the decision of the CJEU in the Dyson v Dreame referral. This was considered by the court not to be well-founded grounds for a stay because the legal and factual situation in the case was considered to be different to that in the Dyson v Dreame referral, meaning that the court was able to rule positively on the “irreconcilable judgments” of Article 8(1) BR.
The Milan Local Division also considered pending EPO opposition-appeal proceedings not to be a well-founded reason for a stay of the UPC proceedings. This was because staying proceedings in view of pending EPO proceedings is discretionary, the EPO appeal decision is not expected until the end of 2026, and the patent was maintained (in amended form, with corresponding amendments being introduced by the patentee in the UPC proceedings) by the Opposition Division and so there was not a reasonable likelihood of the patent being declared invalid.
However, a stay of proceedings was granted for the Spanish part of the proceedings on the basis of pending invalidity proceedings at the Spanish national courts. The Milan Local Division held that they have jurisdiction over the Spanish part of the proceedings because the Milan Local Division was seized before the Spanish national courts, but that a stay was appropriate due to the Spanish courts’ exclusive jurisdiction over the validity of the Spanish part of the patent (Article 24(4) BR) – even after BSH Hausgeräte v Electrolux.
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