Keeping The Lights On Safely Without Overreach

The Sustainable Harnessing and Advancement of Nuclear Energy for Transforming India Act, 2025 (act) is an important step in supporting India’s nuclear energy ambitions and AI-enabled nuclear technologies. It provides administrative sanctions as well as criminal prosecution. However, extensive executive discretion and the reversal of evidentiary burdens raise worries about proportionality, procedural fairness and regulatory overreach.

The act gives the government and the Atomic Energy Regulatory Board wide regulatory powers. Section 24 allows the board to set standards of safety, inspection and enforcement.

The government retains overarching policy and emergency powers. Chapter V permits extensive inspection, search, seizure and suspension based on reasonable belief of non-compliance or a risk to safety. Objections to pre-enforcement actions are thus limited.

Nuclear enforcement powers and penalties

Enforcement applies to contraventions not posing immediate threats to public safety or the environment. Breaches are classified as severe, major, moderate or minor. Monetary penalties range from INR50,000 (USD550) to INR10 million. Section 70(5) requires adjudicating officers to consider gravity, safety implications, recurrence, financial benefit and remedies undertaken. Continuing violations are further penalised.

Section 83 authorises the government to increase penalties by laying notifications before parliament under section 86. There is no legislative debate and excessive executive discretion.

Section 71 links penal consequences to the danger posed to the public. The unauthorised operation of nuclear or radiation facilities, breach of licences or safety authorisations, safety infractions and non-compliance with compulsory insurance obligations under section 15 carry maximum sentences of five years’ imprisonment.

Balancing nuclear safety and investment

Obstructing regulatory authorities and statutory filing misrepresentation are punishable by imprisonment for up to three years. Maximum sentences of 10 years’ imprisonment apply to the unauthorised handling of nuclear material and unlawful disclosure of restricted information. Attempts, abetting and conspiracy are within the act.

The criminal culpability of organisations is contentious. Section 10 makes licensees, employers, occupiers and facility owners responsible for safety, security and safeguards. This reverses the burden of proof. Section 72 makes companies and individuals vicariously liable for offences and section 73 extends such liability to government departments. The provisions presume guilt unless the accused establishes they had no knowledge or exercised due diligence. This is worrying because of the long custodial sentences.

The statute has some procedural safeguards. Section 74 restricts bringing offences to court to complaints by authorised officers and section 75 requires senior police officers to approve investigations. Section 76 prescribes the offences that may be compounded on payment of appropriate sums. A court must consider the gravity of conduct and the mental state of the defendant. However, offences of insurance non-compliance, unpaid penalties, unauthorised handling of nuclear material, disclosure of restricted information and conduct posing serious safety risks may not be so compounded.

Balancing nuclear safety and investment

The provisions have drawn mixed responses. Government-owned entities accept stringent enforcement as necessary because of the risks involved. Private participants caution that expanded vicarious liability, reversed evidentiary burdens, severe punishments and discretionary enforcement may deter investment and innovation, particularly in section 9 AI-enabled nuclear technology.

Nuclear safety must be balanced against constitutional safeguards and commercial viability. The board should exercise its section 24 powers to introduce objective, risk-based technical standards and ensure statutory safe harbours. These will mitigate consequences for entities demonstrating robust compliance and promptly remedying infractions. Changes must be made to parliamentary approval of higher penalties; to when criminal and administrative sanctions apply, and to compounding for first-time non-wilful violations. Although the act is an effort to link deterrence to exceptional nuclear risks, its effect depends on principled implementation, institutional restraint and continued regulatory engagement.

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